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City governments across the United States are struggling to keep housing and services 
affordable for lower-income households as neighborhood conditions improve in previously 
disinvested areas. Despite considerable fiscal and political constraints, numerous cities are 
tackling this challenge through policy tools that protect the stock of low-cost housing and 
support lower-income residents’ ability to remain in place when reinvestment raises the threat of 
displacement. Drawing on a framework informed by theories of equity planning, the Just City, 
and redistributive policy action, this study examines how cities are mitigating displacement in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrification and analyzes the conditions that motivate, facilitate, and 
shape their policy responses. Data were collected through an original survey of housing, 
planning, and community development officials, a systematic review of policy documents, and 
semi-structured interviews with city officials and community advocates. Through sequential 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, I show that although city governments possess and are 
using diverse tools to create more equitable outcomes in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification, 
their tendency to delay action until market appreciation is advanced, dependence on market-
based tools amid fiscal constraint, and need to balance neighborhood-based and city-wide goals 
weaken their capacity to tackle displacement. This study concludes that proactive approaches 
that address reinvestment and long-term affordability concurrently would minimize the tensions 
associated with the timing, form, and scale of intervention. Cities’ demonstrated responsiveness 
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Introduction: The Dilemma of Equitable Neighborhood Change 
 
City governments across the United States (U.S.) are struggling to keep housing and 
services affordable for lower-income households as neighborhood conditions improve in 
previously disinvested areas. City officials have a strong incentive to promote reinvestment and 
redevelopment in these neighborhoods, because enhanced residential quality can benefit 
incumbent residents, reduce socioeconomic segregation, and raise critical property tax revenue. 
However, the associated increases in living costs and changes to neighborhood character have 
the potential to displace lower-income residents and jeopardize their chances of benefitting from 
neighborhood improvements. Reinvestment and redevelopment can thus precipitate 
gentrification, which refers to the socioeconomic transformation of previously disinvested 
neighborhoods due to an influx of more affluent households and higher-end development 
(Hwang & Lin, 2016; Levy, Comey, & Padilla, 2007; Schlichtman, Patch, & Lamont Hill, 2017; 
Smith & Williams, 1986; Wyly & Hammel, 1999). 
The tension between reinvestment, redevelopment, and displacement is not new. Post-
war federally-funded slum clearance and highway construction programs demolished housing in 
lower-income neighborhoods across the country, and replacement public housing units were 
often not accessible to displaced households (Biles, 2000; Vale, 2013). However, cities today are 
operating in a different context than that which characterized the immediate post-war decades. 
Since the 1970s, economic and political shifts at the global, national, and local levels, along with 
the private sector’s expanded role and interest in urban investment, have increased municipal 
governments’ incentives to facilitate upmarket private development in lower-cost central 
neighborhoods and reduced their capacity to prevent the displacement of incumbent residents (S. 
S. Fainstein, 2010; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Harvey, 1989; Hyra, 2012).   
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The market-oriented and devolved nature of contemporary urban development has 
created theoretical and practical questions about city governments’ capacity to promote equitable 
development within a system that gives them strong incentives to advance the interests of private 
investors and affluent households over those of lower-income residents. In the context of urban 
planning, equitable development refers to approaches that minimize the costs and increase the 
benefits of local development for disadvantaged households by strengthening their opportunities 
for economic stability and mobility, active participation in their community’s future, and 
residential choice – including the option to remain in place if they wish to do so (Blackwell, 
2000; DeFilippis, 2004; S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Krumholz, 2013b; 
Shaw, 2009).  
 
The Current Study 
 
This dissertation focuses on the final prong of the equitable development paradigm. 
Drawing on a framework informed by theories of equity planning, the Just City, and 
redistributive policy action, I examine how cities are mitigating direct and indirect displacement 
in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification and analyze the conditions that motivate, facilitate, and 
shape their policy responses. The study is organized around four sequential research questions: 
1) what are the political, economic, and knowledge environments within which displacement 
mitigation planning occurs in large U.S. cities? 2) how are these cities addressing displacement 
in neighborhoods that are at risk of gentrifying? 3) which conditions are associated with the 
strength of cities’ approaches to mitigating displacement and the type of action they take to 
address this challenge? and 4) how do local policy and planning actors explain the ways in which 
these conditions motivate, facilitate, and shape city governments’ policy approaches?  
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Despite a burgeoning literature on gentrification and displacement, very few empirical 
studies have assessed the actions that cities are taking in response to these phenomena, and this is 
the first to compare municipal policy action through a systematic, large-scale, and national 
investigation. I used an original survey of planning, housing, and community development 
officials and information from policy documents, ordinances, and program descriptions to create 
a dataset that assessed the status of 28 displacement mitigation tools in 80 of the most populous 
U.S. cities. I then merged the policy dataset with contextual information about each locality to 
enable a series of multivariate analyses of the conditions associated with cities’ commitments to 
displacement mitigation policy action. To supplement and expand on the quantitative findings, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with city officials and community advocates in a 
representative subset of study cities. 
In the tradition of equity planning and Just City theory, this study examines the actions 
that cities can take to advance the interests and opportunities of disadvantaged residents within 
the limitations of the current political and economic system. As this dissertation demonstrates, 
although such incremental actions do not push for a radical and rapid overhaul of existing 
structures of injustice, they have immediate benefits for households vulnerable to displacement, 
they can be built on to achieve more gradual systemic change, and they are often the only ones 
that city officials and community advocates consider feasible. I show that despite considerable 
fiscal and political constraints, cities are using diverse policy tools to enable lower-income 
households to access housing and meet their needs in neighborhoods that are vulnerable to 
gentrification. Their interventions are typically designed to achieve a more equitable distribution 
of the costs and benefits of urban development and to increase the power of disadvantaged 
households relative to for-profit actors.  
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However, I argue that three sets of tensions weaken cities’ contemporary approaches to 
displacement mitigation planning. The first concerns the timing of intervention. City 
governments typically do not approach reinvestment and displacement as challenges to be 
tackled concurrently, and they tend to delay action until a crisis of affordability or a threshold of 
market demand exists – by which time it is more costly to intervene. The second involves the 
form of intervention. In light of serious constraints on public subsidies, cities frequently rely on 
tools that leverage strong markets and require the partnership of for-profit actors to be viable. 
This creates a scenario where cities incentivize and harness for-profit actors’ investment in 
rapidly-appreciating neighborhoods (which can put increased pressure on existing low-income 
households) in order to address displacement in these areas. The final set of tensions concerns 
the spatial scale of intervention. Cities’ policy options to preserve affordability and diversity at 
the neighborhood level often conflict with their efforts to achieve the same goals on a broader 
municipal scale, which can lead to trade-offs in the design of displacement mitigation measures.  
This study concludes that advanced planning and early intervention could minimize these 
tensions. Intervening early could create more cost-effective preservation options, enable the use 
of tools that are less reliant on leveraging market demand, and reduce the conflict between 
investing in cost-increasing areas and other parts of the city. Although some cities are integrating 
these principles into their planning frameworks, my research shows that political will is generally 
lacking to act before the problem is advanced, particularly in the face of fiscal constraint, urgent 
competing priorities, and inadequate intergovernmental support. Nonetheless, the demonstrated 
responsiveness of the cities in this study to organized community pressure suggests one key 




Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This study is informed by three major themes in the literature on planning in the current 
era: 1) the shifts in urban governance, redevelopment strategies, and affordable housing policies 
that began in the 1970s, 2) state-supported gentrification and the multiple dimensions of 
displacement, and 3) city governments’ capacity for progressive or redistributive action through 
‘equity’ and ‘Just City’ planning. Chapter 1 situates this dissertation by outlining the current 
context of urban governance and development. It goes on to examine the evidence of the 
multiple dimensions of displacement from gentrifying areas, discuss the tools that cities can use 
to mitigate this outcome, and review the evidence that these interventions achieve their goals. 
Chapter 2 outlines the study’s theoretical foundations in the literature on equity planning, the 
Just City, and redistributive policy action, and addresses the scholarly debates about cities’ 
ability to create a more equitable system.  
This dissertation’s methodological approach is detailed in Chapter 3. The mixed-methods 
research design included a quantitative phase during which data were collected through a survey 
of city officials and a systematic review of policy documents, and a qualitative phase that 
consisted of semi-structured interviews with a representative subset of study cities. The survey 
responses and document review captured information about cities’ policy environments as well 
as the tools they have adopted and implemented to mitigate displacement. Chapter 4 examines 
the political and economic contexts in which contemporary displacement mitigation planning 
takes place and the types of knowledge that are integrated into this process. Chapter 5 provides a 
descriptive overview of the policy tools and forms of action that cities are using to address 
affordability and displacement, investigates how their frameworks vary according to local 
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conditions, and takes an in-depth look at three policy tools that illustrate the tensions of form and 
scale inherent in displacement mitigation planning.   
In Chapter 6, I use a series of multivariate Poisson and logistic regression models to 
analyze how cities’ conditions are related to three measures of their commitment to addressing 
displacement in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification: the intensity of their approach to 
mitigating displacement, their likelihood of having a tool that tackles direct displacement, and 
the type of action they take to address displacement. Chapter 7 then draws on semi-structured 
interviews with city officials and community advocates to put the quantitative results in context, 
investigate unexpected findings, and examine the channels through which these relationships 
operate. The dissertation ends with a summary of the study’s theoretical and methodological 
implications as well as recommendations for those involved in developing, implementing, and 




As noted above, gentrification involves the socioeconomic transformation of disinvested 
neighborhoods due to an influx of more affluent households and upmarket development. In this 
study, lower-income neighborhoods that are experiencing revitalization, reinvestment, or 
redevelopment are considered at risk of experiencing gentrification. For concision, I sometimes 
refer interchangeably to ‘neighborhoods at risk of gentrification/gentrifying,’ ‘gentrifying 
neighborhoods,’ ‘appreciating neighborhoods,’ or ‘neighborhoods with rising costs.’ These terms 
are all intended to signify neighborhoods in which, absent supportive policies, lower-income 
households may be at risk of direct or indirect displacement due to the housing cost increases, 
predatory landlord practices, and cultural and political shifts that often accompany an increase in 
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Chapter 1: The Political and Economic Context of Contemporary Urban Development 
 
City governments’ efforts to minimize displacement amid reinvestment are shaped by the 
market-oriented and devolved nature of urban governance in the U.S. Since the late 1970s, 
municipalities have operated in a context of political opposition to market intervention, large 
reductions in federal aid, heightened competition for more mobile capital, greater reliance on the 
private sector to pursue redevelopment, and limited federal support for place-based housing 
assistance, compared to the decades immediately following World War II (henceforth the ‘post-
war era’) (Dreier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2014; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Peterson, 
1995; Sassen, 2009; Wilson, 2008). This chapter details the impact of these shifts on urban 
governance strategies and discusses the links between redevelopment, gentrification, and 
displacement during this era. It concludes by examining the tools that city governments possess 
to address the multiple dimensions of displacement and reviewing the empirical evidence of their 
effectiveness. 
 
Urban Governance amid Political and Economic Change 
Political Opposition to Market Intervention  
 
The late 20th century witnessed the rise of a political ideology that denounced market 
intervention by government and extolled government retrenchment. This ideology is broadly 
referred to as ‘neoliberalism,’ which is ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade’ (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Although it was implemented differently across 
national and local contexts, the neoliberal program of privatization, deregulation, and welfare 
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state retrenchment generally departed from the post-war state commitment to industry regulation 
and social welfare expenditure (Dreier et al., 2014; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 2007; Jessop, 
2002). In the U.S., proponents of this ideology built popular support for its political agenda 
through corporation-backed think-tanks and media outlets whose ‘appeals to…individual 
freedoms…[and] cultural nationalism’ resonated with a segment of the electorate who felt 
aggrieved by redistributive programs that they perceived as benefiting special interest groups 
(Dreier et al., 2014; S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2007, pp. 50 & 60). As this philosophy 
became mainstream with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, it ushered in an era of 
entrepreneurial urban governance in which cities, to different degrees, prioritized market 
efficiency and budgetary discipline over social redistribution (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Hackworth, 
2007; Harvey, 1989; Theodore, Peck, & Brenner, 2011). The ‘de facto policy consensus’ around 
retrenchment and austerity at the federal, state, and local levels has continued to influence urban 
governance and ‘preemptively restrict’ cities’ policy options well into the 21st century (Peck, 
2012, pp. 628 & 631). 
 
Decreased Funding and Increased Fiscal Constraints 
 
This political climate also underpinned a shift away from urban programs at the federal 
level. The federal retreat from cities, which began in the 1970s and intensified thereafter, created 
an ongoing context of fiscal constraint and reliance on own-source revenue for municipalities 
(Dreier et al., 2014; Peck, 2012). In the 1980s, federal aid to cities decreased by 60% (Dreier et 
al., 2014, p. 153). The subsequent ending of welfare as an entitlement in the 1990s was 
particularly devastating for cities with large populations of poor households (Dreier et al., 2014; 
Peterson, 1995; Wilson, 2008). Over the past 25 years, federal aid to cities has constituted 5% of 
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overall municipal revenues, compared to a high of 15% in 1978, and state aid has decreased from 
23% to 18% of municipal budgets (Dreier et al., 2014; Pagano, 2013, p. 9). Cities’ share of own-
source revenue has risen correspondingly, from 60% in 1977 to 74% in 2013, but municipal 
governments are also restricted in their autonomy to raise money; for example, since 1978, 46 
states have introduced limits on cities’ tax-raising capacity (Dreier et al., 2014; Hoene & Pagano, 
2003; The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012; The Urban Institute & The Brookings Institution, 2015). 
During this period, cities’ ‘fiscal straightjacket’ was compounded by the redirection of some 
categorical funding for cities into block grants to states and the introduction of unfunded 
mandates (Dreier et al., 2014, p. 180; Eisinger, 1998; Hackworth, 2007).  
Funding cuts and fiscal constraints have continued in recent years. The budget of the 
HOME Investment Partnerships Program, which provides grants for the construction, 
rehabilitation, or purchase of housing for low-income households, was reduced by 50% between 
2010 and 2016 (National Association of Counties, 2017; National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, 2017; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2017b). During the same 
period, funding for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which provides 
local governments with flexible entitlement grants for affordable housing, community 
development, and service provision, was reduced by 25%; the real value of the program has 
declined by over 50% since 1995 (National Association of Counties, 2015; Theodos, Stacy, & 
Ho, 2017). The state budget cuts and loss of local tax revenue that followed the 2008 recession 
further limited cities’ fiscal capacity and pushed them to reduce services (Chernick, Langley, & 
Reschovsky, 2011; Davidson & Ward, 2014; Langley, 2015; Pagano, 2013; Peck, 2012, 2014; 
The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). The Government Accountability Office (2012, pp. 3 & 6) 
estimates that it will take 30 years for local property tax revenue to reach 2009 levels, and local 
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governments will have to decrease spending by nearly 13% annually until 2062 to avoid fiscal 
shortfalls.  
 
Increased Influence of Municipal Bond Agencies 
 
The increased importance of municipal bond rating agencies also constrains cities’ ability 
to promote equitable development. Although municipal bond markets in the U.S. can be traced to 
the early 19th century and rating agencies have evaluated municipal securities since the early 
20th century, the influence of these institutions has increased since the 1970s (Cantor & Packer, 
1994; Hackworth, 2007; Mitchell & Beckett, 2008; Sbragia, 1996; Sinclair, 2008). As federal 
assistance for urban service provision and development declined, municipalities borrowed more; 
meanwhile, following the default crises of New York City in 1975, Cleveland in 1978, and the 
Washington Public Power Supply System in 1984 (among others), investors heightened their 
standards for information on city borrowers (Hackworth, 2007; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Mitchell & 
Beckett, 2008; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012). The importance of municipal 
ratings also increased with the rise of direct lending that is not intermediated by banks and the 
increase in municipal debt ownership by institutional investors, such as pension and money 
market funds, which face limits on the amount of high-risk debt they can own (Hackworth, 2007; 
Mitchell & Beckett, 2008; Sinclair, 2008). Bond rating agencies base their assessments of 
municipal credit-worthiness on cities’ budgetary restraint, managerial efficiency, and economic 
prospects; consequently, when cities are forced or feel compelled to comply with rating agency 
priorities, they typically privatize services, reduce public spending, and promote economic 
growth over redistribution (Hackworth, 2007; Mitchell & Beckett, 2008; Peck, 2012; Sbragia, 





These changes in municipal finance were occurring as cities competed for increasingly 
mobile capital amid the globalization of production processes, financial deregulation, and the rise 
of FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) and high-tech industries (Fox & Treuhaft, 2006; 
Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 2009; Smith, 2002). As corporations extended their 
operations into international markets, their demand for centralized FIRE services in urban 
centers increased (Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 2009). To attract and accommodate these industries and 
their workers, city governments subsidized the private redevelopment of previously disinvested 
downtown neighborhoods into offices, higher-cost housing, and consumer-oriented spaces (S. S. 
Fainstein, 2010; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 2009). At the other end of the new 
service economy, individuals without a higher education were contending with a regime of 
flexible, contingent, and often exploitative low-wage jobs, which decreased income security at a 
time when shifts in urban demographics and global investment were revalorizing inner-city 
neighborhoods (DeFilippis, 2009; Eisinger, 1988; Harvey, 1989, 2007; Sassen, 2009; Tilly, 
2006; Wilson, 2008).  
 
Financialization of Urban Real Estate 
 
Changing real estate investment patterns shifted the dynamics of urban development 
during this era. As falling rates of profit in manufacturing drove up capital investment in real 
estate - a shift that was aided by the rising globalized financial services industry, novel trading 
technologies and financial instruments, and regulatory changes that reduced barriers to foreign 
investment – many U.S. cities experienced increased pressure on their housing markets 
(Fernandez, Hofman, & Aalbers, 2016; Fields & Uffer, 2014; Gotham, 2006; Krippner, 2005; 
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Weber, 2002, 2010). Meanwhile, economic growth, population gains, and falling crime rates in 
the 1990s and 2000s increased investors’ interest in central neighborhoods (Ellen & O’Regan, 
2008, 2010, Goetz, 2012a, 2012b; Sassen, 2009; Wyly & Hammel, 2004a). The expansion of 
prime and subprime lending pushed up housing prices and exacerbated sociospatial inequality, 
both overall and in inner-city locations (Aalbers, 2008; Hyra, 2012; Wyly, Atia, & Hammel, 
2004). The 2008 housing crisis not only reduced local governments’ tax revenues and devastated 
many low-income and predominantly minority communities, but also generated affordability 
pressures in the rental market, as households that were forced to exit or delay homeownership 
competed for a rental stock that did not keep pace with demand (Chernick et al., 2011; Crump, 
2013; Immergluck, 2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2010, 2011, 2017). 
 
The Rise of Speculative Public-Private Redevelopment  
 
The above-mentioned fiscal, economic, and governance patterns have led city governments 
to promote the redevelopment of previously low-income neighborhoods in ways that can produce 
gentrification in recent decades (Hackworth, 2002, 2007; Smith, 2002; Weber, 2010; Wyly & 
Hammel, 1999). Through direct subsidies, tax concessions, favorable loans, and zoning changes, 
local governments continue to attempt to draw private capital and upscale redevelopment to 
neighborhoods where low-income and minority residents were previously concentrated (S. S. 
Fainstein, 2010; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hyra, 2012; Newman, 2004; Newman & Ashton, 
2004; Weber, 2002).  This increased investment in central-city neighborhoods is reflected in 
changing demographics: whereas in 1970 only a quarter of large cities had at least one 
downtown census tract that was experiencing an increase in resident socioeconomic status, this 
percentage doubled by 2010 (Hwang & Lin, 2016).   
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City governments’ efforts to remake central neighborhoods to attract higher-income 
knowledge-based employers and workers came after decades of physical decline and poverty 
concentration in the urban core. In the post-war era, the federal government channeled 
investment away from cities through housing and transportation policies that subsidized the 
suburbanization of businesses and middle-class households, excluded urban neighborhoods from 
eligibility for mortgage lending using racially driven criteria, and concentrated public housing in 
inner-city areas (Dreier et al., 2014; Wilson, 2008). Although federal and municipal governments 
attempted to revitalize central cities through urban renewal programs between 1949 and 1975, 
the redevelopment process that has been unfolding since the late 1970s (and more intensely since 
the mid-1990s) is distinct from these efforts in both form and scale (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; 
Hyra, 2012). When post-war city governments allied with local business elites to pursue 
downtown redevelopment using federal slum clearance funds, the local state retained regulatory 
control over the process and a separation of roles was mandated between urban renewal 
authorities and private developers; in contrast, contemporary cities’ dependence on the private 
sector for financing has created public-private partnerships that target a wider range of issues and 
blur the lines between city and developer, as governments forge risk- and profit-sharing deals 
(Beauregard, 1998; Clarke & Gaile, 1992; N. I. Fainstein & Fainstein, 1985; S. S. Fainstein, 
2010; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Hyra, 2012; Sagalyn, 1990, 2007; Smith, 2002).  
With the decline of federal aid and locational advantages as drivers of urban investment, 
and within the new context of real estate finance and public-private partnerships, speculative 
redevelopment has become an important source of revenue for city governments (Clarke & 
Gaile, 1992; Davidson & Ward, 2014; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; M. V. Levine, 1989; 
Smith, 2002; Weber, 2010). This manifests in a heightened reliance on innovative financial 
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instruments to subsidize private development in previously disinvested neighborhoods. One such 
tool is Tax Increment Financing (TIF), which originated in the 1950s but became more 
commonly and intensively used from the 1970s onwards (Erickson, 2011; Weber & O’Neill-
Kohl, 2013). TIF allows governments to target distressed neighborhoods for redevelopment, sell 
the rights to future property tax revenue increases to investors, and use the funds obtained 
through this process to finance developers’ construction costs in the target area (Weber, 2002, 
2010). Although TIF funds can provide city governments with flexible revenue that has been 
used to finance affordable housing and neighborhood organizations (Erickson, 2011; J. A. Martin 
& Pentel, 2002), the tool’s success – and its impact on revenues - is vulnerable to project-specific 
complications and broader economic downturns (Davidson & Ward, 2014; Weber, 2010).  
 
Federal Retreat from Place-based Affordable Housing  
 
As the above-mentioned changes heightened demand for inner-city housing and increased 
municipal governments’ reliance on private investment, the federal government’s retreat from 
public housing curtailed city governments’ ability to preserve place-based affordability1 for low-
income households, particularly in neighborhoods targeted for reinvestment (Goetz, 2003, 
2012b; Vale, 2013). The federal retreat from place-based subsidized housing was three-pronged. 
It involved the rise of tenant-based assistance, a shift from government-owned to privately-
owned projects, and the mixed-income redevelopment of public housing.  
                                                 
1 Place-based affordability policies maintain the affordability of a unit over time, thus enabling 
beneficiary households to remain ‘in place’ as the neighborhood changes and preserving the unit’s 
affordability when the incumbent household leaves. They are distinct from tenant-based subsidies, which 




Shift to tenant-based assistance: Since the 1980s, the dominant federal approach to 
housing assistance has been the Housing Choice Voucher program, which gives low-income 
households subsidies to rent privately-owned units. The program aims to promote residential 
mobility and reduce poverty concentration (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2001), but it is a weak tool for preserving place-based affordability in appreciating 
neighborhoods. The voucher subsidizes the difference between 30% of a household’s income 
and the 40th percentile of rents in the metro area; although tenants can rent a more expensive unit 
and make up the difference out of pocket, they are prohibited from spending more than 40% of 
their income on rent (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).2 When rents 
in a neighborhood rise beyond voucher holders’ ability to pay, it therefore becomes more 
lucrative for landlords to lease to market-rate tenants (Ellen & Torrats-Espinosa, 2016; Freeman, 
2006). Moreover, subsidies that are used on the private market leave recipients vulnerable to 
discrimination from landlords who may be reluctant to rent to assisted or minority households, 
particularly in appreciating areas (Krumholz, 2013a; Marcus & Zuk, 2017; M. A. Turner, 2013).  
Shift to privately-owned projects: Amid the move away from government-owned 
housing, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was introduced in 1986 to stimulate 
private production of low-income housing by providing tax credits to investors through state and 
local agencies (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2016). However, LIHTC 
is ill-suited to address long-term affordability in neighborhoods at risk of gentrifying due to its 
limited-term affordability covenants (typically 30 years or less) and inducements to build in 
high-poverty areas (Freeman, 2006; Williamson, Smith, & Strambi-Kramer, 2009). Developers 
                                                 
2 The Obama-era ‘Small Area Fair Market Rents’ program, which would have increased voucher 




may also have an incentive to build in areas that are poised to gentrify, to reap the benefits of 
higher market rates once affordability covenants expire (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009).  
Mixed-income redevelopment: The third facet of the shift in federal housing policy 
involved the redevelopment of public housing through the HOPE VI program. HOPE VI was 
introduced in 1992 to address the physical distress and concentrated poverty that characterized 
many public housing projects at the end of the 20th century (Schwartz, 2006; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2017a). By using federal funds to leverage private investment 
for the transformation of public housing into lower-density, mixed-income, privately-managed 
developments, the program aimed to improve residential quality for public housing residents, 
revitalize surrounding neighborhoods, and reduce poverty concentration (Goetz, 2011; Popkin et 
al., 2004; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2017a; Vale, 2013).3 Although 
HOPE VI did improve living conditions in many redeveloped areas, rates of return by original 
residents were low due to the reduction in on-site subsidized units, rigorous eligibility and 
screening processes, and long periods between relocation and reconstruction (Goetz, 2011; 
Marquis & Ghosh, 2008; Popkin et al., 2004; Popkin, Levy, & Buron, 2009; Schwartz, 2006; 
Vale, 2013). The removal of federal regulations mandating the replacement of each demolished 
public housing unit led to a net loss of permanently subsidized units for very low-income 
households (Hackworth, 2007; Popkin et al., 2004; Schwartz, 2006; Vale, 2013).  
Due to its focus on attracting private investment to previously disinvested inner-city 
neighborhoods, displacement of incumbent very low-income residents, reconstruction of the built 
environment for more affluent households, and racial and income turnover effects at the 
                                                 
3Also introduced in the 1990s, the Federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative 
took a similar approach to urban revitalization. A combination of block grants, tax breaks, and regulatory 
concessions were aimed at stimulating private investment and improving economic health in distressed 
inner-city neighborhoods (Hyra, 2012; Rich & Stoker, 2014).  
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neighborhood level, HOPE VI is often referred to as an example of a redevelopment strategy that 
can produce ‘state-supported’ gentrification (J. C. Fraser, Burns, Bazuin, & Oakley, 2012; Goetz, 
2010, p. 1581; Hackworth, 2007; Lees, 2008). While there is substance to this claim,4 
implementation of HOPE VI varied widely across cities with differing local conditions. In 
Seattle, a history of social-democratic politics, low levels of public housing segregation, and the 
locational appeal of existing developments influenced the adoption of a local one-for-one 
replacement requirement (Hackworth, 2007). Seattle’s approach of widespread redevelopment 
with local regulation contrasts with New York City’s very limited participation in HOPE VI, 
which was influenced by local activism against the program, and Chicago’s decision, shaped by 
the Housing Authority’s mismanagement and tenants’ political isolation, to demolish most of its 
public housing and replace only a fraction of the units (Goetz, 2011; Hackworth, 2007).5  
 
Localized Impacts and Responses  
 
As the divergence in HOPE VI implementation suggests, the political and economic 
pressures described in this section manifested differently in cities with diverse institutions, policy 
and regulatory landscapes, economic bases, and political dynamics (Dreier et al., 2014; 
Hackworth, 2007; Peck, 2012; Theodore et al., 2011). For example, the globalization of 
manufacturing production had an especially devastating impact on cities like Baltimore and 
                                                 
4This assessment is supported by evidence that between 1990 and 2000, significantly higher volumes of 
public housing were sold or demolished in large cities that had higher gaps between public housing and 
market rents (Goetz, 2010). 
 
5Introduced in 2009 as a successor to HOPE VI, the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative similarly provides 
grants for city governments to revitalize neighborhoods with distressed subsidized housing by leveraging 
private investment for mixed-income redevelopment, although it includes stricter requirements for the 
replacement of demolished units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013; U.S. 




Detroit, where large-scale post-war in-migration of minority households and out-migration of 
white households had produced high poverty rates and low tax revenues, compared to cities like 
New York and San Francisco, where the fiscal impact of deindustrialization was tempered by the 
compensatory growth of the high-end services and technology sectors, as well as the relatively 
lower losses of population (Dreier et al., 2014). The impact was blunter still in younger cities 
like San Jose and Phoenix, with more diversified economies (Dreier et al., 2014). Across local 
contexts, however, overarching fiscal and economic constraints introduced common pressures in 
the realms of redevelopment and place-based affordability that increased cities’ efforts to attract 
private investment and higher-income households to disinvested neighborhoods. 
 
Consequences of Socioeconomic Diversification in Previously Disinvested Neighborhoods  
Expected and Observed Outcomes of Mixed-Income Neighborhoods 
 
Governments’ efforts to draw affluent households to disinvested areas are based on 
several theorized benefits. These include the expectation that exposure to middle-class 
households will improve low-income individuals’ self-sufficiency and employment outcomes; 
that newcomers’ economic and political capital will improve neighborhood amenities; and that 
the associated increases in property values and retail activity will enhance the tax base (Betancur, 
2010; Chaskin & Joseph, 2013; J. C. Fraser & Kick, 2007; Joseph, Chaskin, & Webber, 2007; 
Lees, 2008; Porter, 2009; Quercia & Galster, 1997; Rose et al., 2013; Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 
1997).  
The evidence that exposure to higher-income households improves lower-income 
households’ socioeconomic outcomes is mixed, with results often varying based on research 
subjects’ age, gender, and length of tenure in a neighborhood (Anil, Sjoquist, & Wallace, 2010; 
Boston, 2005; Chaskin & Joseph, 2011; Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016; Clampet‐Lundquist & 
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Massey, 2008; Ellen & Turner, 1997; Graves, 2011; Levy, McDade, & Bertumen, 2013; Ludwig 
et al., 2012; Popkin et al., 2009). Long-term evaluations of HOPE VI projects did not identify 
improvements in the economic outcomes of affected public housing residents (Popkin, 2010; 
Popkin et al., 2009). The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment found that former public 
housing residents who used vouchers to move to low-poverty areas were more likely to have 
social ties with more affluent households, but did not have significantly different employment or 
earnings outcomes than a control group (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). Children in the MTO 
experimental group who moved to low-poverty areas before the age of 13 had higher educational 
attainment and income as adults compared to the control group, but this was not the case for 
those who moved between the ages of 13 and 18 (Chetty et al., 2016).  
Evidence of higher-income households’ impact on amenities in previously disinvested 
areas is also mixed. Although some higher-income in-movers use their clout to protect the 
incumbent community (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Tissot, 2014), others advance their own social 
and economic interests, which are not always compatible with those of longstanding residents 
(Butler, Hamnett, & Ramsden, 2013; Chaskin, 2013; Hyra, 2014; Lipman, 2011). The case of 
education illustrates these tensions. Gentrification has not been found to improve the outcomes 
of nearby schools (Keels, Burdick-Will, & Keene, 2013), and affluent in-movers often use their 
knowledge of the system to secure their child’s entry to institutions outside of the neighborhood 
(Butler et al., 2013; DeSena & Ansalone, 2009). When higher-income households choose to send 
their children to public schools in gentrifying areas, their greater economic capacity to do so (for 
example, by purchasing property in the school’s immediate vicinity) can displace lower-income 
children from well-performing institutions (Butler et al., 2013). Additionally, the retail amenities 
that accompany an influx of affluent households are often unaffordable to incumbent residents 
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and incompatible with their tastes (Deener, 2007; Freeman, 2006; Hyra, 2014; Zukin et al., 
2009). Long-time residents may thus benefit from the regularization of services but suffer the 
loss of longstanding establishments and cultural amenities (Betancur, 2010; Freeman, 2006; 
Parekh, 2015).  
There is clearer evidence to support the benefits of mixed-income redevelopment for city 
budgets. Reduced concentrations of poverty are associated with lower fiscal outlays for cities, 
and redevelopment projects have been found to increase property values – although these fiscal 
benefits depend on certain thresholds of in-movers and upgrading activity as well as the type of 
redevelopment undertaken (L. N. Brown, 2009; DeGiovanni, 1984; Ellen, Schill, Schwartz, & 
Voicu, 2003; Immergluck, 2009; Pack, 1998; Quercia & Galster, 1997; Weber, Bhatta, & 
Merriman, 2007). For example, some HOPE VI redevelopment projects have been associated 
with increased neighborhood investment and property values, decreased crime rates, and 
increased tax revenues (Bair & Fitzgerald, 2005; Castells, 2010; Cloud & Roll, 2011; 
Zielenbach, Voith, & Mariano, 2010). Factors such as original site conditions, locational 
desirability, and tenure mix influence the aggregate economic improvements associated with 
these projects (Castells, 2010; Zielenbach et al., 2010). 
 
Evidence of Displacement from Gentrifying Neighborhoods 
 
Despite the uneven evidence of household- and city-level benefits from mixed-income 
development, city governments continue to promote private investment in low-income 
neighborhoods in the hopes of solving a host of social and economic problems by shifting the 
socioeconomic mix (Betancur, 2010; Chaskin & Joseph, 2013; J. C. Fraser & Kick, 2007; Lees, 
2008; Porter, 2009). When the associated increases in housing costs outpace existing residents’ 
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earnings, reinvestment raises the threat of displacement and jeopardizes incumbent households’ 
chances of benefitting from improvements to their neighborhoods.  
The extent of involuntary displacement from gentrifying neighborhoods is unclear. 
Quantitative studies have found little causal evidence of elevated mobility from these areas 
among low-income households (Ding, Hwang, & Divringi, 2016; Ellen & O’Regan, 2011; 
Freeman, 2005, 2006; Freeman & Braconi, 2004; Freeman, Cassola, & Cai, 2015; K. O. Lee, 
2014; McKinnish, Walsh, & White, 2010; Vigdor, 2002). However, as discussed below, the 
manifold costs of gentrification for low-income and minority households, small businesses, and 
service providers are well-documented. These costs include direct physical displacement, which 
occurs due to landlord harassment or building sale, conversion, or demolition; direct economic 
displacement, which occurs when incumbent households cannot afford increases in housing 
costs; exclusionary displacement, which occurs when the loss of low-cost housing prevents 
lower-income households from moving into a neighborhood that was previously affordable to 
them; and displacement pressure, which occurs when households that remain in a neighborhood 
feel alienated by political, cultural, and commercial changes (Marcuse, 1986). This section 
briefly reviews the evidence of each of these types of displacement. 
Direct physical and economic displacement: Finding evidence of direct displacement 
from gentrifying neighborhoods is complicated, because the subjects no longer live in these 
areas. Nonetheless, some studies have captured this phenomenon. In a study of New York City, 
interviews with residents and community organizations revealed that households in gentrifying 
neighborhoods were being displaced from their long-time homes by prohibitive rent increases, 
and that landlords were harassing, overcharging, and withholding services from rent-regulated 
tenants (Newman & Wyly, 2006; Wyly, Newman, Schafran, & Lee, 2010). Those who were not 
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directly displaced were often forced to accept substandard housing conditions and/or high rent 
burdens – compromises that can become unsustainable (Newman & Wyly, 2006). Following the 
physical, demographic, and cultural changes that accompanied state-supported redevelopment in 
New York City’s Greenpoint-Williamsburg neighborhoods, incumbent Polish residents also 
experienced economic displacement, landlord harassment, and burdens due to rising costs 
(Stabrowski, 2014). A study of residents of buildings sold in predatory equity6 deals in New 
York City similarly documented widespread tenant harassment by landlords through the 
withholding of services and repairs and overcharging of rents (Stabilizing NYC & Urban Justice 
Center, 2017). A survey of households assisted by a legal aid organization in San Mateo County 
found that amid increased demand by higher-income households, lower-income residents 
experienced direct displacement due to cost increases, landlord harassment, and building sales or 
upgrading (Marcus & Zuk, 2017). And in a quantitative study of Toronto neighborhoods, Chum 
(2015) found that the early stages of gentrification were associated with significantly elevated 
eviction rates. 
Direct displacement can have pronounced impacts on individuals’ lives (Fullilove & 
Wallace, 2011). Newman and Wyly’s (2006) interviewees noted that displacees often doubled up 
with other households, entered homeless shelters, or left the city. A subsequent study found that 
poor renters who were displaced from their units moved to less central neighborhoods and spent 
more of their income on rent (Wyly et al., 2010). In San Mateo County, displaced residents ‘were 
forced to make difficult and precarious trade-offs when searching for housing,’ including moving 
to distant neighborhoods with fewer job opportunities, accepting inadequate housing conditions, 
                                                 
6Predatory equity buildings are rent stabilized projects that are purchased at a higher price than existing 
rents indicate they are worth, are in substandard condition, experience high levels of tenant harassment 
and turnover, and lose their status as affordable housing as units exit rent stabilization and landlords 
charge extra fees (Stabilizing NYC & Urban Justice Center, 2017).   
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leaving the city, or becoming homeless (Marcus & Zuk, 2017, p. 2). Although less advantaged 
residents of Philadelphia’s gentrifying neighborhoods were not significantly more likely to move 
than their peers in non-gentrifying areas, those that did leave were more likely to relocate to a 
neighborhood with a lower median income than their original location (Ding & Hwang, 2016).  
Displacement pressure: Displacement is not always a matter of moving involuntarily due 
to increased costs or harassment. In Freeman’s (2006) study of New York City’s Harlem and 
Clinton Hill, African American residents cited the displacement of community-oriented 
businesses, disruption of long-held practices, and increased police presence among the negative 
outcomes of gentrification. Similar concerns were voiced by African American residents of New 
Orleans’ Tremé neighborhood, where gentrification has displaced long-time practices and 
increased police surveillance due to newcomers’ discomfort with and complaints about 
communal traditions in the area (Parekh, 2015). As Washington D.C.’s Shaw/U Street area 
gentrified, the socioeconomic and racial shifts manifested in the political and cultural 
displacement of the area’s African American residents (Hyra, 2014). Similar divisions emerged 
in Chicago between gentrifying in-movers and incumbent residents of Latino origin (Betancur, 
2010). Among remaining Polish residents of Greenpoint-Williamsburg, ‘their experiences of 
place- their ability, freedom, and security to inhabit- have been radically diminished’ by 
neighborhood change (Stabrowski, 2014, p. 796). 
Changes to neighborhood culture are often mirrored in shifting commercial offerings. 
When Harlem and Williamsburg began attracting more affluent residents in the late 20th century, 
the share of ‘local’ retail businesses declined significantly, while chain stores and boutiques that 
targeted in-movers increased in prevalence (Zukin et al., 2009, p. 58). Such changes affect 
customers as well as proprietors. Long-time African American residents of Portland, Oregon’s 
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Alberta District felt that the businesses that emerged as the neighborhood gentrified neither met 
their needs nor welcomed their community, in contrast to the establishments that these 
businesses replaced (Monroe Sullivan & Shaw, 2011). Low-income residents of Los Angeles’ 
Venice Beach felt similarly economically and culturally excluded by the area’s changed 
commercial character and ‘neighborhood brand’ (Deener, 2007, p. 294). The loss of service 
providers can also decrease the supports available to low-income households in gentrifying 
neighborhoods (De Verteuil, 2010). 
Exclusionary displacement: There is ample evidence that the loss of low-cost units in 
gentrifying areas excludes low-income households from neighborhoods previously accessible to 
them. Existing studies document the decline of affordable units associated with gentrification 
and redevelopment (Kamel, 2012), depict parents who remain in gentrifying areas while their 
adult children are priced out (Davidson, 2008; Freeman, 2006), report incidences of residents 
displaced by fires or other events who are unable to find affordable replacements in their old 
neighborhoods (Twigge-Molecey, 2014), and describe ‘middle-income buyers out-competing 
lower-income groups in both the home owner and rental sectors in…cheaper housing markets’ 
(Keddie & Tonkiss, 2010, p. 66). In addition, Freeman (2005) found that renters who moved out 
of units in gentrifying neighborhoods were significantly less likely to remain in the area than 
comparable renters in non-gentrifying neighborhoods. Individuals who were white and those of 
higher socioeconomic status were significantly more likely to move into gentrifying than non-
gentrifying neighborhoods, while those who were African American and those of lower 




Policy Tools that Preserve Affordability and Mitigate Displacement 
The evidence that displacement occurs and is harmful to lower-income households, 
combined with data on the negative effects of residential segregation (Dreier et al., 2014; Li, 
Campbell, & Fernandez, 2013; Sampson, 2012) and findings that residents of low-income areas 
can benefit from the reinvestment process (Dastrup & Ellen, 2016; Ding & Hwang, 2016; 
Freeman, 2006; Hartley, 2013), indicates that cities need tools that can protect incumbent 
residents when conditions improve in their neighborhoods. This study defines displacement 
mitigation policy tools as interventions that protect the ability of lower-income households to 
access housing, and meet their cultural, commercial, and social needs, in neighborhoods where 
reinvestment or redevelopment raises the threat of displacement. In this section, I review the 
literature on the tools available to achieve these goals and examine the evidence of their 
effectiveness.7 
 
Policy Tools to Mitigate Displacement from Neighborhoods at Risk of Gentrification 
City governments play a significant role in determining the policy protections available to 
low-income households through their control over public funding, land assemblage, zoning, 
taxation, and permitting (Freeman & Schuetz, 2017; Kraus, 2013). The academic, policy, and 
                                                 
7 This section’s review of policy tools draws on the following sources: (596 Acres/New York City 
Community Land Initiative., 2016; Abello, 2017a; Affordable Housing Advocates & Greater Cincinnati 
Homeless Coalition, 2015; Association for Neighborhood & Housing Development, 2015; Barnett, 2016; 
Beyond Housing, 2012; Blackwell, 2000; Carpenter & Lees, 1995; Causa Justa/Just Cause, 2014; 
Coalition for Community Advancement, 2015; Cohen & Marti, 2009; Davis, 2006; De Verteuil, 2010; 
DeFilippis, 2004; Dreier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2014; Dulchin, Gates, & Williams, 2013; S. S. 
Fainstein, 2010; Freeman, 2006; Freeman & Schuetz, 2017; Gates, 2015; Greater Cincinnati Homeless 
Coalition, 2012; Herrine, Yager, & Mian, 2016; Homes for Working Families and the Center for Housing 
Policy, 2006; Keddie & Tonkiss, 2010; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016; Levy, 
Comey, & Padilla, 2006, 2007; Ley & Dobson, 2008; Lubell, 2016; Manhattan Community Board 11, 
2016; Marcuse, 2011; Newman & Wyly, 2006; Right to the City Alliance, 2010; Schuetz, Meltzer, & 
Been, 2009; Shaw, 2005; Shaw & Hagemans, 2015; Sutton, 2010; Zuk & Chapple, 2015; Zupan, 2011).  
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advocacy literatures identify several tools that cities possess to mitigate displacement. These fall 
into four categories: affordable housing preservation, affordable housing development, 
commercial/service preservation, and inclusive economic development.  
Affordable housing preservation: ‘Affordable housing’ refers to units that are priced at 
below-market rates, restricted in the rents they can charge, and/or targeted at households below 
certain income limits. Tools in this category protect affordability and security of tenure for low-
income households by preventing illegal evictions, shielding residents from sharp increases in 
housing costs, and stemming the loss of low-cost units. Specific policy tools include investing in 
the continued physical and financial viability of subsidized housing; regulating rent increases; 
barring rental units from being leased on the short-term market; establishing just cause eviction 
laws; providing legal assistance to tenants facing harassment and eviction; establishing 
affordability covenants on low-cost market-rate units; providing property tax breaks for long-
time homeowners; establishing a right of first refusal when rental buildings are offered for sale; 
converting market-rate, regulated, or subsidized housing to decommodified housing; and 
requiring one-for-one replacement of below-market-rate units. 
Affordable housing development: Tools in this category increase the availability of 
affordable units in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification through funding, loans, incentives, or 
requirements. One such tool is inclusionary zoning, through which governments mandate or 
encourage the construction of below-market-rate units when developers build new market-rate 
housing. Other tools for increasing a neighborhood’s affordable housing stock include 
transforming vacant city-owned property or land, or privately-owned buildings in physical or 
financial distress, to non-profit or decommodified housing, such as Community Land Trusts 
(CLTs). Measures to increase the funding available for affordable housing development include 
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housing trust funds8 and taxing districts (such as TIF districts) that direct a proportion of tax 
revenue realized by rising property values into the creation of affordable housing in the 
appreciating neighborhood. 
Commercial/service preservation: Policy tools in this category address displacement 
pressure by preserving the viability of incumbent services and businesses in areas at risk of 
gentrification. Tools that can combat this type of displacement include regulating commercial 
rent increases; providing financial assistance to local or culturally significant businesses (or to 
landlords who continue their tenancy at affordable rates); restricting the space leased to chain 
retailers in specific areas; and setting aside below-market-rate commercial units in new 
developments for incumbent, local, and/or minority-owned businesses.    
Inclusive economic development: Inclusive economic development interventions aim to 
redistribute the costs and benefits of neighborhood change by ensuring that incumbent residents 
have opportunities to benefit economically from new development. The most commonly-cited 
programs in this category require or incentivize the reservation of a percentage of construction 
and retail jobs generated through redevelopment for residents of the affected neighborhood, or 
provide training and education to local residents so that they are eligible for such jobs.  
 Additional policy tools and cross-cutting concerns: The literature identified several tools 
that can mitigate gentrification but do not directly correspond to the categories above, such as 
anti-speculation taxes, vacant property registries, and anti-warehousing laws. Several cross-
cutting concerns about displacement mitigation planning also emerged. These included the 
length of time that new units are required to remain affordable, whether affordable units 
                                                 
8While housing trust funds do not typically target specific neighborhoods, their dedicated nature can 
facilitate long-term planning for the construction of affordable housing in appreciating neighborhoods 
before this action becomes prohibitively expensive, and their flexibility means they can be tailored to the 
specific problems created by gentrification (Levy et al., 2006). 
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developed through incentives or requirements are mandated to be built on-site, whether residents 
of neighborhoods in which development occurs receive priority for new affordable units, and 
whether the income levels targeted for new units reflect the neighborhood’s income distribution. 
 
Empirical Evidence that Policy Tools Mitigate Displacement 
Although many sources identify the tools that cities can use to mitigate displacement, 
evaluations of these tools’ effectiveness are rare. This section assesses the existing evidence 
regarding the above-listed tools’ record in addressing physical, economic, and exclusionary 
displacement, displacement pressure, and overall affordability, particularly in neighborhoods at 
risk of gentrification. These interventions can affect numerous other aspects of the housing 
market. While this review focuses on affordability and displacement, it acknowledges cases 
where trade-offs in outcomes may occur. It also details programmatic features that can impact 
programs’ efficacy. Because few peer-reviewed evaluations exist, this section also draws on 
media stories and reports from non-profit and government organizations.  
Rent regulation: Rent regulation, control, or stabilization programs aim to mitigate 
economic displacement by limiting the permitted increases in rents for qualifying units. 
Exceptions to rent limits are often allowed when vacancies occur, improvements are made, or the 
rent reaches a specified level (Arnott, 1995; Crispell, 2016a; Ellen & O’Flaherty, 2013; Goetz, 
1995). Such policies may also address physical displacement through tenure security rights, 
including restrictions on the reasons for tenant eviction (Arnott, 1995; Crispell, 2016a).  
Critics argue that rent regulation encourages the conversion of rental units to other uses 
and decreases investors’ incentives to construct and maintain rental units, but the empirical 
evidence of these outcomes is mixed (Arnott, 1995; Goetz, 1995; Jenkins, 2009; Mora-
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Sanguinetti, 2011; Sims, 2007; B. Turner, Malpezzi, & Persson, 2003). There is, however, 
consistent evidence that rent regulation increases housing stability and affordability for tenants, 
both overall and in appreciating neighborhoods. In New York City, rent regulated tenants had 
longer tenancies and lower rent burdens than their counterparts in unregulated housing (B. 
Turner et al., 2003; Van Ryzin & Kamber, 2002). Neighborhoods in California with rent control 
programs that limited the rent that could be charged on vacancy9 had significantly lower median 
rents (and lower rent increases) over a ten-year period than comparable block groups without 
regulations; regulated neighborhoods also had significantly lower tenant turnover and greater 
ethnic diversity (Heskin, Levine, & Garrett, 2000). The average length of residence in rental 
units increased significantly in Santa Monica following the introduction of rent control in 1979, 
and the city’s rent increases were considerably lower than the surrounding area, with low-income 
households experiencing the greatest savings (N. Levine, Grigsby, & Heskin, 1990).  Housing 
advocates in Los Angeles also credit that city’s Rent Stabilization Ordinance with protecting 
affordability throughout the city (Levy et al., 2007). 
 Freeman and Braconi (2004) found that residence in a rent stabilized unit significantly 
decreased the odds of moving among non-college-educated households in New York City, but 
not among poor households and not specifically in gentrifying neighborhoods. However, a 
subsequent qualitative study by Freeman (2006) identified rent regulation as a critical 
mechanism enabling residents to remain in place when their neighborhoods gentrified. 
Interviewees in another study of New York City similarly ‘identified the city’s rent regulations 
as the single most important form of public intervention’ enabling households to remain in 
gentrifying neighborhoods (Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 47; Wyly et al., 2010). Rent stabilization 
                                                 




has also been credited with stemming the loss of low-income households from several 
neighborhoods that are vulnerable to gentrification in the Bay Area (Crispell, 2016b; Zuk & 
Chapple, 2016). However, informants in New York City and the Bay Area also cited loopholes 
and illegal practices that were rapidly reducing the regulated stock, including landlords charging 
higher rents than permitted, harassing tenants, and ceasing to provide services (Cohen & Marti, 
2009; Freeman, 2006; Goetz, 1995; Levy et al., 2007; Newman & Wyly, 2006; Wyly et al., 
2010).   
 Anti-eviction and harassment ordinances: Anti-eviction ordinances limit the legal 
reasons for which residents can be evicted, and anti-harassment laws protect tenants from 
landlord actions intended to force them out. Both tools target physical displacement. Although 
evaluations of these policies are scarce, just cause eviction and other tenant rights have been 
credited with protecting the low-income population in East Palo Alto and other gentrifying 
districts of the Bay Area from displacement (Causa Justa/Just Cause, 2014; Crispell, Rockefeller 
Harris, & Cespedes, 2016). The absence of such protections has also been identified as a factor 
reducing the ability of rent control to prevent displacement in the Bay Area (Crispell, 2016a).  
 Legal aid for tenants: Cities can also address physical displacement by providing tenants 
with legal aid when eviction or harassment cases go to court. Landlords are much more likely to 
have legal representation than tenants, and low-income tenants are the least likely to have 
counsel (Boston Bar Association Task Force on the Civil Right to Counsel, 2012, New York 
City Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services, 2016; Seron, Frankel, 
Van Ryzin, & Kovath, 2001; Steinberg, 2011). A randomized experiment in New York City 
found that low-income tenants who received representation in housing court were significantly 
and substantially less likely to receive eviction orders, and more likely to win actions against 
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their landlords, than their counterparts without counsel (Seron et al., 2001). An experimental 
study in Massachusetts showed similar benefits: tenants with representation were twice as likely 
to resist eviction, and received five times the monetary payment, compared to those without 
(Boston Bar Association Task Force on the Civil Right to Counsel, 2012; Greiner, Pattanayak, & 
Hennessy, 2013). In an observational study in San Mateo, tenants with full representation were 
more likely to receive judgments that allowed them to remain in their homes, or resulted in the 
landlord rebating money, than those receiving no assistance or limited advice (Steinberg, 2011).  
 Condo conversion controls, no net loss policies, and right of first refusal: Condo 
conversion controls and no net loss policies aim to prevent the loss of rental housing due to 
demolition or conversion to other uses. They target physical, exclusionary, and economic 
displacement. Right of first refusal policies primarily address economic and physical 
displacement by giving existing tenants the first right to purchase a unit or a building that is 
being offered for sale (Gallaher, 2016; Gorska & Crispell, 2016).  
 A survey of policymakers, community advocates, and other stakeholders in the Bay Area 
found that respondents considered condo conversion controls an effective tool for preserving the 
stock of rental units, although some informants indicated that developers evaded these controls 
through buy-outs10 and other loopholes (Cespedes, Crispell, Blackston, Plowman, & Graves, 
2015; Gorska & Crispell, 2016). In San Francisco’s Chinatown, zoning regulations that restricted 
the demolition of low-cost housing and the conversion of single room occupancy units have been 
identified as a major reason the neighborhood resisted gentrification-induced displacement and 
preserved its low-cost housing stock (Crispell & Montojo, 2016).  
                                                 




Right of first refusal laws are also effective in combatting direct displacement. A study of 
Washington D.C.’s Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA), which gives tenants whose 
buildings are offered for sale the right to form an association to purchase the building at a 
favorable price,11 found that across seven buildings that entered the process, roughly half of 
tenants remained in their units (Gallaher, 2016). The author noted, ‘the goal of landlords selling 
their properties and the developers buying them is 100 percent displacement. In this context, 
even the lowest figures in the sample data set are meaningful’ (Gallaher, 2016, p. 123). However, 
units that were not retained by tenants, and those that were sold by tenant-purchasers, reverted to 
market prices (Gallaher, 2016). Regulatory weaknesses have also allowed some property owners 
to evade TOPA’s provisions (Comeau, 2010; Gallaher, 2016; Lloyd, 2015). Despite these 
limitations, the Act has enabled residents of several gentrifying areas to remain in place and help 
shape the future of their communities (Howell, 2013, 2016a; Huron, 2012; Lloyd, 2015).  
Inclusionary zoning: Inclusionary zoning requires or incentivizes the inclusion of below-
market-rate rental or ownership units in new private developments. Both voluntary and 
mandatory programs typically offer incentives such as density bonuses, height waivers, or zoning 
changes to offset the cost of these units. For city governments, inclusionary zoning is an 
attractive way to produce affordable housing without direct public subsidy (Freeman & Schuetz, 
2017; Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, 2009). Developers are often given the option to build affordable 
units in a different location than the market-rate construction or to contribute a fee in lieu of 
construction (Schuetz et al., 2009; Thaden & Wang, 2017). When inclusionary units are built on-
site and preserve long-term affordability, they can address exclusionary displacement by 
ensuring that low-cost units remain available to low-income in-movers.  
                                                 
11Tenant associations that purchase buildings can also preserve them as rentals, which are entered into 
rent stabilization (Gallaher, 2016).  
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Empirical evaluations of inclusionary zoning programs have not directly assessed their 
impact on displacement but have focused on other aspects of these programs that are likely to 
affect their capacity to address this phenomenon. This includes their impact on housing 
production, their programmatic features, and their capacity to foster socioeconomic integration.   
Inclusionary zoning programs have been found to contribute modestly to the production 
of subsidized housing (Freeman & Schuetz, 2017). A national study of 675 jurisdictions found 
that such programs had produced 173,707 units of below-market-rate housing and collected $1.7 
billion in in-lieu fees during their existence (Thaden & Wang, 2017). Between 1980 and 2003, 
inclusionary zoning contributed an estimated 2.3% of new residential construction in the Bay 
Area and 3% in the Washington, D.C. metro area (Schuetz et al., 2009, p. 452). Inclusionary 
zoning created 43% of new affordable units across three counties in the Washington D.C. metro 
area between 1974 and 1999 (K. D. Brown, 2001). Programmatic features affect the relative 
productivity of different programs; for example, there is evidence that mandatory programs 
produce more affordable units than voluntary ones, and those that target very low-income 
households produce significantly fewer units (Mukhija, Regus, Slovin, & Das, 2010; Schuetz, 
Meltzer, & Been, 2010). Despite concerns that mandatory inclusionary zoning adversely affects 
the overall production of units, Mukhija et al. (2010) did not find a significant difference in 
annual construction permits issued in cities with mandatory programs compared to those without. 
However, developers find ways to evade requirements. One study found that when demand was 
high, developers were likely to propose developments that fell below the threshold that triggered 
the mandate to include affordable units (Dawkins, Jeon, & Knaap, 2016). 
Units produced through inclusionary zoning typically have longer affordability terms 
than those constructed through federal programs (Hickey, Sturtevant, & Thaden, 2014; Thaden 
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& Wang, 2017). Nationally, 90% of inclusionary zoning programs had affordability terms of 30 
years or longer, compared to the 5-30 years typical of federally subsidized housing (Thaden & 
Wang, 2017). Of 330 programs nationwide, approximately a third required permanent 
affordability (Hickey et al., 2014).  
Research also suggests that inclusionary zoning is an effective tool for fostering 
socioeconomic integration. In the Washington, D.C. area, inclusionary units were distributed 
outside high-poverty areas, and in Montgomery County, Maryland, inclusionary ownership units 
were primarily built in suburban neighborhoods where market-rate housing was constructed (K. 
D. Brown, 2001; Dawkins et al., 2016). Kontokosta (2014) found that in Suffolk County and 
Montgomery County, neighborhoods that received inclusionary zoning units experienced greater 
levels of racial and socioeconomic integration compared to those that did not receive such units.  
Subsidized housing: Subsidized units are rented or sold at below-market rates to income-
qualifying households through public funding or tax incentives. This includes government-
owned public housing as well as privately-owned units financed through public grants, tax 
credits, housing bonds, property tax abatements, housing trust funds, or TIF. Subsidized units 
with long-term affordability covenants can mitigate exclusionary and economic displacement. 
For those that remain affordable in perpetuity, investment in physical maintenance is critical. 
The stock of subsidized housing is therefore affected by programs that establish affordability 
covenants on market-rate, distressed, or vacant properties, extend affordability covenants, or 
invest in the physical viability of existing subsidized housing.  
Subsidized housing provides a bulwark against displacement generally and in gentrifying 
neighborhoods. Zuk and Chapple (2016) found that subsidized housing construction was twice as 
effective as market-rate construction in reducing displacement in census tracts across the Bay 
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Area. However, neither type of construction alleviated displacement at the block-group level - a 
finding which the authors attributed to the extreme mismatch between housing need and supply. 
Despite rising housing costs and demographic change in Washington D.C.’s Shaw/U Street and 
Columbia Heights neighborhoods, ‘thousands’ of low-income residents of subsidized units have 
remained in place (Howell, 2016b; Hyra, 2014, p. 1759). Publicly subsidized units have also 
been credited with stemming the displacement of low-income households from neighborhoods in 
East Palo Alto, San Jose, New York City, and Vancouver that were vulnerable to or experienced 
gentrification (Crispell, 2016b; Crispell et al., 2016; Dastrup & Ellen, 2016; Freeman, 2006; Ley 
& Dobson, 2008; Newman & Wyly, 2006). However, the impact of subsidized housing in 
gentrifying areas can vary based on the income levels targeted. Where new units are not 
affordable to existing residents or new subsidized developments are part of a strategy to ‘reclaim 
urban neighborhoods for higher income groups,’ they can be harbingers of, rather than 
safeguards against, gentrification (Sarmiento & Sims, 2015, p. 325).   
Decommodified housing: Decommodified housing, such as CLTs, Mutual Housing 
Associations (MHAs), and Limited Equity Housing Co-operatives (LEHCs), removes buildings 
and/or land from the market to ensure permanent affordability and protect residents from 
displacement due to disinvestment or reinvestment (Choi, Van Zandt, & Matarrita-Cascante, 
2017; DeFilippis, 2004). Decommodified housing differs from traditional subsidized housing 
because it entrenches collective ownership and incorporates community and resident 
participation in its governing structure (Choi et al., 2017; DeFilippis, 2004).  
A large-scale quantitative study found that census tracts with CLTs had significantly 
lower odds of experiencing gentrification than those without CLTs; furthermore, CLTs were 
effective in preserving neighborhood-level affordability and socioeconomic and racial diversity 
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(Choi et al., 2017). In Boston’s Dudley Triangle, a CLT that was established during a period of 
disinvestment has preserved affordability for residents amid heightened demand and shielded 
them from foreclosure during downturns (Dwyer, 2015; Louie, 2016). In Stamford Connecticut’s 
West Side (a disinvested area that experienced an influx of relatively affluent households), two 
MHA developments have preserved affordability for lower-income residents (DeFilippis, 2004). 
Several other studies document the efficacy of CLTs and LEHCs in preserving long-term 
affordability, including in rising markets (Abrams, Eng, Jacobus, & Dailey, 2010; Davis & 
Demetrowitz, 2003; Huron, 2012; Saegert & Benítez, 2005; Temkin, Theodos, & Price, 2010).   
Regulation of short-term rentals: Online home-sharing platforms such as Airbnb and 
HomeAway facilitate individuals’ ability to rent out a room or a unit to tourists for short periods 
(Gurran & Phibbs, 2017). Because offering units on a nightly basis can be more profitable than 
doing so monthly, these platforms have the potential to increase housing costs and reduce 
availability for long-term residents (Cócola Gant, 2016; Feldman, 2017; Gurran & Phibbs, 2017; 
Inside Airbnb, 2016; D. Lee, 2016; Schäfer & Braun, 2016). An influx of tourists can also affect 
a neighborhood’s character (Cócola Gant, 2016; Gurran & Phibbs, 2017; Santolli, 2017; Schäfer 
& Braun, 2016). Studies suggest that short-term rentals are particularly prevalent in areas with 
tight housing markets and those that are at risk of gentrification (Cox, 2017; Gurran & Phibbs, 
2017; D. Lee, 2016; Office of New York State Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, 2014).  
Systematic research on the effects of short-term rental regulation has yet to emerge. 
However, there is tentative evidence that such regulations can reduce the number of units listed 
on short-term rental websites. In the month prior to Berlin’s introduction of regulations that 
strictly limited landlords’ right to lease apartments on a short-term basis, Airbnb listings for the 
city decreased by 40% and ads by large-scale operators decreased by 50% (O’Sullivan, 2016a). 
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Six months later, although the regulations had not eliminated illegal short-term rentals, they 
appeared to have curbed Airbnb’s growth in Berlin (O’Sullivan, 2016b). In New York, the share 
of entire homes listed on Airbnb (compared to individual rooms) fell from 68% in 2011 to 53% 
in 2016; this coincided with the city’s increase in regulatory attention and introduction of fines 
for advertising full-unit rentals (Coles, Egesdal, Ellen, Li, & Sundararajan, 2017; Kusisto, 2017). 
After New Orleans banned short-term rentals in the French Quarter, the area saw an increase in 
available long-term rentals (Feldman, 2017). However, Barcelona’s attempts to curtail short-term 
leasing had little impact on the number of units offered illegally (Santolli, 2017). 
Property tax breaks for homeowners: For households on low or fixed incomes, increased 
property tax bills raise the threat of economic displacement (Bowman, Kenyon, Langley, & 
Paquin, 2009; I. W. Martin & Beck, 2016). Property tax breaks targeted at households with 
appreciating assessments aim to shield owner-occupiers from this outcome (Bowman et al., 
2009; City of Philadelphia, 2015; I. W. Martin & Beck, 2016). State-level programs that limit 
allowable increases in property tax rates or assessed values have been found to reduce owner-
occupants’ likelihood of moving (Ferreira, 2010; Ihlanfeldt, 2011; Stohs, Childs, & Stevenson, 
2001), although a national study found no evidence that such programs decrease owners’ 
mobility from gentrifying neighborhoods (I. W. Martin & Beck, 2016). However, these studies 
did not examine property tax relief programs that target households who are at risk of 
displacement. Interventions that take income into account may reduce displacement more 
effectively than broad tax limitations or assessment caps, because they directly address a 
household’s tax-paying capacity (Bowman et al., 2009; Kenyon, Langley, & Paquin, 2010). 
There is some evidence that local tax relief programs can successfully target low-income 
households in previously disinvested neighborhoods where values are appreciating. For example, 
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many of the households eligible for Philadelphia’s Long-Time Owner-Occupant program, which 
capped property tax assessments for low- and moderate-income households whose assessed 
values tripled from one year to another, lived in neighborhoods where poor households were 
concentrated (Community Legal Services of Philadelphia, 2016).  
 Housing trust funds: Housing trust funds provide a dedicated and flexible revenue stream 
for affordable housing programs (Center for Community Change, 2016; Larsen, 2009; Scally, 
2012). Because of their flexibility, these funds can be marshalled to address economic, physical, 
or exclusionary displacement as needed in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Among other 
examples, housing trust funds have been used to include below-market-rate units in rehabilitated 
buildings in gentrifying areas of Chicago; to preserve neighborhood stability through affordable 
repairs for homeowners in New Orleans; to construct units for very low-income residents in a 
redeveloping area of Charlotte; to preserve low-cost units for low- and very low-income 
residents in appreciating neighborhoods in Washington, D.C.; and to develop units serving 
formerly homeless residents in a gentrifying neighborhood in Philadelphia (Center for 
Community Change, 2016; Coalition for Nonprofit Housing and Economic Development, 2012).  
Commercial affordability initiatives: Commercial affordability programs assist small 
businesses to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods when property values increase. They aim to 
preserve the livelihood of the business owners and their employees and address displacement 
pressure among incumbent residents (Abello, 2017a; Association for Neighborhood & Housing 
Development, 2017; Ferm, 2016; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016). Existing reports suggest that 
such measures can keep local small businesses rooted in their communities. San Francisco has an 
ordinance that requires enterprises with more than 11 locations globally to obtain a special use 
permit if they wish to open a store in one of the city’s commercial districts; criteria for 
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evaluating applications include the ratio of businesses serving neighborhood needs compared to 
city-wide or regional needs (Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 2015; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 
2016). Whereas chain businesses occupy a quarter of the commercial space (10% of 
establishments) in areas where they require a special permit, they occupy 53% of the area (25% 
of establishments) where the ordinance does not apply (Strategic Economics, 2014). Areas with 
retail controls also have substantially more independent establishments than those not covered by 
the ordinance (Strategic Economics, 2014). A program in Paris through which the city buys or 
establishes rent limits on establishments where culturally important businesses operate assisted 
roughly 650 enterprises between 2004 and 2015 (Gaillard, 2015; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016). 
However, a pilot program in Barcelona through which the city purchased establishments in a 
gentrifying district and provided subsidized leases had mixed results, with half of new 
establishments targeting the incumbent local population and the remainder oriented to a more 
upscale market (Pascual-Molinas & Ribera-Fumaz, 2009). In London, a program aimed at 
securing space for small businesses and non-profit organizations in new mixed-use developments 
was more often used to protect creative-sector enterprises than traditional incumbent businesses 
(Ferm, 2016). 
 Local hiring policies: Local hiring ordinances aim to ensure that disadvantaged residents 
benefit from the retail and construction jobs generated by development (Mulligan-Hansel, 2008; 
Savitch-Lew, 2016; Schrock, 2014; Zupan, 2011). Although these programs do not directly 
target displacement, they seek to more equitably distribute the costs and benefits publicly-
subsidized urban development (Savitch-Lew, 2016; Schrock, 2014). 
 The scope and outcomes of local hiring programs vary considerably (Mulligan-Hansel, 
2008; Schrock, 2014). A study of programs in nine cities, including those that target residents of 
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particular neighborhoods, found that they achieved or surpassed their hiring goals and often 
created permanent employment positions (Mulligan-Hansel, 2008). San Francisco’s local hiring 
mandate for construction jobs in publicly funded development projects increased the rate of local 
hiring for eligible projects from 20% in 2011 to 45% in 2016 (Savitch-Lew, 2016). Roughly 
3,400 San Francisco residents were hired through the program between 2011 and 2016, including 
residents of one of the city’s lowest-income zip codes (Savitch-Lew, 2016). The Milwaukee 
Opportunities for Restoring Employment Ordinance, which sets wage, training, and employment 
requirements for publicly-subsidized projects, ‘regularly exceed[s] the targeted hiring 
requirements’ (Partnership for Working Families, 2016). The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit 
Authority has also exceeded its hiring mandates for residents from low-income census tracts and 
substantially increased the employment of African American workers in its projects (Partnership 
for Working Families, 2016). A geographically targeted hiring program established through a 
Community Benefits Agreement for the L.A. Live project also achieved consistent compliance 
and employed ‘hundreds’ of eligible residents (Saito & Truong, 2014, p. 278).  
Displacement mitigation frameworks: The individual tools described above have 
complementary strengths and weaknesses, and a robust displacement mitigation strategy should 
incorporate multiple approaches. Howell (2016b, p. 306) notes that 20% of units in Washington 
D.C.’s Columbia Heights remain income-limited, and many long-time residents remain in place, 
through a combination of a right of first refusal, subsidized housing preservation, and housing 
trust fund financing (together with mobilized advocacy to implement these tools). The author 
concludes that ‘[g]iven the neighborhood’s trajectory in terms of rising home sales prices and 
rents, changing demographics, and active tenant displacement during the housing boom, it is 
unlikely that much of the population of low- and moderate-income households of color – 
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particularly renters – could have remained in the community without these…interventions’ 
(Howell, 2016b, p. 312).  
 
 
Reinvestment, Displacement Mitigation, and Local Context  
 
Mitigating displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification is not a widespread 
problem for all cities, many of which face more extensive struggles with poverty and decline 
than reinvestment (Cortright & Mahmoudi, 2014; Landis, 2016). Even cities that have highly 
gentrified neighborhoods also include areas of concentrated poverty (e.g. Austenson, Been, 
O’Regan, Rosoff, & Yager, 2017; Dowdell, 2016). However, gentrification and disinvestment 
are not separate phenomena, and the question of how to improve living conditions in an equitable 
manner is just as pertinent for neighborhoods struggling with concentrated poverty as it is for 
those with advanced levels of gentrification. Gentrification is a process that can occur over long 
periods of time: the literature is replete with examples of this process transforming 
neighborhoods ‘once thought ungentrifiable’ (e.g. Gallaher, 2016; Hackworth, 2002, p. 825; 
Levy et al., 2007; Schaffer & Smith, 1986; Zukin, 2016). The tools analyzed in this dissertation 
can be used to address the current risk of displacement in gentrifying areas or to help cities 
revitalize neighborhoods in a way that guards against future displacement. They therefore offer 
possibilities for cities and neighborhoods across a range of reinvestment/disinvestment contexts.  
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Foundations of Equitable Urban Planning and Policymaking 
 
The processes of displacement associated with contemporary gentrification are not 
inevitable by-products of reinvestment, and more equitable forms of development are possible 
(Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Maloutas, 2011; Shaw, 2009; Shaw & Porter, 2009a). Equity refers 
to ‘a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does 
not favor those who are already better off at the beginning’ (S. S. Fainstein, 2010, pp. 35–36). 
The previous chapter discussed how the political and economic shifts of the past decades have 
constrained cities’ capacity to redistribute resources to disadvantaged residents. These changes 
and constraints also raised theoretical questions about city governments’ ability to create a more 
equitable system. This chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of equitable urban 
planning and policymaking12 and the scholarly debates about cities’ capacity to undertake actions 
that benefit disadvantaged residents. It also reviews the literature on redistributive policy action 
to examine the factors that motivate and facilitate such interventions at the local level.  
 
Equitable Development, Equity Planning, and the Just City 
Drawing on case studies of urban redevelopment and reinvestment from 21 cities 
worldwide, Shaw (2009, p. 257) notes that ‘urban regeneration…does not by definition have the 
class character that is inherent in gentrification. There is a possibility, then, for the process to 
                                                 
12Planning and policymaking are distinct but overlapping governance practices. Policymaking is the 
process through which ‘problems are conceptualized and brought to government for solution; 
governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get 
implemented, evaluated, and revised’ (Sabatier, 2007, p. 3). Planning is the broader practice of governing 
‘human and nonhuman’ activities and relations across time and space while ‘imagining and opening up 
future potentialities for improving the conditions of daily life’ (Healey, 2009, p. 277). Plans guide 
policymaking, and the adoption and implementation of policy tools is critical to bringing plans to fruition. 
This dissertation uses the term ‘displacement mitigation planning’ to refer to the broad process of setting 
the values and desired outcomes that govern neighborhood development, and the term ‘displacement 
mitigation policymaking’ when discussing the subset of actions that result in the adoption and 
implementation of policy tools to achieve these planning goals.   
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carry out a more radical form of reinvestment: one that delivers secure and affordable housing 
and decent services and jobs to people on low incomes.’ In line with this vision, equitable 
neighborhood development aims to improve neighborhood quality in previously disinvested 
areas while providing existing residents with opportunities for active participation in their 
community’s future, avenues for economic stability and mobility, and protection from the many 
dimensions of displacement (Blackwell, 2000; DeFilippis, 2004; S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Kennedy 
& Leonard, 2001; Shaw, 2009).  
Concerns with equity in planning can be traced to the profession’s origins at the turn of 
the twentieth century (Hall, 2002; Krumholz, 2013b), but distributive justice became a central 
and explicit goal with the emergence of advocacy planning in the 1960s (Davidoff, 1965; S. S. 
Fainstein, 2005). Advocacy planners argued that the previously-dominant rational-
comprehensive model’s narrow focus on physical and technical planning had obscured the 
disproportionate costs of urban development and urban renewal for low-income and minority 
communities (Davidoff, 1965). While advocacy planners typically worked as legal 
representatives with and for these communities, the term equity planning would later be adopted 
by distributive justice advocates working within city governments (Krumholz, 1982). 
Recognizing their governments’ complicity in the socioeconomic and racial disparities created 
by uneven urban development, equity planners worked as ‘quiet advocates from within’ 
(Angotti, 2008, p. 15) to advance the interests of the disadvantaged and the excluded (Krumholz, 
1982). Such planning is progressive in the sense that it recognizes that ‘the existing economic 
and institutional mechanisms of society [are] a primary cause of inequity and inequality’ but 
seeks to achieve change ‘without crises or revolution’ (Kraushaar, 1988, p. 91). 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of equitable development in planning theory and practice 
also came to encompass issues of procedural justice, as demands for citizen participation arose in 
opposition to the entrenched process in which technocrats made decisions that affected the lives 
of low-income communities without including their voices (Arnstein, 1969; Bratt & Reardon, 
2013; Davidoff, 1965). Advocacy planning benefitted from novel forms of community 
representation created by the federal War on Poverty and Model Cities programs. For example, 
the 1964 Community Action Program, which aimed to elicit local participation in devising 
solutions to urban poverty, opened the door for representatives of disadvantaged groups to fight 
for communities’ visions of how to solve their neighborhoods’ problems – although it fell short 
of meaningful community control (Arnstein, 1969; Bratt & Reardon, 2013; Davidoff, 1965).  
The equity planning tradition that emerged from this era thus asserts that local planners and 
policymakers can work from within and outside of government to improve the resources, 
opportunities, rights, recognition, participation, and power of those who would be continually 
disadvantaged without state intervention (Clavel, 2010; Davidoff, 1965; Kraushaar, 1988; 
Krumholz, 1982, 1999, 2013b; Metzger, 1996; Zapata & Bates, 2015). Fainstein (2010, pp. 183–
184) bases her more recent concept of ‘Just City’ planning on the similar contention that among 
planners, ‘a concern with justice can…lead to policies that foster equitable distribution of 
governmental revenues, produce a lively, diverse, and accessible public realm, and make local 
decision making more transparent and open to the viewpoints of currently excluded groups.’ In 
her formulation, justice in planning encompasses equity (a distribution of resources and 
advantages that favors those who are less well-off), democracy (the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes that affect one’s interests), and diversity (recognition of and respect 
for different social groups and ways of life) (S. S. Fainstein, 2010). She also applies these 
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principles to development at the neighborhood level: equity involves supporting housing and 
services for those who are disadvantaged relative to more affluent newcomers, democracy 
involves supporting incumbent residents’ right to take an active role in shaping the future of their 
neighborhood, and diversity involves supporting the ability of low-income and minority residents 
to retain their place and culture as their neighborhoods diversify along socioeconomic and racial 
lines (S. S. Fainstein, 2010).  
  These principles are interrelated and often in tension (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; N. Fraser, 1990, 
1995). For example, the Just City concept of democracy builds on communicative planning’s 
model of the planner as a mediator of diverse interests who works with communities to forge 
shared strategies through deliberation and negotiation (Forester, 1989, 1999, 2008; Healey, 2006; 
Innes, 1995; Innes & Booher, 2004). This entails not only a change in the traditional forms of 
participation in planning, but a broadening of those included (Forester, 1989; Innes & Booher, 
2004; Young, 2000). Bringing previously excluded segments of society into democratic 
processes that enable genuine participation and voice is expected to promote greater justice in 
policy content and slowly address structural inequality – that is, to promote greater equity (Bratt 
& Reardon, 2013; Forester, 1999; Healey, 2012; Innes & Booher, 2004; Young, 2000). However, 
broadening democracy does not always produce outcomes that reflect the interests of the 
disadvantaged parties and/or advance progressive ends. This is due to the vast differentials in 
power and resources that exist among individuals of various socioeconomic, racial, and 
residential profiles as well as their varying conceptions of the policy content of equitable 
development (Abram, 2000; Balzarini & Shlay, 2016; Brand, 2015; S. S. Fainstein, 2000, 2010; 
N. Fraser, 1990; Huxley, 2000; Young, 1990).  
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Concepts of democracy and equity in planning and development can also conflict with the 
notion of diversity, which calls for respect for group differences without exclusion (Sandercock, 
1997, 2005; Young, 1990). Diversity includes the right to practice behaviors and livelihoods that 
do not conform to culturally dominant ways of life (Angotti, 2008; Sandercock, 2005). In their 
call for all groups, regardless of difference, to have a right to city space, advocates of diversity in 
planning draw on Lefebvre’s (1996, p. 158) concept of ‘the right to the city,’ in which people 
take control of, negotiate, and self-manage the shape of their urban future in a constant struggle 
towards democracy (Harvey, 2008; Lefebvre, 2009; Purcell, 2013, 2014). The ‘right to the city’ 
has evolved to represent not just a right to community control and recognition, but also to 
specific socioeconomic outcomes, including housing (Attoh, 2011). However, democracy and 
diversity are often in direct tension when it comes to neighborhood norms and behaviors, and 
policies that advance socioeconomic equity – for example, by providing a more equitable 
distribution of housing – may do so at the expense of marginalized groups’ sense of cultural 
belonging (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Young, 2000).  
A classic example of how these tensions complicate equitable planning involves the 
construction of affordable housing in high-opportunity neighborhoods. Such development can 
promote equity by improving low-income households’ access to housing and amenities in 
higher-income neighborhoods, but it is often opposed by existing residents of these areas; 
moreover, when such development does occur, the norms that govern behavior in higher-income 
neighborhoods may lead low-income or minority households to feel excluded (S. S. Fainstein, 
2010; Scally & Tighe, 2015; Young, 2000). As Young (2000, p. 218) notes, ‘[w]hile nearly 
everyone who lives in segregated neighborhoods wants better housing, transportation access, 
public parks, and so on, many resist the implication that they must give up their culturally 
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specific institutions and social networks to mix with strangers who are likely to be distant if not 
disrespectful.’  
While acknowledging the importance, inter-relatedness, and often contradictory nature of 
equity, diversity, and democracy, the primary focus of this dissertation is on one aspect of the 
Just City configuration: how city governments can advance equity in neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification through policy tools that strengthen low-income households’ opportunities to 
access housing and meet their needs. However, the design of this research was also informed by 
the ‘democracy’ and ‘diversity’ principles of equitable development in a Just City. Firstly, the 
policy tools to promote equity that this dissertation examines were not chosen based only on the 
recommendations of planning and policy experts. As detailed in Chapter 3, I reviewed the 
demands of community groups working with and advocating for low-income and minority 
residents to determine which tools cities should consider using to advance equitable 
neighborhood change. Secondly, the survey asks about, and Chapter 4 examines, cities’ 
processes for incorporating residents’ input into redevelopment and rezoning plans. Thirdly, the 
survey’s questions about the preservation of affordability for small businesses in neighborhoods 
at risk of gentrification are intended to capture one aspect of the preservation of diversity: the 
ability of low-income households to continue meeting their commercial and cultural needs when 
reinvestment occurs. Finally, this dissertation includes discussions of the practices and tensions 
involved in three programmatic considerations for preserving diversity in neighborhoods at risk 
of gentrification: the income levels to which affordable housing units are targeted, the provision 
of on-site versus off-site units, and giving preference to existing (or formerly displaced) residents 




Critiques of Local Capacity to Promote Equity  
The contention of equity and Just City planning theorists that city governments in a 
neoliberal era have the capacity to advance equitable policy agendas stands in discussion with 
two major strands of critique: the city limits, growth machine, and regime politics literatures on 
the one hand, and the neoliberal urbanism literature on the other. 
 
City Limits, the Growth Machine, and Regime Politics  
 
Amid global economic restructuring and its national and local reverberations in the 1970s 
and 1980s, a debate emerged in urban governance that asked whether city governments had the 
fiscal capacity and incentive to pursue anything other than entrepreneurial or pro-growth 
policies. Building on Tiebout’s (1956) theory of residential choice and local expenditure, 
Peterson’s (1981, 1995) ‘city limits’ argument claimed that inter-city competition for investment 
and well-off taxpayers compelled municipal governments to prioritize ‘developmental’ policies 
that enhanced their city’s attractiveness to capital and skilled workers and to avoid 
‘redistributive’ expenditures that benefited the city’s less affluent. According to Peterson’s 
argument, redistributive policies at the local level risked attracting concentrations of poor 
residents, while the taxes that funded these services would alienate more affluent residents, 
leading cities into bankruptcy. The ‘city limits’ argument acknowledged local variations in 
redistributive expenditure based on fiscal capacity, but argued that within the existing system, 
cities could not engage in substantial redistribution without jeopardizing their fiscal wellbeing 
(Peterson, 1981, 1995). The ‘growth machine’ and ‘regime politics’ hypotheses paid more 
attention to the politics behind the prioritization of growth. The ‘growth machine’ literature 
posited that the dominant forces of governance in cities were united in their commitment to 
50 
 
create the conditions for investment and that this ‘growth imperative’ precluded the pursuit of 
alternative policy measures (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976, pp. 309 & 310). The 
regime politics thesis similarly held that city officials’ need to form coalitions with influential 




The more recent concept of neoliberal urbanism accords with the account that amid the 
globalization of production, declining federal transfers, and expanding municipal responsibilities, 
city governments are compelled to partner with the private sector and operate in an increasingly 
business-like manner (Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009; 
Smith, 2002).13 Linking this observation to a critique of the overarching system, proponents of 
this view argue that local and national states in capitalist countries act in the interests of 
sustaining existing economic structures when they intervene to address the negative social 
consequences of capitalist markets (Harvey, 1973, 1989; Jessop, 2002; Theodore et al., 2011). 
Cities have become primary sites of efforts to manage these tensions in the neoliberal era, and 
municipal governments’ introduction of measures to address the social and environmental costs 
of competitive growth only serve to support, legitimize, and protect the existing order, according 
to this view (Jessop, 2002; Theodore et al., 2011).  
While acknowledging that neoliberal urbanism has unfolded in contingent and path-
dependent ways, these critics doubt localities’ ability to alter the trajectory of outcomes unless 
                                                 
13The concept of ‘austerity’ urbanism associated with the 2008 recession, according to which ‘those who 
govern cities find themselves with fewer levers to pull and under the ever more disciplining effects of the 
financial markets,’ is usually depicted as an extension or deepening of ‘neoliberal’ urbanism and similarly 
highlights the policy constraints arising from cities’ fiscal woes (Davidson & Ward, 2014, p. 90; Peck, 
2012; Tabb, 2014). 
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they can transcend the system of inter-city competition for capital (Harvey, 1989; Theodore et 
al., 2011). From this perspective, incremental change is ‘constrained to mitigating the worst 
outcomes at the margins of an unjust system’ (Harvey & Potter, 2009, p. 46).  
 
The Potential for Incrementally Progressive City Action 
 
These critiques acknowledge that differences in local conditions mediate the impact of 
structural constraints, but they also contend that those constraints preclude city governments 
from undertaking anything more than peripheral reform. Equity and Just City planners agree that 
neoliberalism has imposed common limits on city governments’ policy options; as Fainstein 
(2010, p. 81) acknowledges, ‘within capitalist cities that are competing with one another for 
investment, a reflexive opposition to inducements to investors may leave cities with very little 
left to redistribute.’ Despite these constraints, multiple studies from the equity planning and Just 
City traditions document progressive policies that have enhanced the quality of life and 
opportunities of disadvantaged residents (Clavel, 1986, 2010; Clavel & Kleniewski, 1990; S. S. 
Fainstein, 2010; Goetz, 1994; Krumholz, 1982, 1999; Logan & Swanstrom, 1990; Shaw & 
Porter, 2009b).  
The underlying question of whether such local reforms constitute a basis for meaningful 
change or simply reinforce an unjust system is unlikely to find a definitive answer, but defenders 
of the agency of planners and city governments have made compelling arguments for the former 
interpretation. Stone (2015, p. 114) likens the relationship between local action and structural 
inequality to the impact of ‘build[ing] shelters and plant[ing] trees as a windbreak’ against the 
‘prevailing wind’ of neoliberal capitalism. Krumholz (2013b, p. 127) notes that advancing equity 
through planning ‘is not to suggest that urban planners…can reverse industrial decline or change 
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the political economy of their cities. Only broad social and political movements can accomplish 
that. But urban planners can make a substantial difference to the quality of life of their cities if 
they…give highest priority to improving the lives of the poor and near-poor residents.’ Clavel 
and Kleniewski (1990) conclude their review of city-level progressive measures by noting that 
even if the impact of such measures is limited, they still provide benefits to groups that would 
not otherwise be served by the market. Similarly, Davis (2006, p. 365) holds that  
[d]evolution is not a passing disturbance but a climatic change in the political 
environment, one likely to be with us for quite a while…There are limits in the ability 
(and will) of cities and states to cope with these changes. Yet there are also opportunities 
that should not be ignored, offering room to maneuver and reason to hope that some of 
the innovations being tried by nonfederal units of government may nudge the entire 
system in a positive direction. 
As these excerpts demonstrate, advocates of progressive reform recognize that city governments’ 
capacity to promote equity is limited to incremental interventions but defend the value of such 
action. Incremental reforms build on or modify previous policies and practices and then become 
the basis for future policy changes (Lindblom, 1979; Waste, 1989). In his defense of 
incrementalism, Lindblom (1979, p. 520) notes that ‘[a] fast-moving sequence of small changes 
can more speedily accomplish a drastic alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent 
major policy change…[I]ncremental change patterns are, under ordinary circumstances, the 
fastest method of change available.’ When that change is made in the direction of more equitable 
policies, each small policy gain establishes a more just starting point for subsequent policy 
modifications, thus strengthening the bargaining position of progressive planners and advocates 
and achieving gradual structural transformation (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Friedmann, 2008; 
Krumholz, 1999).  
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Within the affordable housing and gentrification literature, many also recognize the value of 
incremental measures that mitigate the effects of market-led property development (Bernt, 2012; 
Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Levy et al., 2007; Schlichtman et al., 2017; Shaw, 2005, 2009). 
There is ample evidence that such interventions can form the basis of wider reforms. A case 
study of local policy’s potential to mitigate displacement in San Francisco concluded that ‘[t]he 
work of responding to the gentrification process in concrete ways is a hard road of incremental 
and patient chipping away at an entrenched paradigm of…real estate development…A 
combination of technical savvy and political strategy has incrementally advanced a set of more 
progressive standards for planning and development of the city’ (Cohen & Marti, 2009, p. 225). 
A San Francisco housing organizer noted that while the city’s new condo conversion policy 
would not in isolation end evictions by speculative landlords, it had consolidated relationships, 
built momentum, and changed the housing narrative among legislators, such that controlling 
speculation was now on the political agenda, in a shift that was likely to bolster other affordable 
housing efforts (Causa Justa/Just Cause, 2014). In Boston, successive municipal governments 
defended a weak commercial development impact fee even as developers threatened to cease 
construction; after these threats were proven false and the development community came to 
‘accept linkage as a “rule of the game” ,’ the city was able to increase and expand the fee 
(Clavel, 2010; Dreier & Ehrlich, 1991, p. 366). The successful defense and expansion of the 
linkage policy channeled millions of dollars into low-and moderate-income housing development 
and made a broader set of affordable housing reforms possible (Clavel, 2010; Dreier & Ehrlich, 
1991). To gain voter support for its initial passage, the scope of Seattle’s first Housing Levy was 
strategically limited to financing housing for elderly citizens, but voters have since agreed 
numerous times to broaden the scope of the tax (Levy et al., 2007). Similarly, the existence of a 
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Housing Trust Fund in Los Angeles has been credited with increasing the visibility of housing 
affordability on the city’s agenda and facilitating a discussion of additional tools, such as 
inclusionary zoning (Levy et al., 2007). Despite its brief existence, Chicago’s local hiring 
program ‘managed to institutionalize a principle of linked development that endured much, much 
longer than the program itself’ (Schrock, 2014, p. 668). As Shaw (2009, p. 254) concludes, ‘[t]he 
existence of these modifying policies, oriented on some level to towards greater social equity in 
the urban regeneration process, opens up space for further demands.’   
This dissertation examines the factors that make such measures possible. In doing so, it 
examines why and how the policies advocated by equity planning and Just City proponents are 
adopted and implemented. It is insufficient to identify policy tools that advance equity without 
understanding how policymakers navigate the constraints to introducing and implementing these 
interventions – and what motivates them to do so (Lake, 2014). The remainder of this chapter 
therefore reviews the conditions associated with local governments’ redistributive policy action.  
 
Conditions Associated with Redistributive Local Policy Action  
This dissertation builds on a rich theoretical and empirical literature on redistributive 
local policy action. Previous quantitative studies have not comprehensively examined why cities 
adopt and implement policy tools that mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification. This literature review therefore focuses on the conditions associated with local 
action in three policy areas where, as with displacement mitigation, local governments’ incentive 
to promote economic growth can conflict with redistributive concerns: affordable housing 
development, local economic development, and living wage ordinances. Although there is an 
important practical difference between policy adoption and implementation (Pressman & 
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Wildavsky, 1973; Talen, 1996), the same theses are typically advanced in the literature to 
explain why redistributive policies are adopted or implemented.14 These theses concern 
conditions that motivate local action (problem severity/need and interest group mobilization) and 
factors that facilitate it (fiscal/economic strength, locational demand, political/institutional 
environments, and policy landscapes). This section assesses the evidence for these theories from 
quantitative and qualitative research at the state, county, and city levels.  
 
Problem Severity/Need 
The problem severity thesis posits that cities with higher levels of socioeconomic need 
are more likely to engage in redistribution (Berry & Berry, 2007; Peterson, 1995; Sharp & 
Maynard-Moody, 1991). Some versions of this thesis hold that crisis events or conditions 
increase the likelihood of policy innovation by focusing public concern and political will on the 
problem at hand (Berry & Berry, 2007; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007; Zahariadis, 2007).   
Empirical studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the need for affordable 
housing and city support for low-income housing construction in downtown areas (Goetz, 1994), 
requirements that developers contribute to low- and middle-income housing (Elkins, 1995; 
Reese, 1998), the strength of state affordable housing policy innovation (Basolo & Scally, 2008), 
the likelihood of housing trust fund adoption at the state level (Scally, 2012), the likelihood and 
timing of inclusionary zoning adoption (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, 2007; Stromberg & 
Sturtevant, 2016), and cities’ expenditure on housing and community development (Yerena, 
2015). Case studies also show that local stakeholders are less likely to support displacement 
mitigation interventions during early stages of neighborhood revitalization, whereas cities feel 
                                                 
14For concision, I use the term ‘policy action’ to refer collectively to policy adoption and implementation. 
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more pressure to intervene where affordability crises exist (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Kraus, 
2013; Levy et al., 2007).  
The evidence is more contradictory in other policy areas. An early study found that cities 
with higher poverty rates and larger reductions in the municipal government share of 
employment were significantly more likely to adopt living wage ordinances (I. Martin, 2006), 
but in a more recent analysis using a larger sample, per capita income and poverty rates were not 
significantly associated with this outcome (Swarts & Vasi, 2011). This suggests that policy 
domains like affordable housing have a relatively discrete and ‘readily identifiable client base’ 
that increases visibility and mobilization around a crisis and narrows the potential policy 
responses (Reese, 1998, p. 698; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002a). In contrast, the affected population 
may be more diffuse and less able to exert organized pressure in an area like living wages or 
inequality more generally (Einstein & Glick, 2016a). The existing evidence thus suggests that 
problem severity is a strong motivator of city redistributive action in the realm of affordable 
housing, though it may be less relevant to broader policy areas.  
 
Interest Groups 
The interest group thesis argues that the relative organization, mobilization, and influence 
of progressive community groups and pro-growth interests determine whether the needs of 
disadvantaged residents are addressed (Berry & Berry, 2007; Stone, 2005; Zahariadis, 2007). 
There is consistent evidence that the presence of organized community advocacy groups 
increases cities’ likelihood of adopting redistributive policies, including in the realm of 
affordable housing. Quantitative studies have found a significant and positive relationship 
between the presence of active community or housing advocacy groups and local commitments 
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to affordable housing (Basolo, 1999; Goetz, 1994; Yerena, 2015), between the strength of 
neighborhood activism and policies requiring developers to build low- and middle-income 
housing (Elkins, 1995), and between community input in the planning process and the adoption 
of low-income housing requirements (Reese, 1998; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002a). Qualitative case 
studies have also identified local affordable housing activism as a factor impeding the 
gentrification of low-income neighborhoods, promoting interventions that preserve place-based 
affordability, and influencing the adoption of innovative affordable housing and equitable 
development policies more generally (Angotti, 2008; Basolo & Scally, 2008; Bernt, 2012; Cohen 
& Marti, 2009; Dreier et al., 2014; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Levy et al., 2007; Shaw, 2005; 
Zupan, 2011). The density of community organizations also had a positive and significant impact 
on cities’ likelihood of adopting a living wage ordinance (I. Martin, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). 
Overall, the evidence indicates that the strength of local affordable housing advocacy is likely to 
be critical in putting displacement mitigation on the policy agenda. 
The relationship between the strength of pro-development interests and redistributive 
policy action is less clear, and findings are often counter-intuitive. Reese (1998) found that the 
level of business input in planning was significantly and positively associated with cities’ 
adoption of policies requiring developer contributions to low-income housing. A case study of 
affordable housing policy innovation in California and New Jersey provides insight into this 
finding: the authors noted that the ability of housing advocates to influence the policy agenda 
was ‘most certainly related to the agreement among various groups, including business and the 
development community, that action was needed to address the housing crisis’ (Basolo & Scally, 
2008, p. 763). Cities with a higher density of business organizations are also significantly more 
likely to pass living wage ordinances (I. Martin, 2006). This may indicate that a highly visible 
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business presence provides a more direct target for resistance, thus enhancing the success of 
progressive campaigns (I. Martin, 2006). These studies indicate that the strength of business and 
pro-growth interests matters, although perhaps in unpredictable ways. The considerable 
consensus regarding business and real estate interests as forces promoting gentrification (e.g. 
Angotti, 2008; Cohen & Marti, 2009; Davis, 2006; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Wyly & Hammel, 
2004b), and their visibility in gentrifying areas, suggests that pro-development interests must be 
accounted for when analyzing the conditions associated with local action in this domain.  
 
Fiscal and Economic Strength 
City governments that are motivated to enact redistributive policies must have the 
resources to do so, particularly since they are typically reluctant to raise taxes (Berry & Berry, 
2007; Einstein & Glick, 2016a; Pagano, 2013; Peterson, 1981, 1995; Swanstrom, 1988). In the 
context of displacement mitigation, cities that are fiscally and economically stressed are less 
likely to favor using their scarce resources on programs that dampen private investment and 
property value increases in revitalizing neighborhoods. Indeed, a survey of 70 U.S. mayors found 
that leaders of ‘the most disadvantaged cities [we]re significantly more likely to embrace 
gentrification relative to mayors of the most affluent cities’ (Einstein, Glick, & Lusk, 2014, p. 4). 
Market strength also matters, as mayors of cities with higher median housing values were 
significantly less likely to agree with the statement that ‘[i]t is good for a neighborhood when it 
experiences rising property values, even if it means that some current residents might have to 
move out’ (Einstein & Glick, 2016b, p. 23). Cities with high property values have significantly 
higher per-capita expenditures (Craw, 2008) and are more likely to devote local-source funding 
to affordable housing (Basolo, 1999), institute certain building regulations, and require 
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developers to create low-and middle-income housing (Elkins, 1995). Case studies also 
demonstrate that city officials have more leeway to enact displacement mitigation interventions 
during the periods of property value appreciation that characterize the onset of gentrification 
(Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Levy, Comey, & Padilla, 2006). 
Like property values, cities’ fiscal resources are positively associated with overall per 
capita expenditure (Basolo & Lowery, 2010; Craw, 2008), per capita welfare spending (Peterson, 
1981, 1995; Sharp & Maynard-Moody, 1991), adoption of policies requiring developers to 
finance infrastructure development (Elkins, 1995), adoption of living wage ordinances (Swarts & 
Vasi, 2011), and implementation of equity-oriented sustainability policies, including housing 
affordability and inclusionary zoning initiatives (Paterson & Saha, 2010). Cities with higher per 
capita income and better bond ratings also adopt more affordable housing policies (Goetz, 1994), 
and those receiving higher levels of federal funding for affordable housing are significantly more 
likely to spend local funds in this area (Basolo, 1999). Case studies also indicate that resource 
constraints hinder affordable housing policy innovation at the state level (Basolo & Scally, 
2008). Existing evidence thus clearly identifies local economic strength and fiscal resources as 




Large cities have more leverage to adopt redistributive policies because their unique 
attributes increase the costs of relocation for firms, heighten city governments’ bargaining power 
with the private sector, and increase their ability to raise taxes without inducing flight (Craw, 
2008; Dreier et al., 2014; Kantor, Savitch, & Haddock, 1997; Peterson, 1995; Swanstrom, 1988). 
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This thesis makes intuitive sense in the context of gentrification: cities that are struggling to 
retain residents are more likely to encourage, rather than mitigate, private investment in 
declining neighborhoods.  
Several empirical studies support this thesis. Jurisdictions with larger populations are 
more likely to adopt inclusionary zoning programs (Schuetz et al., 2007) and living wage 
ordinances (Martin, 2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). Larger cities are also more likely to 
spend local dollars on affordable housing, and they spend significantly higher amounts of local 
funds in this area (Basolo, 1999). Municipalities with higher population densities have 
significantly higher scores on an index of sustainability action that includes housing affordability 
(Saha, 2009), while cities facing higher levels of regional competition are less likely to spend 
local revenue on affordable housing and more likely to devote funds to economic development 
than affordable housing (Basolo, 1999, 2000). Examining redistribution more broadly, Craw 
(2008) found that municipalities facing less competition, and those that differed from competing 
municipalities in the range of services offered, had significantly higher levels of expenditure per 
capita. Basolo and Lowery (2010) also found an inverse relationship between the level of 
jurisdictional competition and per capita local expenditure.     
 
Political Institutions/Environment 
Several features of the political environment have been theorized to affect local redistributive 
action. The form of government (mayor-council or council-manager) has been a common fixture 
in policy action studies, but it has yielded inconsistent and often insignificant results. There is 
some evidence that cities with mayor-council systems spend more on redistribution than those 
with council-manager systems; on the other hand, cities with at-large council elections (typically 
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associated with council-manager systems) are more likely to prioritize redistributive policies 
over economic development than those with district elections (more common in cities with 
mayor-council systems) (Basolo, 2000; Craw, 2008; International City/County Management 
Association, 2006; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002a; Svara, 2003; Waste, 1989). Cities where mayors 
have more authority15 were found to be more likely to enact education programs and hiring 
requirements, but less likely to require developers to pay for infrastructure - and this variable was 
not significantly related to affordable housing requirements (Elkins, 1995). No significant 
difference has emerged between the council-manager and mayor-council systems in the 
likelihood of adopting living wage ordinances, of supporting gentrification at the expense of 
incumbent residents, or of adopting sustainability policies (including affordable housing 
initiatives) (Einstein & Glick, 2016b; Saha, 2009; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). These inconsistent and 
insignificant results accord with a large body of research that cautions that the analytic value of 
traditional distinctions between local institutional forms is waning as each system comes to adopt 
features of the other (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, 2009; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004; 
Nelson & Svara, 2010; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002b).16,17  
                                                 
15As measured by the presence of partisan elections, a term length over 3 years, a popular vote to elect the 
mayor, and a mayoral veto (Elkins, 1995). 
 
16As no consensus has formed around a new measure of institutional structure, this study omits this 
variable in favor of more consistent and less disputed measures of the political environment. 
 
17Another institutional factor that has been theorized to affect a policy’s likelihood of successful adoption 
is the influx of personnel who are in support of (or in opposition to) that issue into governance structures 
(Berry & Berry, 2007; Zahariadis, 2007). However, this variable is very difficult to operationalize in a 
large-scale quantitative study. At the state level, factors such the professionalization of the legislature, 
party cohesiveness, and the existence of policy entrepreneurs have also been posited to affect the 
likelihood of policy innovation, but these variables are less common in large-N studies of redistributive 
policy action at the city level (Abel, Salazar, & Robert, 2015; Berry & Berry, 2007; Mintrom, 1997; 
Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Zahariadis, 2007). 
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The majoritarian preferences in a locality are also hypothesized to influence the policy 
decisions of local governments (Kraus, 2013; Zahariadis, 2007). This thesis suggests that ‘local 
officials can be responsive to the actively expressed policy positions of a specific issue public,’ 
in line with the interest group thesis, ‘while simultaneously acting within the parameters of the 
general public’s views and priorities’ (Kraus, 2013, p. 15). The majoritarian responsiveness 
viewpoint argues that it is residents’ degree of ‘ambivalence about redistributive policies and 
inequality generally’ that city governments are responding to when they decide whether or not to 
enact progressive policies (Kraus, 2013, p. 21).   
Majoritarian preferences are often measured using indicators of voting patterns in national 
elections. The share of residents voting Democrat is positively associated with several 
redistributive issues that tie in with national-level campaigns, such as living wage ordinances; 
however, partisanship is a less clear predictor of local issues like gentrification (Einstein & 
Glick, 2016b; I. Martin, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). For example, a national study found that 
jurisdictions with higher percentages of individuals voting Democrat are slower to adopt 
inclusionary housing programs (Stromberg & Sturtevant, 2016), although the opposite results 
were found in a study focusing on Bay Area jurisdictions (Meltzer & Schuetz, 2010). Democratic 
mayors were significantly more likely than their Republican counterparts to support 
redistribution, even if it negatively affected businesses and high-income taxpayers, but mayoral 
partisanship was not significantly associated with mayors’ support for increasing property values 
at the expense of residential displacement (Einstein & Glick, 2016b). These findings suggest that 
the Democrat-Republican divide typically used in studies of local redistribution is less 
straightforward in the context of displacement mitigation - possibly because ‘left-of-center’ 
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concerns like environmental sustainability, smart growth, and housing affordability are often in 
tension (Causa Justa/Just Cause, 2014; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Ley & Dobson, 2008). 
Other studies go beyond majoritarian political preferences to examine the more nuanced 
concept of political culture (Blomquist, 2007; Ostrom, 2007; Sharp, 2005). Goetz (1994) found 
that localities where citizens opposed government intervention in public welfare were 
significantly less likely to use progressive economic development tools and to adopt affordable 
housing policies. Similarly, states whose populations had a more liberal political ideology were 
more likely to adopt housing trust funds with a dedicated revenue source (Scally, 2012). The 
concept of a ‘new political culture’ has received considerable attention in recent years. 
Proponents argue that a progressive political subculture exists in localities with more same-sex 
partnerships, young and highly-educated residents, single-person households, knowledge-based 
employees, and non-religious individuals (DeLeon & Naff, 2004; Florida, 2005; Paterson & 
Saha, 2010; Rosdil, 2011, 2013; Sharp, 2005). As Rosdil (2011, p. 3484) posits, ‘[a]s a highly 
educated, culturally unconventional cohort of professionals has rediscovered the charms of city 
living, they are upsetting the economic calculations which generally guided post-war 
development decision-making and are pursuing a new vision of urban community based on 
radically different principles.’ Indeed, cities that score highly on a scale composed of ‘new 
political culture’ variables exhibit higher levels of implementation of sustainability initiatives – 
specifically, equity-oriented policies such as affordable housing, inclusionary zoning, and jobs-
housing balance (Paterson & Saha, 2010; Saha, 2009). A higher percentage of younger, more-
highly-educated residents is also associated with faster adoption of inclusionary zoning measures 
(Schuetz et al., 2007; Stromberg & Sturtevant, 2016). A case study of development policies in 
Las Vegas and Seattle concluded that Seattle’s higher share of residents with ‘less traditional’ 
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lifestyles and knowledge-based employment influenced that city to adopt a more progressive 
approach, including in the realm of affordable housing (Rosdil, 2011, p. 3483). Although the 
presence of highly-educated, younger, knowledge-based, and creative workers in walkable 
central cities may precipitate gentrification (Florida, 2005; Scott, 2006; Sharp, 2007), and the 
attitudes of these residents towards displacement mitigation in up-and-coming neighborhoods 
may therefore be ambivalent, several studies suggest that ‘citizens may…evaluate local political 
issues more on the basis of their relevance to the survival and vitality of a shared way of life than 
in terms of their impact on their economic interests’ (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Rosdil, 2013, p. 14; 
Tissot, 2014). 
Another measure of political preferences with relevance to displacement mitigation is the 
percentage of the population that belongs to minority racial or ethnic groups, particularly given 
the vulnerability of communities of color to residential discrimination and displacement (Goetz, 
2010; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Scally, 2012; Sidney, 2004). This is supported by evidence 
that states with higher percentages of African American residents are more likely to adopt 
housing trust funds, that neighborhoods with high percentages of low-income and minority 
residents are more supportive of affordable housing development, and that a higher percentage of 
African American residents is associated with local fair housing advocacy that is more visible 
and more focused on housing affordability (Kraus, 2013; Scally, 2012; Sidney, 2004).18   
 
                                                 
18Although previous studies suggest that the percentage of the population that rents is an important 
variable for measuring political support for affordable housing and inclusionary zoning programs (Basolo, 
1999; Stromberg & Sturtevant, 2016), my dissertation includes policy tools that address displacement for 
both renters and homeowners, and the tenure distribution is therefore not considered likely to predict 




Internal and External Policy Landscapes 
A government’s internal policy history is also likely to influence the policies it subsequently 
adopts, either by enabling the introduction of similar legislation or substituting for other possible 
policies (Berry & Berry, 2007; S. S. Fainstein, 2010). Although large-scale quantitative policy 
action studies have tended to omit this variable (Berry & Berry, 2007), a history of progressive 
policy adoption (as measured by the introduction of an anti-apartheid resolution) was 
significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of adopting a living wage ordinance 
(Swarts & Vasi, 2011) and jurisdictions with more land use regulations were more likely to adopt 
inclusionary zoning programs (Schuetz et al., 2007). The contention that past policy successes 
lay a foundation for future progressive action is also supported by case studies, as noted in the 
examples from Los Angeles, Seattle, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago discussed above. 
Having a foundation of progressive policies to build on can be especially important to facilitate 
the rapid introduction of new displacement mitigation policies, since gentrification can advance 
quickly but ‘the political support, legislation, and staff capacity needed to produce or protect 
affordable housing take months or years to put in place’ (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001, p. 34). If 
this institutional capacity already exists, cities may have a better chance of introducing and 
implementing innovative displacement mitigation policies.  
The policy diffusion and policy transfer literatures posit that the knowledge of policy 
initiatives introduced by other localities can influence local policy action because governments 
learn from, compete with, and face pressure from one another (Benson & Jordan, 2011; Berry & 
Berry, 2007; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Walker, 1969). This is particularly true among 
jurisdictions that are similarly situated geographically, politically, socially, and economically 
(Benson & Jordan, 2011; Berry & Berry, 2007). The ‘learning’ and ‘normative pressure’ 
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channels of policy diffusion can be reasonably applied to displacement mitigation: city 
governments that wish to address place-based affordability are likely to look to existing solutions 
in similar contexts to simplify their options; seeing displacement mitigation policies successfully 
implemented in similar contexts may mitigate local officials’ fears of antagonizing developers; 
and in light of the contested and high-profile nature of gentrification, cities experiencing this 
phenomenon are likely to face pressure to keep up with cities that are taking action. Studies have 
found evidence of policy diffusion in the adoption of living wage ordinances (Martin, 2006; 
Swarts & Vasi, 2011), inclusionary zoning programs (Schuetz et al., 2007), and urban 
regeneration policies (Wolman & Page, 2002). However, previous research also shows that 
policy diffusion among city officials is often not based on a ‘systematic effort put into learning 
from other [localities]’ (Marsden, Frick, May, & Deakin, 2011; Wolman & Page, 2002, p. 484). 
As the methods to detect such diffusion quantitatively are prohibitively data intensive within the 
context of this study, I explore the policy diffusion thesis in the descriptive phase of this 
research. 
 Finally, the orientation of state governments to affordable housing is likely to affect city-
level policies, either by providing legislative and fiscal support (or barriers), or by reducing the 
need for city action. Existing evidence suggests that state-level progressiveness in planning 
enables cities to implement sustainability and equity-oriented policies more successfully 
(Paterson & Saha, 2010; Saha, 2009). Moreover, cities in states that explicitly allow inclusionary 
zoning or grant home rule adopt inclusionary zoning programs earlier (Stromberg & Sturtevant, 
2016), and the presence of state affordable housing mandates is positively associated with the 




City Governments and Displacement Mitigation Policy Action 
 
 Previous theoretical and empirical works present compelling arguments that cities have 
the capacity to undertake action that makes a difference for disadvantaged residents and 
increases the potential for more just policymaking in the future. However, the local context 
affects cities’ capacity to undertake such action. In the case of affordable housing policy - the 
realm most closely related to displacement mitigation - there is strong and consistent evidence 
that the levels of problem severity and affordable housing interest group activity motivate 
redistributive action, and that cities’ economic and fiscal strength facilitates it. In addition, the 
balance of evidence indicates that local political preferences, pro-development interest group 
pressure, locational demand, policy history, and state support must also be accounted for when 
examining why cities decide to take such action.  
 The remainder of this dissertation examines the prevalence and form of city actions to 
mitigate the displacement of disadvantaged households from neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrifying. It also adds a new dimension to the literature on redistributive policy action by 
analyzing the conditions associated with local interventions to mitigate displacement. The 
following chapter details the methods that were used to collect and analyze the data analyzed in 




Chapter 3: Collecting and Analyzing Data on Cities’ Displacement Mitigation Policy Tools 
 
A Mixed-Methods Approach to Examining Displacement Mitigation   
 
To examine how and why cities mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification, this study used a sequential mixed-methods approach involving a large-scale, 
quantitative phase followed by a smaller, qualitative investigation (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 
1989; Hanson, Creswell, Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005; Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). 
The empirical analysis was guided by four questions: 1) what are the political, economic, and 
knowledge environments within which displacement mitigation planning occurs? 2) how are 
large U.S. cities addressing displacement in neighborhoods that are at risk of gentrifying? 3) 
which conditions are associated with the strength of cities’ approaches to mitigating 
displacement and the type of action they take to address this challenge? and 4) how do local 
policy and planning actors explain the ways in which these conditions motivate, facilitate, and 
shape city governments’ policy approaches?     
Chapters 4 and 5 address the first two questions through a descriptive analysis of information 
gathered from an online survey of planning, housing, and community development officials and 
a systematic review of policy documents. In Chapter 6, I draw on the redistributive policy action 
literature to analyze the conditions associated with three measures of cities’ displacement 
mitigation approaches through a series of regression models. Chapter 7 discusses the findings 
from semi-structured telephone interviews that I conducted with city officials and community 
advocates in a subset of study cities for a more in-depth investigation of the quantitative findings. 
This study design was informed by several rationales for mixed methods research. First, the 
concept of complementarity holds that each method can elucidate a different aspect of a problem 
(Greene et al., 1989; Hanson et al., 2005). While quantitative methods are apt for revealing broad 
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trends and relationships, qualitative inquiry is useful for understanding the relevant contexts and 
processes in greater detail. The study was also motivated by the rationale of development, as the 
quantitative phase informed interview selection and questions, while interview results suggested 
potential revisions to future survey studies (Greene et al., 1989; Hanson et al., 2005). Third, it 
included initiation  - the ‘recast[ing of] results from one method to questions or results from the 
other method’ – as the interview results contextualized and reframed the quantitative findings 
(Greene et al., 1989; Hanson et al., 2005, p. 226). Finally, it was motivated by the expansion 
rationale, as the interview phase enabled me to investigate themes that I could not fully 
incorporate into the survey (Greene et al., 1989; Hanson et al., 2005).19 
 
Unit of Analysis  
This dissertation studies U.S. municipal governments. The U.S. represents a critical case 
where neoliberal governance and gentrification are deeply entrenched in urban policy 
(Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Wyly & Hammel, 2004a). Given the severity of the challenge 
facing U.S. city governments, information about the strategies they are using to address 
displacement could prove useful for cities in other advanced industrialized countries where forms 
of neoliberal urbanism emerged in the late 20th century (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Keil, 2002; Novy 
& Mayer, 2009; Shaw, 2012).  
The 146 cities that were recruited for participation were the largest cities by population in 
2015.20 The use of a purposive sample of the most populous U.S. cities is consistent with 
                                                 
19 This research project received approval from Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board. 
 
20 As discussed below, these included the 116 cities with a population over 200,000 and the 30 cities that 




previous quantitative research on the form and extent gentrification in the U.S. (e.g. Hwang, 
2016; Landis, 2016; Maciag, 2015; Wyly & Hammel, 2004b) as well as other studies that this 
research draws on, including many on urban inequality and local governance more broadly 
(Berube, 2014; Cortright & Mahmoudi, 2014; Frug, Barron, & Todd, 2008; Peterson, 1995). 
Large cities experience different pressures, priorities, opportunities, and constraints than smaller 
jurisdictions (Einstein & Glick, 2016a; Frug et al., 2008; Norman, 2013). For example, since the 
1980s, large cities in the U.S. have developed higher levels of income inequality than smaller 
cities and rural areas (Baum-Snow & Pavan, 2012; Berube, 2014; Gubits, 1999). The structural 
political economic differences that contribute to this inequality, such as the concentration in large 
cities of high-end service jobs and the presence of collective goods that poor residents rely on, 
are integral to the process of gentrification. White-collar industries have been key to these cities’ 
shifting class structure and accommodating these industries has been a motivating force behind 
state-supported gentrification projects (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Sassen, 2009; Smith, 1979). There 
is also statistical evidence that gentrification is more common in large metropolitan areas than 
smaller ones (Hwang & Lin, 2016). Large cities are therefore an appropriate focus for an 
examination of policy responses to displacement.  
Studies of ‘large cities’ vary in their definitions, but many of those relevant to this 
research focus on cities with populations over or around 300,000 (El Kalache, Moriah, & Tapper, 
2005; Hwang, 2016; Peterson, 1995; Wyly & Hammel, 2004b). Because only 61 cities had 
populations above 300,000 when this research began, and to ensure an adequate number of 
observations for the quantitative analyses, I broadened my sample to include the 116 cities with 
populations above 200,000 and the thirty cities that fell just below this cut-off. The latter thirty 
cities were recruited as a pre-test sample for the survey. As discussed below, these cities were 
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ultimately included in the final dataset in light of the comparability of the pre-test and formal 
data collection. 
 
Time Frame for Analysis 
This study focuses on policy tools that were in place or awaiting passage as of 2016 and 
early 2017. In prior years, the decline in real estate values and employment precipitated by the 
housing and financial crises of 2008 reduced local tax revenue and increased affordability 
pressures (Bostic, 2013; Pagano, 2013). By 2016, however, the tentative housing and financial 
recoveries were restoring cities’ ability to address such challenges (Pagano, 2013; Shearer, Ng, 
Berube, & Friedhoff, 2016; Weir, 2013). Media reports also indicated that during this period, 
many city governments previously intent on attracting creative and highly-skilled workers began 




To begin developing a survey of cities’ displacement mitigation policy tools, I first 
created a preliminary analytical framework based on my review of the academic, policy, and 
advocacy21 literature on interventions that mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrifying (Table 3.1). The framework incorporated Marcuse’s (1986) conceptual model, to 
ensure that the survey would capture tools that target multiple types of displacement. It also 
                                                 
21I reviewed policy recommendations from local affordable housing/anti-displacement advocacy groups in 
five cities in the study sample. Two cities (New York City and San Francisco) were chosen because of the 
presence of strong anti-gentrification advocacy. Two cities were chosen at random to represent localities 
with populations between 200,000-300,000 (Cincinnati and Orlando) and one to represent those with 




incorporated Fainstein’s (2010) specific guidelines on equitable redevelopment in the Just City. 
To test the framework’s ability to capture policy tools in a quantitatively comparable way, I used 
it to code the plans, policy documents, and program descriptions of three city governments.22  










































































After the coding exercise, I reformulated the preliminary analytical categories and the list 
of policy tools described in Chapter 1 into survey questions, after consulting two survey 
methodology texts (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2014; Groves et al., 2004). During May and 
June 2016, I piloted the survey with eight individuals with expertise in housing, neighborhood, 
and/or economic development. The pilot phase aimed to ensure that the survey questions were 
appropriate measures of the constructs of interest (Groves et al., 2004). It included a group 
discussion, three one-on-one sessions lasting approximately an hour each, one shorter in-person 
discussion, and one instance where feedback was sent by email. The pilot reviewers collectively 
had experience working in neighborhood, city, state, and federal agencies; in the public, private, 
                                                 
22I included a city that has made mitigating displacement a priority (New York), a randomly-selected city 





and non-profit sectors; and in ten geographically diverse U.S. cities.23 The pilot stage evaluated 
‘content standards’ (whether the survey asked for the right information) and ‘cognitive 
standards’ (whether respondents could comprehend, and were inclined to answer, the questions), 
whereas ‘usability standards’ (the ability of respondents to complete the survey as desired by the 
researcher) were evaluated in the field pre-testing phase (Groves et al., 2004). The pilot stage 
resulted in the addition and rewording of questions and motivated the decision to split the survey 
into one on residential tools and another on commercial/inclusive development tools.  
Following the pilot stage, I pre-tested the survey with the 30 cities whose populations fell 
just below 200,000 (the 117th – 146th most populous cities). I identified respondents and their 
contact information using city government websites and emailed a personalized invitation to 
complete a web survey or a fillable PDF (Dillman et al., 2014). Respondents were sent both 
survey components if their position suggested they would have the knowledge to complete them. 
Otherwise, housing and commercial surveys were sent to different individuals. I followed up by 
email or phone two and four weeks after sending the invitations (Dillman et al., 2014). In the 
pre-test phase, 11 surveys were returned from ten cities (33% of surveyed cities) (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2. Response Rate by Survey Phase 
 






Residential survey 20% 48% 42% 
Commercial survey  20% 46% 41% 
Either survey 33% 60% 55% 
   
                                                 
23New York, LA, Chicago, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington D.C., Portland (OR), Miami, Oakland, 





Following pre-testing, I revised the survey to make the questions about policy tools in 
Parts III and IV shorter and more streamlined (Appendix 1). (The questions about policy 
environments did not change). Pre-testing revealed that respondents often skipped detailed policy 
questions, such as the year of a policy’s introduction, so these were removed from the survey. 
Minor wording changes were made to a few questions. The responses regarding commercial 
affordability policy tools indicated that cities typically undertook such action on a case-by-case 
basis rather than adopting formal policies; this section was therefore changed to ask about the 
intensity with which cities used various tools. I checked the validity of the pre-test responses by 
comparing all answers to the information in each city’s ordinances, policy documents, and 
program descriptions. The process revealed that the surveys were reliable and policy tools were 
categorized correctly.     
The final survey, which was distributed between October 2016 and March 2017 to the 
116 cities with populations over 200,000, asked respondents to indicate which of 20 residential 
affordability/displacement mitigation policy tools were proposed, adopted, or implemented in 
their jurisdictions,24 whether they had commercial rent regulation, and how actively they used six 
commercial affordability/inclusive economic development tools. The policy tools are listed in 
Table 3.3, and the survey is available in Appendix 1. The survey also documented cities’ 
processes for engaging residents in plans to redevelop their neighborhoods, asked about policy 
priorities, captured the level of input of private real estate industry groups on redevelopment and 
                                                 
24The survey specified that these could be laws, policies, or programs. While there are key differences 
among these, the survey and project were concerned with identifying whether some type of governmental 
framework for action existed in each policy area. The survey questions asking whether these initiatives 
were adopted or implemented then aimed to distinguish between frameworks that were in the ‘theoretical’ 
or ‘goal-setting’ phase and those where action was taken to secure results (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973, 
p. xxiii). The term ‘policy tool’ is thus used in this and other chapters to describe a formalized 




affordable housing plans, and asked how actively residents or advocacy groups had pressured the 
city to address displacement. It also asked whether cities had been influenced by interventions 
adopted elsewhere.  
 Table 3.3. Policy Tools Included in the Survey25 
Residential displacement mitigation policy tools 
 Rent regulations 
Short-term rental regulations 
No net loss policies 
Condo conversion regulations 
Vacancy controls 
Anti-speculation taxes 
Just cause eviction and anti-harassment ordinances 
Legal aid for tenants 
Right of first refusal when rental units are sold, converted, or rehabilitated 
Mandatory inclusionary zoning 
Voluntary inclusionary zoning 
Support for non-speculative/decommodified housing 
Property tax relief for homeowners 
Conversion of market-rate units to affordable housing 
Preservation of subsidized or regulated housing 
Affordable housing development on public land 
Conversion of financially or physically distressed units to affordable housing 
Funding/incentives for affordable housing 
Housing trust fund 
Reinvesting increased property tax revenue in affordable housing 
Commercial displacement mitigation policy tools 
 Commercial rent regulation 
 Assistance/incentives for landlords to provide small businesses with affordable/long-term leases 
Assistance for historically or culturally significant local businesses 
Restrictions on the locations where national chain retailers can operate 
Set-asides of affordable commercial space for locally-owned small businesses 
Set-asides of affordable commercial space for minority-owned businesses 
Inclusive economic development policy tools 
 Set-asides of construction or retail for residents of the affected neighborhood 
 
 
                                                 
25A city may have many interventions that fall under the same qualitative policy tool. The dataset captures 
each of these interventions. However, I could not account for the scope of different programs, and 
therefore could not distinguish between a city with one very well-funded and heavily-used intervention 
and one with two less prolific ones. Therefore, a city that has two legal aid interventions is considered to 




In the final phase, 82 surveys were completed for 70 different cities (60% of the 116 
cities with over 200,000 residents) (Table 3.2). The total response (including the pre-test and 
final phase) consisted of 94 surveys from 80 different cities (55% of those surveyed).26 This 
included 62 housing surveys (42% of those surveyed) and 60 commercial surveys (41% of those 
surveyed). This response rate is in the normal range for studies that use surveys of local 
governments to ask about policy tools (Conroy, 2006; Jepson, 2004; Lehning, 2012; Saha & 
Paterson, 2008). 
The pre-test survey components on policy environments and residential policy tools 
collected the same information as the final survey, were verified and supplemented in the same 
way (as described in the next section), and relied on the same sampling strategy (a purposive 
sample of the largest U.S. cities). These pre-test observations were therefore included in the 
dataset to increase the efficiency of the study (Thabane et al., 2010).27 For 17 cities that 
completed the policy environment and commercial/inclusive development survey components 
but not the housing component, I collected information on the relevant housing policy tools 
using policy documents, ordinances, and program descriptions.28 The residential dataset thus has 




                                                 
26One commercial affordability survey from a pre-test city was returned during the final phase.   
 
27The pre-test data on commercial displacement and inclusive development mitigation tools were 
evaluated differently from the final round surveys and were therefore not included in analyses. 
 
28Based on the very high level of correspondence between the information contained in the policy 
documents I systematically reviewed and that included in survey responses on policy tools, I am confident 






For each city, I verified and supplemented the residential affordability survey responses 
through a review of ordinances, plans, policy documents, and program descriptions. As the 
survey questions on commercial affordability/inclusive development asked about the intensity of 
use of different tools rather than their status, these programs were captured in the dataset as an 
index of activity rather than an inventory of policy details.  
For each intervention to address residential affordability and displacement that a city had 
proposed or in place, I captured the following information: the policy tool(s) it used (e.g. rent 
regulation, right of first refusal, inclusionary zoning); the name of the intervention; the 
intervention status (proposed, adopted, or implemented); the geographic focus (e.g. city-wide, in 
gentrifying neighborhoods, in neighborhoods targeted for growth); the level(s) of government 
that financed the intervention; the level(s) of government that administered the intervention; the 
type of displacement addressed; the tenure targeted; and the income group targeted. For tools 
like inclusionary zoning that require or incentivize construction of affordable units, I also 
captured whether units were required to be built on-site, could be built off-site, or could be 
substituted for a fee, and documented the percentage of affordable units required and the 
duration of affordability.  
Each record in the database also included documentation of the sources consulted and 
excerpts of relevant text. Sources included ordinances, housing plans, comprehensive plans, 
reports to HUD on the use of entitlement funding, and descriptions of programs on housing and 
community development department websites.29 The survey responses and policy document 
                                                 
29In addition to reviewing these sources for all survey respondent cities, I also reviewed policy documents 
for other cities within the study sample of the 146 largest cities to obtain additional information on policy 
environments and specific policy tools. Although this information is not included in the quantitative 
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coding were entered into a Microsoft Access database and converted to a Stata dataset. The final 
dataset has information on 724 city-level interventions to address affordability and displacement, 
either generally or in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Each category in the database was 
quality-checked extensively to ensure consistency.  
 
Categorizing Policy Tools  
The displacement mitigation policy tools that are the focus of this study directly protect 
low-income households’ ability to afford housing, and meet their cultural and commercial needs, 
in neighborhoods where rising costs raise the threat of displacement. However, several of the 
tools included in the study can either be used to mitigate displacement in such neighborhoods or 
to address affordability on a broader scale. For example, an intervention that funds the 
acquisition and rent-restriction of market-rate units affordable to low-income households can be 
used city-wide or targeted at neighborhoods where housing costs are rising. Interventions that 
target neighborhoods at risk of gentrification are likely to be more effective in addressing the 
needs of lower-income households in these areas because of the increased urgency and cost of 
acting in appreciating markets. My dataset and analyses therefore distinguish between 
interventions that are broadly targeted and those directed at neighborhoods experiencing 
reinvestment, redevelopment, revitalization, rezoning, or growth.  
While the distinction is important, affordability and displacement mitigation interventions 
that are not directly targeted at gentrifying neighborhoods were also included in this study, for 
several reasons. First, many tools that apply to qualifying units city-wide, such as rent regulation 
                                                 
analyses, excerpts from these cities’ documents are included in the descriptive overviews of environments 




or just cause eviction, can be particularly important for addressing displacement in areas at risk 
of gentrification. Second, broad financing tools like housing trust funds provide flexible 
resources that can be marshalled in appreciating areas when the need arises. Third, 
neighborhoods that are not currently at risk of gentrification may appreciate in the future; 
investing in long-term affordability through measures such as CLTs can guard against 
displacement when markets turn. Finally, many cities are struggling with city-wide affordability 
crises that can aggravate neighborhood-specific gentrification pressures. This study therefore 
provides a resource for understanding and comparing how cities are addressing both issues. 
This section describes the policy tools captured in the residential affordability dataset. It 
classifies each tool by the type of displacement addressed and the type of action taken (Table 
3.4). The types of displacement were drawn from Marcuse’s (1986) framework. I identified six 
types of policy action: (1) tools that regulate market activity, (2) tools that strengthen tenants’ 
rights, (3) the use of zoning to require or incentivize affordable housing development, (4) the 
investment of public resources in establishing or prolonging affordability covenants on existing 
low-cost land or housing, (5) the investment of public resources in creating new affordable 
housing units, and (6) the establishment of dedicated revenue streams for affordable housing. 
Individual interventions may combine multiple types of action; for example, many inclusionary 
zoning programs also provide subsidies to developers, and rent regulation laws often include 
tenant protections. However, the simplified categorization provides a framework for 






Table 3.4. Residential Displacement Mitigation Tools Categorized by Types of Action and 
Displacement Addressed 
 
Type of action  Policy tool Primary type(s) of 
displacement addressed 
Regulating market activity 
 Rent regulation Physical 
 Short-term rental regulation Economic, exclusionary, 
displacement pressure 
 No net loss policies Economic and exclusionary 
 Condo conversion regulations Economic and exclusionary 
 Vacancy controls Overall affordability 
 Anti-speculation taxes Overall affordability 
Strengthening tenants’ rights 
 Just cause eviction and anti-harassment 
ordinances 
Physical 
 Legal aid for tenants Physical 
 Right of first refusal when rental units are sold, 
converted or rehabilitated 
Economic and physical 
Zoning for affordable housing development 
 Mandatory inclusionary zoning Exclusionary* 
 Voluntary inclusionary zoning Exclusionary* 
Using public resources to extend affordability of low-cost land/housing 
 Support for non-speculative/decommodified 
housing 
Exclusionary* 
 Property tax relief for homeowners Economic 
 Conversion of market-rate units to affordable 
housing 
Exclusionary* 
 Preservation of subsidized or regulated housing Economic, physical, 
exclusionary  
 Homeowner/renter repair programs Economic and physical 
Using public resources to create new affordable units 
 Affordable housing development on public land Exclusionary* 
 Conversion of financially or physically distressed 
units to affordable housing 
Exclusionary* 
 Funding/incentives for affordable housing Exclusionary* 
Dedicating revenue streams for affordable housing 
 Housing trust fund Physical, economic and 
exclusionary  
 Reinvesting increased property tax revenue in 
affordable housing 
Exclusionary* 
*If interventions in these categories include provisions giving preference for units to lower-income households in 
the affected neighborhood, they can also address economic displacement. 
81 
 
Finally, this section describes how I categorized interventions as either specifically 
addressing displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification, or as addressing 
affordability and displacement more broadly. In general, interventions were categorized as 
addressing gentrification-induced displacement if they targeted neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification, addressed the types of displacement that are common in these areas, or possessed 
the flexibility needed to address the rapid changes that characterize this process.  
1. Policy Tools that Regulate Market Activity 
Rent regulation: This category captures interventions that establish annual limits on the 
rent increases that landlords can charge incumbent tenants in applicable units. It also includes 
interventions that require landlords to give tenants advance notice of, and relocation assistance to 
compensate for, rent increases above a certain percentage. Rent regulation interventions were 
always considered to directly mitigate gentrification-induced displacement because of their 
ability to protect tenants in appreciating neighborhoods from economic displacement. 
Short-term rental regulation: Cities’ approaches to addressing the impact of short-term 
rentals were captured in this category. Such interventions can address economic and 
exclusionary displacement when they reduce the removal of long-term rental units from the 
market, and displacement pressure when they limit the changes to neighborhood culture that can 
accompany an influx of tourists. Interventions were considered to directly address gentrification-
induced displacement when they banned the short-term rental of entire units or non-primary 
residences, required hosts to obtain a conditional use permit, capped the number of rentals 
allowed, limited the days per year that a unit could be rented out to short-term guests, or 
prohibited such rentals in residential zones. Interventions that required hosts to register, obtain a 
license, and/or pay a transient occupancy tax were not considered to address either gentrification-
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induced displacement or overall affordability, unless a portion of the tax was directed to 
affordable housing. In that case, the intervention was considered to address overall affordability.  
No net loss policies: This category captures interventions that require one-for-one 
replacement of subsidized, rent-regulated, and/or below-market-rate units. They may apply city-
wide or in specific areas, to projects receiving certain types of financing, or to specific types of 
units. No net loss policies were considered to mitigate economic and exclusionary displacement 
from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification when they applied to affordable units in areas that 
are experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment. When policies applied city-wide or in other 
areas, they were considered to address affordability and displacement more generally.   
Condominium conversion regulations: Interventions in this category regulate the 
conversion of rental units to condominiums by limiting the number of conversions that are 
permitted annually, prohibiting conversions when the city’s rental vacancy rate falls below a 
certain level, requiring relocation assistance for displaced tenants, and/or requiring a review of 
the project’s potential impact on existing tenants or the city’s low-income housing stock prior to 
approval.30 Interventions in this category were considered to mitigate gentrification-induced 
economic displacement if they mandated assistance for existing tenants to find a comparable unit 
in the same neighborhood. They were considered to address gentrification-induced economic and 
exclusionary displacement if they required the maintenance of low-income housing on-site or if 
the effect on the low-income housing stock or the property owner’s history of evictions and rent 
increases were eligible grounds for rejecting an application. Provisions for non-geographically 
                                                 
30Interventions that only required tenant notification or prohibited eviction during the period prior to 
conversion were not captured, as these do not provide long-term protection for tenants nor a disincentive 




targeted relocation assistance were considered to address broad affordability, as these do not 
necessarily enable displaced households to remain in the area. 
Vacancy controls: In neighborhoods where property values are expected to appreciate, 
owners may keep properties vacant until it is profitable to sell them. This category captured 
measures aimed at limiting such property ‘warehousing,’ including those that require landlords 
to register and pay a fee for vacant units. Because interventions in this category do not directly 
address displacement but rather aim to reduce speculation, they were coded as addressing overall 
affordability.31  
Anti-speculation taxes: Interventions in this category aim to disincentivize speculative 
property transfers (which typically involve the purchase, renovation, and quick sale of previously 
lower-cost buildings) and/or allow city governments to capture a portion of the profits realized 
through these transfers. Such measures were considered to address overall affordability.   
2. Policy Tools that Strengthen Tenants’ Rights 
Just cause eviction and anti-harassment ordinances: This category captured laws that 
establish penalties for harassment and/or outline specific reasons for which tenants can be 
evicted. While every city in the study was bound by state laws governing eviction, they can also 
have city-level legislation that applies to all tenants or to those in rent-regulated units. Just cause 
eviction ordinances were considered to directly mitigate gentrification-induced, physical 
displacement whenever they were in place.  
Legal aid for tenants: Interventions in this category provide legal aid to tenants whose 
landlords are harassing or evicting them. These measures were considered to mitigate 
                                                 
31Interventions aimed at eliminating blight, such as those concerning abandoned or nuisance properties, 
were not captured. 
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gentrification-induced displacement regardless of whether they were geographically targeted, 
because anti-harassment or -eviction legal assistance that is available city-wide provides a direct 
tool to address the types of physical displacement that are common in gentrifying neighborhoods.   
Right of first refusal when rental units are sold, converted or rehabilitated: Right of first 
refusal ordinances require owners who intend to sell or renovate rental units, or to convert them 
to condominiums, to first offer the units to the existing tenants for rent or purchase. Such 
measures most commonly apply to condo conversions and give the tenant a period within which 
they have the sole right to purchase the unit. After that, the owner is prohibited from offering the 
unit to an external buyer at a more favorable price. Right of first refusal policies typically include 
provisions protecting tenants from eviction, exploitative rent increases, or construction intrusions 
that might force them out before they can exercise this right. Others require that low-income, 
elderly, or disabled tenants be granted lifetime leases for their units (with limits on subsequent 
rent increases). Right of first refusal policies were considered to mitigate economic displacement 
in gentrifying areas if they included provisions to assist tenants to purchase their units or 
provided lifetime leases. Measures that established a right of first purchase but did not include 
provisions for purchase assistance were considered to address physical displacement more 
broadly, as they enable existing tenants with the means to do so to remain in their unit.  
3. Policy Tools that Use Zoning for Affordable Housing Development 
Mandatory and voluntary inclusionary zoning: Inclusionary zoning programs incentivize 
or require developers to include a percentage of below-market-rate units in new developments. 
This may apply to projects above a certain size, in a specific area, receiving certain types of 
financing, or receiving a zoning variance. Inclusionary programs typically include options to 
build affordable units off-site or to pay a fee in lieu of constructing them. Some offer incentives 
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for units to be built on-site or to target lower income levels. This tool harnesses developers’ 
desire to build market-rate units in appreciating neighborhoods. As such, programs that required 
or provided incentives for affordable units to be built on-site, in the same area, or in another 
growth-targeted neighborhood were categorized as mitigating gentrification-induced 
exclusionary displacement. Programs that required on-site replacement of displaced low-income 
units were also coded as mitigating gentrification-induced exclusionary displacement. When 
those residing in the affected neighborhood were granted preference for on-site inclusionary 
units, the program was coded as addressing economic displacement as well.32 Programs allowing 
for in-lieu fees or off-site construction were categorized as addressing overall affordability. 
Cases where the exercise of off-site or in-lieu options was at the discretion of city officials, and 
where in-lieu fees were used to address displacement associated with development, were coded 
as mitigating gentrification-induced exclusionary displacement.    
4. Policy Tools that Use Public Resources to Extend Affordability of Low-cost 
Land/Housing 
Support for non-speculative/decommodified housing: This category captures initiatives 
that provide funding, land, or other assistance to non-market housing forms, such as CLTs. 
Programs were considered to mitigate gentrification-induced exclusionary displacement when 
utilized in neighborhoods experiencing, or expected to experience, rising values. Programs used 
in other neighborhoods or city-wide were considered to address overall affordability.  
Property tax relief for homeowners: This category captures interventions that provide 
property tax breaks to homeowners, including city-wide programs for residents below a certain 
income level and those targeting neighborhoods with rising property values. The former policy 
                                                 
32This rule was applied to all policy tools that gave preference to affected households or neighborhood 
residents when affordable housing units were preserved or created. 
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type was categorized under broad affordability/displacement mitigation measures and the latter 
was considered to mitigate gentrification-induced economic displacement.  
Conversion of market-rate units to affordable housing: Interventions in this category 
finance the acquisition of unsubsidized properties to establish rent limits on future rentals or 
provide incentives for owners of market-rate properties occupied by lower-income households to 
agree to rent restrictions. These interventions were considered to mitigate gentrification-induced 
economic and exclusionary displacement when they targeted appreciating neighborhoods, and to 
address affordability more broadly otherwise.   
Preservation of subsidized or regulated housing: Investments in the long-term physical 
or financial viability of subsidized or rent-limited housing were captured here. Interventions 
included providing financial assistance for property owners to extend the affordability terms of 
subsidized units; facilitating the acquisition of such properties for retention as affordable 
housing; and investing in the rehabilitation of public or rent-regulated housing. Initiatives to 
redevelop public housing were considered to mitigate physical displacement in neighborhoods at 
risk of gentrification if demolished units were required to be replaced on-site, and to address 
overall affordability if demolished units were to be replaced without locational restrictions. 
Extensions of affordability contracts were coded as mitigating gentrification-induced economic 
and exclusionary displacement if they targeted projects in redeveloping or appreciating areas, 
and to address overall affordability otherwise.  
Homeowner/renter repair programs:33 This category included home repair grants or 
loans for low- or moderate-income homeowners to avert economic or physical displacement, as 
                                                 
33This tool was not included in the survey but was added during supplementary coding. Open-ended 
survey responses and the review of policy documents demonstrated it was a common and well-
documented tool that cities use to mitigate displacement. 
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well as programs that fund repairs to multifamily rental housing occupied by low- or moderate-
income households. These interventions were considered to address overall affordability/ 
displacement mitigation unless they targeted neighborhoods at risk of gentrifying. 
5. Policy Tools that Use Public Resources to Create New Affordable Units 
Affordable housing development on public land: Interventions in this category allocate 
vacant or underutilized public property for affordable housing development. Typically, such 
initiatives provide land to non-profit developers at a discount for the construction of below-
market-rate units. Public land may also be placed in a land bank or trust to preserve below-
market-rate values in perpetuity. Interventions in this category were considered to advance 
overall affordability unless they were specifically deployed to address exclusionary displacement 
in neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment.  
Conversion of financially or physically distressed units to affordable housing: This 
category captured interventions that facilitate the conversion of properties that are vacant, 
substandard, foreclosed, or tax-delinquent to affordable housing. Examples include tax 
exemptions for developers who convert vacant properties to affordable housing and the transfer 
of tax-foreclosed properties to developers who agree to lease or sell units at below-market rates. 
Such programs were considered to mitigate gentrification-induced exclusionary displacement if 
targeted at neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment, and overall 
affordability/displacement in other cases. 
Funding/incentives for affordable housing: This category includes interventions that 
provide public funding or other incentives for affordable housing development that were not 
captured in other categories. Examples include grants, low-interest loans, and tax exemptions for 
affordable housing development. Funding sources include local housing bonds, local general 
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funds, and tax credit or grant funding from state and federal governments. Interventions were 
categorized as addressing overall affordability/displacement mitigation unless they targeted areas 
experiencing, or expected to experience, reinvestment, or redevelopment.  
6. Policy Tools that Dedicate Revenue Streams for Affordable Housing 
Housing trust funds: This category captured dedicated funding sources that were devoted 
to affordable housing. Such funds are financed through a variety of mechanisms, including 
property taxes, transient occupancy taxes, in-lieu fees from inclusionary programs, development 
linkage fees, and general funds. Because of their specific relevance to economic, physical, and 
exclusionary displacement mitigation in areas at risk of gentrification, these interventions were 
coded as direct tools for this purpose regardless of their geographic targeting. 
Reinvesting increased property tax revenue in affordable housing: Interventions in this 
category allocate a portion of property tax revenue generated in a district with rising property 
values to affordable housing in that area. This includes using TIF funds to finance affordable 
housing. Interventions were considered to mitigate gentrification-induced exclusionary 
displacement when they financed affordable housing within the appreciating district, and overall 
affordability when they were used to finance affordable housing in other areas or city-wide.  
 
Policy Status 
 I categorized interventions as ‘proposed,’ ‘adopted,’ or ‘implemented’ based on survey 
responses and policy documents. When drawing on policy documents, interventions were 
categorized as ‘implemented’ if there was evidence of their implementation, such as a record of 
units constructed/preserved or tenants represented. The extensive documentation provided in 
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cities’ policy and program reports facilitated this exercise. In cases where such evidence was not 
present, but the intervention existed on paper, it was coded as ‘adopted’.  
 
Income Levels 
 Where applicable, the dataset captured the income level(s) to which an intervention was 
targeted. While in certain cases income levels are not relevant, as with rent control, just cause 
eviction, short-term rental laws, vacancy controls, and anti-speculation taxes, the majority of the 
study interventions are only likely to assist those most vulnerable to displacement if they target 
extremely/very low, low, or moderate-income households.34,35 For such tools, an intervention 
was considered to mitigate displacement if it targeted one of these income levels and/or referred 
to ‘affordable’ or ‘below-market-rate’ housing. Interventions that targeted middle-income or 
senior households were included if they specifically aimed to mitigate displacement from 
gentrifying areas.  
 
                                                 
34The dataset captured the income level that each intervention targeted where this was specified, and 
categorized income levels according to the common categorizations that emerged in policy documents. 
Below 30% AMI constitutes ‘extremely low-income’; 30-50% AMI constitutes ‘very low-income’; 50-
80% AMI constitutes ‘low-income’; 80-120% AMI constitutes ‘moderate-income’, and 120%-150% AMI 
constitutes ‘middle-income’ (e.g. City of New York, 2014; Florida Housing Financing Corporation, 2017; 
State of California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2016; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2017c).  
 
35The metropolitan area used to calculate AMI can include jurisdictions beyond the city limits that have a 
higher median income than the city itself. As a result, affordable housing measures have been criticized 
for the mismatch between the AMI levels they target and the income levels of local residents (Abello, 
2017b; Manhattan Community Board 10, 2013; The National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2017). It is 
beyond the scope of this study to assess the appropriateness of each intervention’s income targeting in the 
neighborhood to which it applies, but I descriptively examine the income levels targeted by such 




Program Levels and Financing 
 The dataset also captured the level(s) of government involved in financing and 
administering each intervention. While the analyses in Chapters 5-7 focus on interventions that 
are established by city ordinances or administered by city agencies,36 these may be financed by 
any level of government. For example, a city that uses CDBG funding for the acquisition and 
rent-restriction of market-rate housing was considered to have a city-level program in this 
category, since a city agency decides how to use the funds. Programs jointly administered by the 
city and other levels of government were also included.  
 
Analyzing the Conditions Associated with Displacement Mitigation Policy Action 
 The data on policy tools described above was examined in a series of multivariate 
regression models that analyzed the conditions associated with city governments’ displacement 
mitigation action.37 I examined this question from three angles: 1) how do local conditions affect 
the intensity of cities’ displacement mitigation frameworks? 2) what is the relationship between 
these conditions and the likelihood that cities will address direct displacement? and 3) how do 
these conditions affect the type of action that city governments take to mitigate displacement? 
This section discusses the operationalization of the variables used in the analyses. Chapter 6 
outlines the hypotheses tested in each model.   
 
 
                                                 
36Or metro/county-level in cases of consolidated government.   
 
37Due to the very low number of cities that had commercial displacement mitigation policy tools in place 






Model 1: Intensity of Displacement Mitigation Approach (Poisson Regression) 
 
The first dependent variable captures the number of policy tools cities have adopted to 
mitigate residential displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification (out of the 19 tools 
captured).38 The main dependent variable counts all adopted policy tools, regardless of their 
implementation status, while a second version of the model analyzes the conditions associated 
with the number of displacement mitigation policy tools that a city has implemented.  
Model 2: Probability of Adopting a Direct Displacement Tool (Logistic Regression) 
 
The second outcome analyzed is a binary variable indicating whether a city has adopted 
at least one intervention that addresses direct physical or economic displacement in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Direct displacement measures are the most likely to 
benefit incumbent residents of these neighborhoods. An analysis of indirect displacement tools 
was not conducted due to the small number of cities without at least one intervention in this 
category.  
Model 3: Type of Action Taken to Mitigate Displacement (Poisson Regression) 
 
The displacement mitigation tools analyzed in this study involve diverse types of action. 
The third analysis conducted in Chapter 6 categorizes tools into two groups: those that primarily 
use regulations or zoning to address displacement, and those that use funding or other public 
resources to do so. The dependent variable is the count of policy tools adopted in each category.  
 
 
                                                 
38Because the regression analyses focus on tools that mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification, two tools (vacancy controls and anti-speculation taxes) that do not directly address 




After grouping the data into these categories, I examined each tool’s correlations to the 
overall index (item-test correlation) and to the other items in the index (item-rest correlation). 
One tool that scored considerably lower on both measures than the others (the use of public land 
for affordable housing) was omitted from the indices but included as a control variable in both 
models. The groupings displayed high internal consistency. The ‘regulation/ zoning’ index had a 




 This section details the independent variables used to operationalize the policy action 
theses included in the analyses (Table 3.6).  
Problem Severity/Need 
 
 The primary measure of need used in the regression analyses is the level of gentrification, 
as proxied by the percentage of tracts that gentrified between 2000 and 2010. Drawing on the 
methods used in previous research, I categorized each census tract in the study cities as ‘non-
gentrifiable,’ ‘gentrified,’ or ‘not gentrified’ (e.g. Ding et al., 2016; Freeman, 2005; Maciag, 
Table 3.5. Categorization of Policy Tools by Primary Action 
Regulations/zoning index Funding/resources index 
Condo conversion regulations Legal aid for tenants 
Right of first refusal Support for decommodified housing  
No net loss/one-for-one replacement  Conversion of market-rate to deed/rent-restricted 
units 
Mandatory inclusionary zoning Preservation of subsidized/regulated housing 
Voluntary inclusionary zoning Housing trust fund/dedicated revenue source 
Short-term rental regulations Conversion of distressed housing to deed/rent-
restricted units 
Just cause eviction Tax breaks for homeowners 
Rent regulation Funding for affordable housing development 
 Homeowner/renter repair programs 




2015). Census tracts were considered eligible to gentrify if they had median incomes below the 
median for the metro area in 2000. Eligible tracts were categorized as gentrified if, between 2000 
and 2010, they experienced a percentage increase in median rent or housing price above the 
percent change in median rent or housing price for the metro area, as well as an above-median 
increase in the share of residents with a college degree.39 Some model specifications used the 
change in median home value between 2000 and 2010 as a proxy for need, and others used a 
dichotomous variable that characterized high-gentrification cities as those in which over 50% of 
eligible census tracts gentrified between 2000 and 2010 (the 75th percentile for the sample). One 
analysis tested a broader measure of need: the level of median gross rent, which I obtained from 
the 2011-2015 American Community Survey (ACS).  
Interest Groups  
 
The analyses include two measures of interest group influence: the level of community 
pressure to address displacement and the level of private real estate input on affordable housing 
and redevelopment plans. Data on community pressure came from a survey question that asked 
how actively residents or advocacy groups pressured the city government to address affordability 
in neighborhoods experiencing redevelopment or reinvestment. Options included ‘not at all,’ ‘not 
actively,’ ‘somewhat actively,’ and ‘very actively’. Due to a small number of responses in the 
lowest categories, ‘not at all’ and ‘not actively’ responses were combined. The categorical 
variable received a value of 1 (inactive pressure), 2 (somewhat active pressure), or 3 (very active 
pressure). In the logistic regression, this variable was treated as binary due to a small number of 
observations in one cell in cross-tabulations with the dependent variable. The binary measure had 
a value of 0 if pressure was not present/not active and 1 if it was somewhat/very active. Pro-
                                                 
39Data were obtained from the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, & Stults, n.d.). 
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development groups’ influence on displacement mitigation planning was measured by two 
survey questions that asked how actively private real estate industry groups provide input on the 
city’s redevelopment plans and affordable housing plans, using the four-point response scale 
above. I took the average of the ratings on these questions to create a continuous variable. 
Table 3.6. Independent Variables Used in Main Analyses and Alternate Specifications 
 




The percentage of eligible tracts that 
gentrified between 2000 and 2010 (treated 
as dichotomous in one model) 
Calculation of Longitudinal 
Tract Database (from Census 
2000 and ACS 2008-12) 
2000 - 
2010 
Median gross rent American Community Survey 2011-15 
Change in median home value between 
2000 and 2010 
Calculation of Longitudinal 
Tract Database (from Census 





Pro-affordable housing community pressure Survey of city governments 2016/17 
Real estate input on affordable housing/ 
redevelopment 




Median house value American Community Survey 2011-15 
Per capita general revenue Census Bureau Survey of State 
& Local Government Finance 
2014 
Per capita property tax revenue Census Bureau Survey of State 







Percentage of the population that identifies 
as African American 
American Community Survey 2011-15 





Adoption of living wage ordinance by 2006 Swarts & Vasi 2011 2006 
State regulatory and financial support for 
affordable housing 
National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, 2014 
 




Number of tools adopted in 
regulation/zoning and funding/resources 
categories 
Survey of city governments 2016/17 
 
Fiscal and Economic Strength 
 
Alternate model specifications account for cities’ fiscal and economic strength using the 
median housing value, per capita general revenue, and per capita property tax revenue. Data on 
median housing values were obtained from the 2011-2015 ACS, while data on per capita general 
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and property tax revenue were drawn from the 2014 Survey of State and Local Governments (the 
most recent dataset available at the time of this study) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). 
Locational Demand 
 
 Locational demand was proxied using the city’s total population, which was drawn from 
the 2011-2015 ACS. 
Public Support for Redistributive Housing Policies  
 
Based on evidence that jurisdictions with higher percentages of the population identifying 
as African American have higher levels of redistributive housing action, and considering the 
disproportionate impact that gentrification can have on neighborhoods with high percentages of 
African American residents, the regression models control for the percentage of residents 
identifying as African American according to the 2011-2015 ACS.  
I also constructed a new political culture variable. Based on the literature (DeLeon & 
Naff, 2004; Florida, 2005; Paterson & Saha, 2010; Rosdil, 2011, 2013; Saha, 2009; Sharp, 2005), 
I identified seven variables commonly associated with a city’s political culture: the percentage of 
the population aged 18-44; the percentage of individuals living alone or with non-relatives; the 
percentage of same-sex partner households; the percentage of women in the workforce; the 
percentage of residents in professional, technical, educational, creative, or knowledge-based 
jobs; the percentage of the workforce that bikes or walks to work; and the percentage of residents 
over 25 with a college degree. After extracting these variables from the 2011-2015 ACS and 
standardizing them, I constructed an index of new political culture using regression factor 
scores.40 The index shows a high degree of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86).  
                                                 
40This method weights each variable’s contribution to the index according to the strength of its association 
with the underlying factor being measured, and accounts for the correlations among the initial variables. 





State-level affordable housing policies can require, facilitate, reduce the need for, or 
impede city-level action. The analyses control for this influence through a variable that assigns 
states one point each for permitting (i.e. not explicitly prohibiting) rent regulation and mandatory 
inclusionary zoning (National Multifamily Housing Council, 2017) and one additional point for 
each capital/production program listed in the National Low Income Housing Coalition’s (2014) 
database of rental housing programs.  
The literature on incrementalism and research on policy action suggest that cities’ 
displacement mitigation approaches are likely to be influenced by a history of progressive policy 
action. This concept is proxied by a variable that indicates whether a city had a living wage 
ordinance in 2006 – ten years before the current study. I obtained a list of these cities from 
Swarts & Vasi’s (2011) study. In the models that examine different categories of action, the 
number of regulation/zoning tools is included as an independent variable when the number of 
funding/resources tools is examined as an outcome, and vice versa. These variables serve as a 
more direct proxy for a supportive policy environment in these models.   
 




Following the regression analyses, I carried out semi-structured follow-up interviews 
with city officials and community advocates in a representative subset of study cities. As the goal 
of the interviews was to contextualize and expand on the quantitative findings, I first performed a 
                                                 
rotation was not applicable. Bartlett’s test indicated sufficient correlation among the underlying variables 




cluster analysis that categorized the cities in the regression analyses into groups based on 
similarities across the included independent variables.41 The analysis yielded four groupings:  
Group 1 (Low-demand, low-resource cities with relatively unsupportive 
political/policy environments): The 27 cities in this group had relatively low levels of 
gentrification, with 59% scoring in the lowest third of the sample on this measure. The average 
property value and per capita general revenue for this group were also well below the average for 
the full sample. Half of cities in this group scored in the bottom third of the sample on these 
indicators and over 80% scored in the lowest two-thirds. Cities in this group also tended to have 
considerably smaller populations than the average city in the sample. They had relatively 
unsupportive state environments, experienced inactive community pressure to address 
displacement, and had an average new political culture score well below the full-sample average. 
Only 11% of cities in this group had a living wage ordinance as of 2006. The average percentage 
of residents identifying as African American was similar to the full-sample average.  Levels of 
real estate input on affordable housing plans were slightly below average for the sample.  
Group 2 (Moderate-demand, moderate-resource cities with relatively supportive 
political/policy environments): Among the 21 cities in this group, the majority experienced 
moderate-to-high levels of gentrification. The average property value was comparable to the full-
sample average, but the average population was lower. These cities tended to have higher-than-
average per capita general revenue, state support for affordable housing, percentages of the 
                                                 
41I used agglomerative hierarchical clustering, which ‘start[s] with each point as a singleton cluster and 
then repeatedly merg[es] the two closest clusters until a single, all-encompassing cluster remains’ (Tan, 
Steinbach, & Kumar, 2005, p. 495). I used the group average version of this technique, which defines 
cluster proximity ‘as the average pairwise proximity among all pairs of points in the different clusters’ 
(Tan et al., 2005, p. 521). Finally, because the dataset contained a mix of continuous and binary variables 




population identifying as African American, and new political culture scores. These cities 
typically experienced somewhat active pressure to address displacement and had real estate input 
levels that were slightly below average. A fifth had a living wage ordinance as of 2006. 
Group 3 (High-demand, moderate-resource cities with mixed policy/political 
environments): The 25 cities in this group had relatively high levels of gentrification, with 
nearly half in the top third of the sample. This group also had an average property value that was 
slightly higher than the full-sample average, with three quarters of cities scoring in the top or 
middle third. The average per capita revenue was slightly below the full-sample average, while 
the average population was slightly higher. These cities tended to have state environments that 
were slightly less supportive than the average city in the sample, but their new political culture 
scores were slightly higher than average. The average percentage of residents identifying as 
African American was similar to the full sample. All the cities in this group experienced very 
active community pressure to address displacement, and levels of real estate input were also 
higher than the full-sample average. A quarter had a living wage ordinance as of 2006.  
Group 4 (High-demand, high-resource cities with very supportive policy/political 
environments): The four cities in this group had high levels of gentrification, with three in the 
top third and one in the middle third of the sample. All had property values in the top third of the 
sample. The average per capita general revenue for this sub-sample was three times that of the 
full sample, and all cities fell in the top third of the sample on this indicator. These cities also had 
populations in the top third of the sample and an average percentage of residents identifying as 
African American that was below the full-sample average. The average state support score in 
these cities was nearly double that of the full sample. All the cities in this group experienced very 
active pressure to address displacement, all had a living wage ordinance in 2006, and their 
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average new political culture score was considerably higher than the full-sample average.  Levels 
of real estate input were also much higher than average for the sample. 
 To ensure that interview cities were representative of the contexts included in the 
regression models, I interviewed respondents from at least two localities in each of these four 
clusters. I ultimately recruited participants from nine study cities and one national non-profit 
organization that works with cities across the country. Respondent cities were regionally diverse, 
with two Western, two Southern, two Northeastern, and three Midwestern cities represented 
(Table 3.7). Although city officials were my primary population of interest, when interviews 
with these individuals or my pre-interview review of media reports revealed that certain 
community groups had been actively involved in the policy issues this study examines, I reached 
out to those groups to gather additional information on the conditions associated with 
displacement mitigation action. I interviewed four advocacy group members, including one from 
a national non-profit organization. 
Table 3.7. List and Description of Interviewees 
 
Interview  Location Interviewee description 
1 Midwestern city Planning manager 
2 Southern city  Community development director 
3 New York City, NY Senior planning official 
4 Columbus, OH Community development professional 
5 Providence, RI Community development official 
6 New York City, NY Executive director of a community development 
organization 
7 Minneapolis, MN Senior housing official 
8 National non-profit housing 
organization 
Executive staff member    
9 Western city  Director of housing development 
10 New York City, NY Senior housing official 
11 Western city  Housing policy manager 
12 Twin cities (Minneapolis-St. 
Paul) 
Tenant advocate 
13 Columbus and Franklin County, 
OH 
Interim executive director of a local affordable 
housing advocacy organization 
14 Southern city  Official in the city manager’s office  
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Interview Protocol and Procedures 
 
Interviews were conducted by phone and lasted between twenty-five minutes and an 
hour. Prior to each interview, I sent the respondent an information sheet describing the study. I 
also read a telephone script that described the scope of participation. Interviewees verbally 
consented to participate and to be recorded. To ensure that respondents were comfortable giving 
candid answers, I started each interview by discussing with the interviewee how they wished to 
be described if I quoted them. Some asked that their city names be kept confidential and 
preferred that I use the census region in which their city is located (Table 3.7). In these cases, I 
took additional steps to ensure that the city could not be identified, such as omitting or 
anonymizing details about policies, programs, or local politics described by the interviewees 
(Kaiser, 2012).  
Each semi-structured interview was guided by a set of interview questions that sought a 
deeper understanding of the conditions that motivate and enable city governments to address 
displacement and the processes through which these relationships operate (Appendix 2). The 
interview questions built on the broad themes, specific hypotheses, and major findings of 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. I focused on understanding participants’ perceptions of the balance between 
the need for reinvestment and the need to mitigate displacement; the major barriers and 
opportunities to adopting and implementing displacement mitigation policy tools; and the ways 
in which the city’s economic, fiscal, political, and policy environments influence displacement 
mitigation planning and policymaking. I tailored the questions to each city’s context by 
reviewing survey responses, housing plans, media stories, and descriptive statistics.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. I used NVivo qualitative software to code 
the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the interviews following multiple line-by-line 
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readings (Padgett, 1998). Because the interviews were conducted to elaborate on the results of 
the quantitative phase, I developed ‘a priori codes’ based on pre-identified themes; however, the 
first reading of the transcripts was open-ended and identified ‘empirical codes’ that emerged 
from the interviews (Gibson & Brown, 2017, p. 131; Padgett, 1998). During subsequent 
readings, I analyzed the transcripts using both the a priori and empirical codes, before abstracting 
the coded passages to the study themes. I reviewed the transcripts until the point of ‘saturation’, 




Chapter 4: Displacement Mitigation Policy and Planning Environments  
The market-driven and devolved nature of urban development in the U.S. poses 
numerous challenges for city governments that wish to develop neighborhoods equitably. This 
chapter draws on the survey results and review of cities’ policy documents to examine the 
economic, political, and knowledge contexts in which displacement mitigation planning is 
occurring in large U.S. cities.42 The chapter begins with a statistical overview of the 
characteristics of respondent cities compared to the full sample. I go on to examine cities’ self-
reported housing and economic development challenges and the political and fiscal barriers they 
face from higher levels of government. To shed light on cities’ internal political environments, I 
then describe the levels of pro-development and pro-affordability interest group activity reported 
in surveys. Finally, I turn to cities’ knowledge environments by examining survey respondents’ 
processes to solicit community input on redevelopment projects and external policy learning 
experiences.  
Consistent with the literature on contemporary urban governance, I show that cities face 
high levels of housing instability among low-income households, inadequate intergovernmental 
support for place-based affordability, and pressure to foster mixed-income development and 
attract knowledge-based industries. Respondent cities were much more likely to be focused on 
reinvesting in low-income neighborhoods than addressing displacement, and these were not 
typically identified as challenges to be tackled concurrently. Relationships to reinvestment and 
displacement differed both within and across cities, and concern with the costs of displacement 
was more salient where gentrification was advanced. An examination of cities’ political 
environments found that the private sector is active in cities’ housing and redevelopment 
                                                 
42Sources include policy documents for cities within the study sample of the 146 largest cities. 
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planning processes, and community pressure to address affordability and displacement is also 
pervasive. Despite the critical challenges and pressures that cities face, officials are not 
maximizing the policy knowledge they could gain from local residents or from other cities. 
 
Study City Characteristics 
  
 Table 4.1 compares the average characteristics of survey participants to the overall 
sample of survey recipients. Although respondent cities had a higher mean population than the 
full sample, the two groups were very similar across other indicators, including housing cost, 
budgetary characteristics, and levels of gentrification. Respondent cities can thus be considered 
broadly representative of the 146 most populous cities.   
 
Table 4.1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents Compared to Overall Sample 
 
Average characteristics 80 respondent cities 146 largest U.S. 
cities 
Population (2015) 611,999 485,177 
Median rent burden (2015) 32% 32% 
Percent non-Hispanic white (2015) 47% 45% 
Percent of the population that rents (2015) 49% 48% 
Median gross rent (2015) $982 $980 
Median home value (2015) $226,940 $220,297 
Median income (2015) $50,714 $50,799 
Percent of population with a college degree (2015) 32% 31% 
Per capita general revenue (2014) $2,405 $2,440 
Percent of budget from own-source revenue (2014) 79% 79% 
Percent of budget from property taxes (2014) 22% 21% 
Percent of eligible census tracts that gentrified 
(2000-10) 
39% 40% 
Sources: ACS 2011-2015; Longitudinal Tract Database data from Census 2000 and ACS 2008-2012; 









Cities’ Self-Identified Local Development Challenges   
 
Housing and Neighborhood Development  
How does displacement mitigation rank among the local development challenges 
confronting large cities? Table 4.2 displays aggregate responses to the survey question, ‘What 
are the main housing and neighborhood development challenges currently facing your city?’ 
Consistent with the literature, the results depict a context of widespread housing pressure for 
lower-income households and a governmental focus on fostering reinvestment and 
socioeconomic mixing in city neighborhoods.  
Table 4.2. Respondent Cities’ Neighborhood Development Challenges 
 
Neighborhood development challenge Respondent 
cities listing 
this challenge 
Addressing homelessness and/or housing instability 90% 
Increasing housing affordability or access to homeownership for low- or moderate-
income households 
79% 
Improving residential quality in areas of concentrated poverty 69% 
Promoting mixed-income development 68% 
Increasing housing affordability and access in high-opportunity neighborhoods 66% 
Increasing housing affordability or access to homeownership for middle-income or 
workforce households 
65% 
Addressing code enforcement and/or housing quality issues 56% 
Addressing displacement from neighborhoods that are experiencing reinvestment or 
redevelopment 
35% 
Decreasing residential segregation and/or housing discrimination by race 34% 
Stimulating production of market-rate housing 32% 
Addressing high rates of housing vacancy and/or foreclosure 23% 
Other43 15% 
Investing in natural disaster recovery or resiliency planning 8% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Residential Affordability Policies 
 
                                                 
43These included abandoned, vacant or blighted property; executive housing; brownfield development, 
environmental conditions, and loss of employment opportunities in industrial areas; low rental vacancy; a 
lack of available units for voucher holders; special needs housing; and maximizing the impact of place-
based investments.   
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The vast majority (90%) of cities identified homelessness and housing instability as a 
challenge, while 79% were grappling with housing affordability for low- and moderate-income 
households. Also among the top concerns were improving residential quality in areas of 
concentrated poverty and promoting mixed-income development. The frequency of these 
responses reveals a common policy concern with encouraging reinvestment and/or 
socioeconomic diversification at the neighborhood level. Although these are the types of policies 
that can precipitate gentrification, only 35% of respondent cities expressed a concern with 
addressing displacement from neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment. 
Cities that cited improving neighborhood quality in poor areas or promoting mixed-income 
development as current challenges identified displacement mitigation as a concern at similar 
rates as the overall sample (Figure 4.1). 
 
This disparity in levels of concern with promoting reinvestment and mixed-income 
development on one hand, and addressing displacement on the other, is consistent with the 
argument that cities often see neighborhood-level socioeconomic succession as a desired 
outcome rather than a challenge associated with reinvestment (Betancur, 2010; Rose et al., 2013; 













in areas of concentrated
poverty that also cited
displacement as a challenge
Respondents concerned with
promoting mixed-income
development that also cited
displacement as a challenge
Respondents that cited
displacement as a challenge
(overall sample)
Figure 4.1. Survey Respondents Citing Displacement Mitigation as a 
Challenge by Presence of Other Concerns  
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reinvestment-displacement cycle. The socioeconomic changes associated with gentrification can 
evolve over prolonged periods of time, and cities that are in the early stages of this process may 
have yet to perceive its negative consequences for lower-income households. This is borne out 
by the data: cities that were concerned with reinvesting in poor neighborhoods but not addressing 
displacement were more than three times as likely to have low levels of gentrification compared 
to those citing both challenges. The findings were similar when comparing cities that were 
concerned only with promoting mixed-income development to those additionally concerned with 
mitigating displacement. Overall, cities with more advanced levels of gentrification (as measured 
by tertiles of the percentage of tracts that gentrified between 2000 and 2010) were more likely to 
name displacement as a concern (Figure 4.2).  
 
The data thus indicate that cities do not typically consider reinvestment/socioeconomic 
mixing and displacement as simultaneous challenges, particularly at the early stages of 
neighborhood change. However, these processes are clearly linked: when capital and higher-
income households pour into previously disinvested neighborhoods, the upward pressure on 
housing costs and the incentives for landlords to attract more affluent tenants can jeopardize low-




















Figure 4.2. Survey Respondents Citing Displacement 
Mitigation as a Challenge by Level of Gentrification
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These links are frequently acknowledged in the housing plans of cities where the adverse effects 
of gentrification have become more salient. For example, Minneapolis’ Consolidated Plan (2015, 
p. 111) acknowledges the challenges confronted in  
neighborhoods [that] are located with[in] commercial corridors that are a 
specific economic development growth strategy target of the city. This public emphasis 
and investment has prompted the market to take another look at these areas for 
investment. Revitalization of the housing stock in these areas…is drawing in 
new homeowners and renters...However, the drawback to this is that 
localized commercial and housing rents can rise and threaten to dislocate long-time 
community residents and community assets.   
 
In a similar vein, Portland’s Comprehensive Plan notes that  
[f]or many, neighborhood revitalization is a positive change. For others, it provokes 
concern that Portland is becoming less affordable. In some circumstances revitalization 
becomes gentrification where the negative consequences outweigh the benefits. These 
consequences include involuntary displacement of lower income households and a 
change in the ethnic and racial make-up of a neighborhood’s residents and businesses 
(City of Portland, 2016, p. I-35). 
 
Nashville’s General Plan similarly outlines the household- and neighborhood-level impact of 
investment: ‘As the demand for housing increases…the cost of land increases…[and] residents 
become cost burdened and must seek more affordable housing elsewhere. In many 
neighborhoods this has resulted in the displacement of residents, and drastic neighborhood 
change as existing homes are upgraded or replaced with new construction’ (Metropolitan 
Planning Commission of Nashville and Davidson County, 2015, pp. 189–190). These excerpts 
from cities in the top third of the sample by level of gentrification provide a preview of the 
challenges that can accompany an influx of reinvestment and higher-income households into 
lower-income neighborhoods and underscore the need for city policies to temper these impacts 





The economic development context influences cities’ approaches to attracting 
investment, and the localized impact of these strategies can affect the local businesses that lower-
income households rely on to meet their commercial and cultural needs. Consistent with the 
literature regarding the economic environment that large cities are operating in, the most 
commonly-cited economic development challenge among respondents involved increasing or 
preserving investment by high-tech or knowledge-based companies (Table 4.3). Other 
frequently-mentioned challenges included supporting local entrepreneurship and small business 
development, increasing job opportunities more generally, and investing in infrastructure. 
Table 4.3. Respondent Cities’ Economic Development Challenges 
 
Economic development challenge Respondent 
cities listing 
this challenge 
Attracting and/or retaining high-tech or knowledge-based firms 75% 
Supporting entrepreneurship and/or small business development 73% 
Increasing job opportunities 70% 
Investing in infrastructure systems 70% 
Commercial redevelopment in economically distressed neighborhoods 65% 
Investing in local workforce training and development 55% 
Commercial redevelopment in the downtown or central business district 50% 
Preserving and/or revitalizing the industrial or manufacturing sector 40% 
Retaining small businesses in neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment/ 
redevelopment 
38% 
Investing in environmental sustainability 38% 
Addressing quality of life issues 38% 
Expanding the retail, service, tourism and/or hospitality sectors 37% 
Other44 9% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Commercial Affordability Policies 
 
                                                 
44Other challenges included city-wide economic development; connecting low-income individuals to 
jobs; maximizing opportunities for, and impact of, investment; and an over-abundance of retail in certain 




Similar to the findings above, investing in commercial redevelopment in distressed areas 
was a more common concern (65%) than retaining small businesses in areas experiencing 
reinvestment or redevelopment (38%). Cities with higher levels of gentrification were also more 
likely to cite retention of small businesses as a challenge (Figure 4.3). However, there was a 
slightly stronger link between these two concerns in the commercial than the residential sphere: 
51% of the cities that cited redevelopment of distressed commercial areas as a challenge also 
identified retaining small businesses as a concern.  
 
 
Varying Challenges Within and Across Cities  
Survey responses confirmed that within cities, development challenges differ by 
neighborhood. For example, several respondents reported grappling with high rates of vacancy as 
well as high rates of housing unaffordability. Reflecting how these differing challenges can play 
out across the city, Philadelphia’s proposed 2018-2022 Consolidated Plan noted that ‘economic 
pressures such as increasing rents and property taxes in appreciating neighborhoods may pose a 
threat to long-term affordability and to current residents,’ while other neighborhoods struggle 




















Figure 4.3. Survey Respondents Citing Displacement 
of Small Businesses as a Challenge by Level of 
Gentrification
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abandoned property (City of Philadelphia Division of Housing and Community Development, 
2017, pp. 172–173). In Irving, Texas, low- and moderate-income census tracts 
are all in dire need of reinvestment through owner and rental housing rehabilitation... 
Single-family owner units are available at relatively low prices, but the market is weak 
because of the need for extensive and expensive renovation in many of the structures, as 
well as stricter loan standards and higher down payment requirements that limit the 
number of potential buyers. More affluent buyers will tend to favor newer construction in 
other, more attractive neighborhoods. The rental market in these neighborhoods is strong 
in the face of increased demand, especially for more modern or better kept buildings. 
Rents tend to increase, even for poorer buildings, exacerbating the cost burden issue for 
low-income households (City of Irving, 2014, p. 69). 
The challenge for cities facing these dual pressures is to foster investments that improve quality 
of life in distressed neighborhoods without triggering the displacement pressures that are evident 
in other parts of the city. Indianapolis’ Consolidated Plan highlights the tightrope that cities must 
walk in this regard. The Plan first notes that ‘[t]he downtown area is a hub of development, both 
commercial and residential, giving new life to older buildings. Between 1990 and 2012 
approximately $9.3 billion was invested by the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors in arts, 
culture, sports, recreational, and educational amenities and in convention center expansions, life 
science, and other commercial buildings and upscale housing options’ (City of Indianapolis, 
2014, p. 7). After discussing how non-residents who work in or visit the city use local services 
and amenities without always contributing financially to their operating costs, the Plan points out 
that ‘[t]his poses an income challenge for the City of Indianapolis, as it must attract residents to 
live within its borders to increase its tax revenue for public services. As such, the City of 
Indianapolis needs to create attractive communities to live, work and play in while preserving its 
diversity of affordable housing and services for all of its residents’ (City of Indianapolis, 2014, p. 
8). 
Different relationships to reinvestment and affordability exist among as well as within 
cities. In some contexts, affordability and displacement issues are not high on the agenda. One 
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respondent noted that ‘[t]his is simply not enough of an issue in this area to merit our attention. 
Housing is still very affordable compared to many areas of the country, and jobs are plentiful’ 
(Survey Respondent 26, 2016). Another commented that ‘we are at the stage where we see rising 
commercial rents and a move away from the monoculture of poverty in some neighborhoods as a 
good thing. When all that you can offer your residents is dollar stores because that is all that the 
market supports, seeing new people with better income and purchasing power that will in turn 
foster new businesses is a good thing’ (Survey Respondent 16, 2016). Elsewhere, displacement 
issues have recently entered the policy agenda and governments are in the process of developing 
new responses to this issue. Several survey respondents mentioned that as affordability pressures 
have become more salient, their administrations are developing and proposing a range of new 
policy approaches. San Antonio’s Comprehensive Plan reflects on this stage in the reinvestment-
affordability relationship:  
The recent successful infill housing in the…urban core has raised concerns about 
gentrification…Gentrification is not yet an extensive issue here, so we can take steps now 
to prevent it. By identifying in advance those neighborhoods where gentrification may 
occur, we can develop policies and strategies to prevent the loss of affordable housing 
and help current residents adjust to market changes without being displaced (City of San 
Antonio, 2016, p. 10.2). 
 
In a third group of cities, where advanced reinvestment has triggered widespread gentrification, 
there exists a more entrenched struggle with, and a longer history of addressing, displacement. 
These cities’ focus at the time of the study involved strengthening their displacement mitigation 
frameworks. This was evident in one respondent’s comment that ‘[t]hough our city has a long 
history of supporting the creation and preservation of affordable housing, under the current 
Mayoral administration our city is taking a fresh look at both how to strengthen our existing 
programs and how to establish new and innovative programs’ (Survey Respondent 89, 2017). 
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Another respondent described their government’s efforts to revise its affordable housing strategy 
in the face of strong demand and low levels of vacancy and affordability:  
The city, like many others, has seen a multi-family boom and yet very few of these 
developments include any affordable units. The city has taken an aggressive approach 
with developers to help them fund more units, and yet we don't seem to be getting 
ahead...Tax credits are the main "go to" but those are limited and extremely competitive. 
Without a significant funding source, we cannot get the new units we need nor can we 
assist those who are cost burdened or facing eviction…We are proposing…bold measures 
to address these issues such as: a significant on-going funding source such as a bond or 
levy, inclusionary zoning, a Community Land Trust, zoning modifications, changes to 
internal processes to expedite and incentivize developers, among other items (Survey 
Respondent 10, 2016).  
 
As this excerpt indicates, efforts to strengthen place-based affordability frameworks typically 
involve approaching the problem from multiple angles. Among others, Boston’s Housing Plan 
pledged to ‘[m]itigate the impacts of gentrification’ through a combination of ‘targeted 
homebuyer assistance programs, strategic acquisitions, community land trusts, and expanded 
tenant and senior services’ (City of Boston, 2014, p. 93) and Austin’s Housing Strategy proposed 
a multi-pronged approach to preventing displacement that includes ‘a combination of new 
funding mechanisms, regulatory changes…and other creative approaches’ (City of Austin 
Neighborhood Housing and Community Development, 2017, p. 3). The prevalence of these 




Although the relationship between reinvestment and affordability varies across localities, 
cities share a common obstacle to displacement mitigation planning: inaction and obstruction 
from higher levels of government. This takes the form of both regulatory barriers and funding 
challenges. Survey respondents frequently referred to state limitations on the actions they could 
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take to address affordability. These challenges were detailed in Raleigh’s 2016-2020 
Consolidated Plan: 
North Carolina law does not allow for inclusionary zoning and efforts in the past to pass 
laws (or introduce bills) to allow it in specific jurisdictions were unsuccessful…[T]he 
City of Raleigh is limited in its ability to innovate in creating additional affordable units 
beyond traditional methods already allowed in state law. Most of these involve financial 
investments by the City and…such methods can only reach as far as the funds that are 
available...Raleigh’s 2009 comprehensive plan envisioned the elimination of its zoning 
barriers to allow for a proliferation of accessory dwelling units…but the NC General 
Assembly passed legislation that prevented the City from implementing [it] (City of 
Raleigh, 2015, p. 81). 
 
Survey responses and cities’ Housing Elements similarly identified the California government’s 
decision to dissolve Redevelopment Agencies45 in 2012 as a serious obstacle to place-based 
affordability planning.  
Cuts in and uncertainty regarding levels of intergovernmental funding also pose serious 
obstacles to place-based affordability planning, because this funding forms a critical component 
of many cities’ strategies to address displacement. Portland’s Consolidated Plan outlines the 
importance of CDBG resources in preserving affordability covenants on privately-owned 
affordable housing units at risk of converting to market rates in high-demand neighborhoods:  
Because of their highly desirable locations, more than 700 affordable homes were 
susceptible to being converted to market-rate rentals or sold as condominiums, displacing 
vulnerable residents…The City partnered with the HUD, the State of Oregon, the 
Network for Oregon Affordable Housing (NOAH), local nonprofits and private 
funders… For every dollar the City invested, we leveraged $4 in private and $5 in federal 
funds…Without CDBG, the $120 million in federal rent assistance contracts would have 
been at risk. More importantly, over 700 affordable homes in our community would have 
been lost (Portland Housing Bureau, 2015b, pp. 203–204). 
  
Survey respondents also noted the importance of intergovernmental programs, such as LIHTC 
and CDBG, for addressing place-based affordability in general.  
                                                 
45Redevelopment Agencies in California had the authority to use TIF to facilitate redevelopment. 20% of 
TIF funds were required to be allocated to housing for low- and moderate-income households (County of 
Los Angeles, n.d.).  
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The lack of stability in the amount of intergovernmental support that cities receive 
consequently hinders their capacity to undertake the long-term planning required to 
comprehensively address place-based affordability. The City of Miami Department of 
Community and Economic Development (2015, p. 8) ‘utilizes, as a base for its anticipated 
resources, funds received for the previous fiscal year to plan for future projects and activities. 
This exercise has proven to be a high order challenge as federal funding awarded to the city has 
been decreasing at an alarming rate…Much of the planning has been undermined by the lack of 
funding availability.’ Similarly, City of San Jose’s Housing Element (2015, p. VII-3) notes that  
[i]t is a challenge to predict precise housing needs over an eight-year period, especially 
given changes in the availability of affordable housing resources and tools in the recent 
past. Over the last few years San José has seen more than a 40% cut in federal entitlement 
funding, along with the elimination of redevelopment agencies, reductions in [s]tate 
funding, and challenges to inclusionary housing programs.  
 
In a city that relies on tax credits to stimulate affordable housing development, ‘[t]he current 
disruption in the tax credit market brought about by the prospect of federal tax reform places this 
strategy in great jeopardy’ (Survey Respondent 90, 2017).  
Despite these challenges, cities exhibit a commitment to filling the gaps left by state and 
federal inaction or obstruction. The value of local housing trust funds in an era of inadequate and 
unstable intergovernmental funding is described by the city of Greensboro, which ‘dedicate[s] 
approximately one cent of the property tax rate…to ensure that [the city] has a reliable source of 
funding for its housing programs. The fund allows Greensboro to pursue long-term planning - a 
luxury many communities don’t have’ (City of Greensboro, 2014). In St. Louis, the ‘decline in 
CDBG funding…has made it extremely difficult to fund those programs that have provided 
much needed services over the years and almost impossible to fund new programs…[T]he City 
generally must turn to other resources to address underserved needs. The creation of the 
Affordable Housing Trust Fund from use tax refunds represents such an action’ (City of St. 
115 
 
Louis Community Development Administration, 2017, p. 33). Amid a decline in 
intergovernmental funding for affordable housing development, ‘the City of San Francisco has 
stepped up with solutions to finance affordable housing production and preservation with local 
legislation and bond measures’ (City and County of San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing 
and Community Development, 2016, p. 58). Despite being blocked in its attempt to adopt new 
policy tools, Raleigh’s government is ‘increasing its use of local funds and providing more 
programmatic opportunities to increase the ability of developers to add to/preserve the supply of 
affordable housing units’ (City of Raleigh Department of Housing & Neighborhoods Community 
Development Division, 2016, pp. 25–26). Although Portland, Oregon is banned by state law 
from instituting rent control, the city recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting landlords from 
increasing rents by 5% or more annually without providing at least 90 days’ notice to tenants, 
and requiring landlords to pay relocation fees if a tenant terminates a rental agreement within 14 
days of receiving a rent increase of 10% or more (Portland city code section 30.01.085: Portland 
renter additional protections, 2017).  
 
Interest Group Pressure 
 
 The policy action literature identifies pro-housing interest group pressure as a major 
factor that motivates cities to undertake redistributive interventions. Although city governments’ 
reliance on the private sector for reinvestment decreases their control over the form that 
development takes, active affordable housing advocacy can increase the likelihood that low-
income housing protections will be introduced. To measure the level of real estate influence and 
affordable housing advocacy, survey participants were asked to indicate how actively: 1) city 
residents or advocacy groups exerted pressure on the city government to address affordability in 
neighborhoods experiencing redevelopment or reinvestment, 2) private real estate industry 
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groups provided input on the city's redevelopment plans, and 3) private real estate industry 
groups provided input on the city's affordable housing plans (Table 4.4).  
The majority (65%) of cities indicated that residents and/or advocacy groups had either 
been very active or somewhat active in pressuring the city government to address displacement 
from neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment. An even larger majority 
(83%) described private real estate industry groups providing input on the city’s redevelopment 
plans very actively or somewhat actively. These groups’ input on affordable housing plans was 
slightly less common, with 63% of cities reporting very active or somewhat active input. Overall, 
the results accord with the contention that cities’ policy agendas are subject to pressures from 
both private real estate and affordable housing interests. The extent to which these competing 
pressures influence the displacement mitigation policy agenda, and the nature of their influence, 
will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Table 4.4. Levels of Interest Group Pressure in Respondent Cities 
Level of activity  Community 
pressure to address 
displacement 
Private real estate input 
on redevelopment plans 
Private real estate input 
on affordable housing 
plans 
Not at all 12% 3% 10% 
Not active 23% 14% 27% 
Somewhat active 28% 56% 48% 
Very active 37% 27% 15% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Residential and Commercial Affordability Policies 
 
Cities with ‘very active’ community pressure to address displacement were most likely to 
identify this issue as a concern for the city government. Furthermore, cities with the top third 
percentages of gentrified tracts were considerably more likely to report very active community 
pressure to address displacement as well as very active levels of input from private real estate 
industry groups on city affordable housing and redevelopment plans, compared to cities with 
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lower levels of gentrification (Figures 4.4-4.6). These findings indicate that in cities with tight 
housing markets, housing policy is high on the agendas of both advocacy groups and the 
development community. Figure 4.6 also shows that even in cities with low or moderate levels of 
gentrification, at least somewhat active input on redevelopment plans from private real estate 
industry groups is typical, as would be expected in a context in which cities must work with the 


























Not at all Not active Somewhat active Very active
Figure 4.4. Survey Respondents Citing Different Levels of 
Community Pressure Activity to Address Displacement by Level of 
Gentrification 





















Not at all Not active Somewhat active Very active
Figure 4.5. Survey Respondents Citing Different Levels of Real Estate 
Input Activity on Affordable Housing Plans by Level of Gentrification





Citizen Participation Processes 
 
 Aggregate community pressure to address affordability and displacement can function to 
put these issues on the city-wide housing agenda, but a more localized approach is required to 
ensure that plans for neighborhood investment incorporate incumbent residents’ knowledge and 
interests. The survey asked, ‘Does your city have a process in place to solicit community input 
when neighborhoods are rezoned or redeveloped by city government?’ Chapter 1 noted that 
planners have increasingly called for a departure from the formal tools of participation (such as 
public hearings) towards less tokenistic forms of community engagement that better integrate 
local knowledge, such as collaboration with community groups and workshops that train 
incumbent residents to participate in the planning process (Arnstein, 1969; Healey, 2006; Innes, 
1995; Innes & Booher, 2004; McGovern, 2013).  
Table 4.5 shows that the traditional tools of participation, which are often mandated by 
local or higher levels of government, remain the most common: 87% of respondents hold a 
public hearing before a neighborhood is designated a rezoning site and/or before rezoning plans 
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Figure 4.6. Survey Respondents Citing Different Levels of Real Estate 
Input Activity on Redevelopment Plans by Level of Gentrification
Low gentrification Moderate gentrification High gentrification
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on the planned changes and work with community organizations to develop and implement them. 
However, more direct forms of community participation in the process are less common. Just 
14% of cities grant neighborhood representatives a binding vote on planned changes.  Moreover, 
only 26% invest in training and education for incumbent residents, despite the potential for such 
investments to increase residents’ likelihood of engaging with, contributing to, and learning from 
the planning process (Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 2003; McGovern, 2013). 
Table 4.5. Soliciting Community Input when Neighborhoods are Rezoned or Redeveloped46 
 
Resident input process Respondent cities 
that use this 
process 




At least one public hearing is held before rezoning/redevelopment plans are 
formalized 
87% 
Neighborhood associations or community groups are consulted on the 
planned changes 
81% 
Elected/appointed neighborhood representatives are consulted on the 
planned changes 
76% 
City works with community development corporations/community groups to 
develop/implement changes 
64% 
Government funds education and/or training initiatives for neighborhood 
residents/community groups 
26% 
Elected/appointed neighborhood representatives hold a non-binding vote on 
the planned changes 
23% 
A negative vote by elected/appointed neighborhood representatives 
necessitates revision of planned changes 
14% 
Other47 14% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Residential and Commercial Affordability Policies 
 
 The variety and combinations of citizen participation tools that cities use can also shape 
the resulting processes (Berman, 1997; Shipley & Utz, 2012). Respondent cities used a range of 
strategies to solicit input, with an average of 4.5 of the eight listed tools used. The majority of 
                                                 
46Respondents were instructed to select all the answers that applied to their city. 
 
47‘Other’ strategies included community workshops, meetings and open houses; task forces and advisory 
committees; consultation with community councils; and solicitation of online feedback. 
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cities (55%) used five or more tools, and only 13% used two or fewer. The most common 
combination (used by 12% of respondents) involved a public hearing 1) prior to designating a 
neighborhood for rezoning and 2) prior to finalizing the planned changes; consulting with 3) 
community groups and 4) neighborhood representatives at the planning stage; and 5) working 
with community development corporations on plan development and/or implementation. The 
second most common strategies (both employed by 7% of respondents) involved each of the 
actions mentioned in the previous sentence, combined with either an investment in resident 
education and training, or a non-binding vote on the planned changes by neighborhood 
representatives.  
 
Policy Diffusion Across Large Cities 
 
Local knowledge from incumbent residents provides one critical source of policy 
learning for city governments; the experience and experimentation of cities that face similar 
challenges constitutes another. The policy diffusion and policy transfer literatures posit that ideas 
spread across cities as governments learn from, compete with, and experience pressure from each 
other (Benson & Jordan, 2011; Berry & Berry, 2007; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Walker, 1969). 
To explore this concept in the context of displacement mitigation, the survey asked, ‘Have 
measures to preserve residential or commercial affordability in other cities influenced the 
introduction of similar measures by your city government?’ Those who responded affirmatively 
were asked to identify the channels through which they learned about these measures and the 
cities that were influential.  
Only 33% of the cities that responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to this question indicated that they 
were influenced by other cities’ measures, which suggests that policy diffusion is not a major 
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factor in the adoption of displacement mitigation strategies. Among this 33% of respondents, the 
majority learned of the influential measures from housing, economic development, or planning 
officials in other cities and/or through a professional organization or association (Table 4.6). The 
importance of within-profession contacts or communities of practice for policy learning has been 
noted in several previous studies, which conclude that planning officials prioritize and value 
policy ideas from colleagues who share a similar position and substantive domain (De Jong & 
Edelenbos, 2007; Marsden et al., 2011; Wolman & Page, 2002). 
Table 4.6. Channels of Policy Diffusion 
   
How did the government learn about influential policies?48  Survey respondents 
citing this channel 
Housing, economic development, or planning officials in other 
cities 
83% 
Professional organization or association 77% 
Conversations/exchanges with elected officials 45% 
City residents, advocacy groups, or community organizations 45% 
Media reports 41% 
Other49 18% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Residential and Commercial Affordability Policies 
 
Also consistent with previous studies (Marsden et al., 2011; Wolman & Page, 2002), 
respondents looked for inspiration from cities within the same geographic area (region) or 
political context (state), as well as from a handful of cities whose efforts are well-known and 
well-publicized. Among the fifteen respondents that identified influential cities, seven listed 
cities within the same region or state. In addition, several large cities with high-profile initiatives 
were mentioned multiple times: Seattle influenced five cities; Denver and San Francisco 
influenced four cities each; and Austin, Portland, and New York influenced two cities each.  
                                                 
48Respondents were instructed to select all the answers that applied. 
 





 This chapter provided original evidence of the policy environments and processes that 
guide large U.S. cities’ displacement mitigation planning. The results reflect the market-driven 
and fiscally constrained context of urban development. Cities were overwhelmingly likely to be 
struggling with homelessness and housing instability. At the neighborhood level, they were 
nearly twice as likely to be concerned with improving residential quality in areas of concentrated 
poverty or promoting mixed-income development than with addressing displacement from areas 
where reinvestment is occurring. These priorities are not surprising in light of recent research 
demonstrating that poverty concentration is a more widespread problem than gentrification for 
U.S. localities (Cortright & Mahmoudi, 2014; Landis, 2016). However, the findings indicate that 
officials tend to approach these two issues – attracting investment and higher-income residents 
on one hand, and addressing the consequences of influxes of capital and affluent households for 
incumbent low-income residents on the other –  as distinct rather than concurrent challenges, 
particularly during the early stages of gentrification.  
 Cities’ surveys and housing plans confirmed that a lack of intergovernmental financial 
and regulatory support severely hampers cities’ place-based affordability efforts. States’ pre-
emption of local action frustrates cities’ ability to adopt policy tools that might mitigate 
displacement, and the instability in levels of intergovermental funding impedes local long-term 
planning in this domain. Further complicating the balancing act that cities are faced with, they 
experience both robust community pressure to address displacement as well as active input from 
the private real estate industry on affordable housing and redevelopment plans. 
Unfortunately, when it comes to incorporating community knowledge into planning for 
neighborhoods that are rezoned or redeveloped, cities are not maximizing residents’ 
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opportunities for participation. The vast majority of cities hold traditional public hearings and 
consultations, which do not typically provide opportunities for residents to take an active and 
iterative role in the planning process. Although most respondent cities also reported working 
with neighborhood groups, neighborhood representatives, and/or community organizations, only 
a quarter provided training or education for incumbent residents to participate in the planning 
process, and even fewer gave neighborhood representatives a binding vote on planned changes. 
The lack of support for residents to participate on an active and equal basis in neighborhood 
redevelopment reduces the possibility for equitable development and diminishes city 
governments’ opportunities to receive local knowledge from those most familiar with the space 
that is being planned (Blanchet-Cohen, 2015; Corburn, 2003; Iacofano & Lewis, 2012).  
Just as cities were not maximizing the integration of local knowledge into their plans, this 
study also identified a missed opportunity when it comes to learning from other cities. When 
respondent cities did learn from each other, professional contacts were the major source, whereas 
such ideas were much less likely to come from external channels such as residents or community 
groups. The prevalence of inter-expert exchange, learning from similar contexts, and influence of 
a handful of prominent cities as channels of diffusion poses the risk that ‘instead of expanding 
the number of ideas and actors involved in the decision-making process…a relatively small 
circle of actors…consistently draw lessons from each other’ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 355). 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 therefore seek to extend knowledge of displacement mitigation planning 
approaches beyond these familiar avenues to offer lessons from a more diverse set of economic, 




Chapter 5: Approaches to Mitigating Displacement in Large U.S. Cities 
Previous chapters highlighted the constraints on city governments’ ability to protect 
lower-income households from displacement when reinvestment occurs in previously disinvested 
neighborhoods. Despite these obstacles, study cities are using multiple tools to increase 
incumbent residents’ opportunities to access housing and meet their needs in these areas. This 
chapter draws on survey responses and information from cities’ plans and policy documents to 
examine how city governments are addressing these challenges.50  
I first assessed the prevalence of policy tools in three categories: tools that address 
residential affordability and displacement specifically in neighborhoods at risk of gentrifying; 
tools that address commercial affordability and inclusive development in these areas; and tools 
that address residential affordability and displacement city-wide. A majority of respondent cities 
did not have a comprehensive framework in place to mitigate gentrification-induced residential 
displacement at the time of this study, and the tools that they used most commonly to address 
this issue relied on harnessing strong markets. Interventions to address place-based affordability 
on a broader spatial scale were more likely to involve investing in affordable units, which is 
more feasible in neighborhoods where land values are low. I also found that action to address 
commercial affordability and inclusive development in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification 
was both uncommon and typically undertaken on a case-by-case basis. 
Next, I provide a descriptive background for the multivariate analyses in Chapter 6 by 
assessing how cities’ use of policy tools to address residential displacement in neighborhoods at 
risk of gentrifying varies by level of need, fiscal and economic strength, and community pressure 
- conditions that the literature identifies as critical for redistributive housing action. While the 
                                                 
50Sources include policy documents for cities within the study sample of the 146 largest cities. 
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number of policy tools that cities had in place increased with higher levels of each of these 
conditions, the level of need did not emerge as a factor that distinguished cities with 
displacement mitigation policy tools from those without such tools. 
Finally, I use the examples of inclusionary zoning, short-term rental regulations, and 
neighborhood preference policies to illustrate the tensions that cities face around the form and 
scale of interventions. In particular, I highlight the challenges associated with relying on a 
market-based tool to address displacement and the difficulties of balancing neighborhood-level 
displacement mitigation aims with individual and city-wide interests. 
 
 
Mitigating Residential Displacement in Neighborhoods at Risk of Gentrification 
 
Prevalence of Policy Tools  
 
This section provides an overview of city-level tools that apply specifically to mitigating 
gentrification-induced displacement because they target neighborhoods at risk of gentrification, 
address the types of displacement that are common in these areas, or possess the flexibility 
needed to tackle the rapid changes that characterize this process. Of the cities in the residential 
dataset, 89% had at least one policy tool adopted to mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at 
risk of gentrification.51 The plurality (24%) had only one tool adopted, and the majority (56%) 
had three or fewer. Seven cities had ten or more tools in place, with a high of 15. The average 
city in the dataset had four tools. The low number of tools adopted overall is consistent with the 
survey results showing that only a third of respondents considered mitigating displacement from 
neighborhoods that were experiencing reinvestment to be a challenge in their cities (Chapter 4). 
                                                 
51The analyses in this chapter include policy tools that were adopted in respondent cities regardless of 
their implementation status. Differences in the conditions associated with adoption or implementation of 




The most common policy tools adopted in the study cities were voluntary inclusionary 
zoning and housing trust funds, both of which were in place in half of the cities with at least one 
policy tool (Table 5.1). As previously discussed, the density bonuses and other incentives 
Table 5.1.  City-Level Policy Tools Adopted to Mitigate Residential Displacement from 
Neighborhoods at Risk of Gentrification  
Type of 
action  
Policy tool Respondent cities 
that have adopted 
this tool 
Regulating market activity 
 Short-term rental regulation 37% 
 Condo conversion regulation 19% 
 No net loss policies 19% 
 Rent regulation 9% 
 At least one tool 53% 
Strengthening tenants’ rights 
 Legal aid for tenants 39% 
 Right of first refusal when rental units are sold, converted or rehabilitated 19% 
 Just cause eviction and anti-harassment ordinances 14% 
 At least one tool 50% 
Zoning for affordable housing development 
 Voluntary inclusionary zoning 50% 
 Mandatory inclusionary zoning 26% 
 At least one tool 56% 
Using public resources to extend affordability of low-cost land/housing 
 Conversion of market-rate units to affordable housing 24% 
 Preservation of subsidized or regulated housing 21% 
 Homeowner/renter repair programs 9% 
 Support for non-speculative/decommodified housing 6% 
 Property tax relief for homeowners 3% 
 At least one tool 37% 
Using public resources to create new affordable units 
 Other funding/incentives for affordable housing 30% 
 Conversion of financially or physically distressed units to affordable 
housing 
11% 
 Affordable housing development on public land 6% 
 At least one tool 37% 
Dedicating revenue streams for affordable housing 
 Housing trust funds 51% 
 Reinvesting increased property tax revenue in affordable housing 20% 
 At least one tool 59% 
Source: Survey of city governments’ residential affordability policies and coding of housing plans, policy 
documents, and program descriptions  
 
Sample is respondent cities with at least one policy tool to mitigate displacement from neighborhoods 
experiencing reinvestment, redevelopment, or gentrification. 
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associated with voluntary inclusionary zoning are most valuable to developers where land values 
are high. Reflecting a similar logic, most of the housing trust funds in the dataset were financed 
either by fees charged on private development or property/occupancy taxes. The two most 
common policy tools to address displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification thus 
aim to redistribute some of the benefits that accrue from heightened development activity and 
strong locational demand.  
Other relatively common policy tools included legal assistance for tenants facing eviction 
or harassment (39%) and regulation of the short-term rental industry (37%). Cities’ approaches 
to regulating short-term rentals are discussed in detail later in this chapter. Legal assistance 
typically involved the city funding legal aid organizations to advise or represent tenants at risk of 
eviction, often using CDBG resources. A few cities also provided proactive education and 
information to tenants. One of the strongest approaches to mitigating displacement through legal 
services exists in New York City. The government funds door-to-door tenant education and legal 
referrals in neighborhoods with heightened displacement risk; has passed laws that protect 
tenants against harassment from owners seeking buy-outs; partners with the state to investigate 
and prosecute tenant harassment; and passed legislation that will, within five years, guarantee 
legal counsel for all low-income tenants facing eviction (New York City Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development, 2016; New York City Office of the Mayor, 2015, 2016, 2017).  
The most common approaches that were proposed at the time of the survey were short-
term rental regulations and the rent-restriction of unsubsidized and/or unregulated units. The 
survey also asked respondents to list any tools used to address displacement that were not 
captured by the survey questions. Responses included neighborhood preference policies, rental 
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assistance, infill development incentives, homeownership assistance, and zoning revisions to 
allow accessory dwelling units. 
The least commonly-used tools to address displacement from areas at risk of 
gentrification were property tax relief for homeowners, development on public land, and 
decommodified housing. In the case of tax relief, the infrequency of use reflects policy design: 
the majority of such programs do not target neighborhoods or households with rising values. The 
other two policy tools are simply more difficult to implement in appreciating neighborhoods, 
because public land and affordable private land are both typically scarce in high-demand areas 
(Levy et al., 2007).  
Table 5.1 organizes cities’ adopted tools into the types of action they entail. Although 
there was not substantial variation, the creation of dedicated revenue streams and zoning for 
affordable housing were the most common actions, while investing public resources to preserve 
low-cost land or housing, or to create new affordable units in appreciating neighborhoods, were 
the least common. The relative infrequency of these actions supports the notion that fewer 
opportunities to extend and create affordability exist once a neighborhood is attracting demand. 
The review of policy documents shed some light on the tools that large cities are using to make 
the most of the opportunities that do arise to invest resources in affordability in appreciating 
areas. One of the most common approaches involves using flexible funding tools to finance the 
conversion of lower-cost, unsubsidized properties into long-term, affordable housing. Cities’ 
plans and policy documents revealed a variety of programs. For example, San Francisco’s Small 
Sites Program, which is financed by affordable housing impact fees and housing trust funds, 
provides loans for the acquisition, rehabilitation, and rent-restriction of buildings with 5-25 units 
and an average household income of 80% AMI; priority is given to buildings at risk of Ellis Act 
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conversion52 (San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development, 2014; 
San Francisco Office of the Mayor, 2014). Boston is using its Inclusionary Development funds to 
finance the Acquisition Opportunity Property Program, which pre-qualifies affordable housing 
developers for loans to purchase occupied rental buildings and set aside 40% of units for low- 
and moderate-income households (City of Boston, 2016, 2017). By providing quick access to 
funding, the program aims to enable these developers to compete with private investors in 
appreciating neighborhoods and prevent displacement due to gentrification (City of Boston, 
2017). Minneapolis has committed city funds to the Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing 
Preservation program, which (combined with regional funding) will provide non-profit 
developers with low-cost loans to acquire and rent-restrict rental buildings where tenants are 
likely to be displaced by rent increases (City of Minneapolis, 2017; City of Minneapolis 
Community Planning & Economic Development, 2017). Raleigh uses local funds to 
enable ‘nonprofit developers to purchase the mostly unsubsidized...apartment developments 
threatened with redevelopment in Raleigh’s more attractive locations’ (City of Raleigh 
Department of Housing & Neighborhoods Community Development Division, 2016, p. 33). 
When it comes to creating new affordable housing in appreciating neighborhoods (as 
opposed to extending the affordability of low-cost units), the most common approach involved a 
general commitment of funding to construct units. Such programs typically channeled CDBG 
and HOME funds to developers to produce affordable housing in areas experiencing 
redevelopment or gentrification. For example, Portland’s Consolidated Plan ‘[a]llocate[d] $1.5M 
annual federal grant funding (CDBG/HOME) for rental housing development to […increase] 
[Portland Housing Bureau]’s ability to create and maintain affordability in gentrifying 
52The ‘Ellis Act’ permits landlords in California to remove units (including rent-stabilized ones) from the 
rental market if the withdrawal is intended to be permanent (California Government Code, 1985). 
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communities and racial/ethnic communities at risk of displacement’ (Portland Housing Bureau, 
2015b, p. 203). Similarly, Philadelphia allocated Housing Trust Fund, HOME, and CDBG funds 
to provide gap financing for the construction of rental housing for low- and moderate-income 
households in ‘appreciating markets where the availability of housing is threatened’ (among 
other target areas) (Philadelphia Division of Housing and Community Development, 2017, p. 2).  
This section demonstrates that dedicated funding sources and zoning incentives for 
developers are critical components of cities’ displacement mitigation strategies. Flexible funds 
(including from inclusionary fees, development impact fees, dedicated property tax revenue, and 
federal entitlement funding) are being marshalled to address rapidly-changing conditions in 
gentrifying areas through preservation, construction, and anti-eviction legal aid, while incentive 
zoning leverages developers’ desire to build in these neighborhoods to redistribute the costs and 
benefits of market appreciation.  
 
Types of Displacement Addressed and Income Groups Targeted 
 
The tools examined in this study can address different types of displacement. Of the 264 
interventions captured that specifically mitigated gentrification-induced displacement (including 
cases where a city had multiple interventions under the same policy tool), 62% addressed 
exclusionary displacement, 34% economic displacement, 33% physical displacement, and 10% 
displacement pressure.53 Put another way, 35% of cities had residential interventions that 
addressed displacement pressure, 43% had interventions that addressed both physical and 
economic displacement, 66% had interventions that addressed either physical or economic 
displacement, and 80% had interventions that addressed exclusionary displacement. Thus, cities 
                                                 
53Interventions sometimes address more than one type of displacement. 
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were more likely to have interventions that preserved or increased the stock of low-cost units in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrification than to directly protect incumbent residents.  
On the other hand, the interventions did typically target the lowest-income households. 
Of the 165 initiatives that specified an income level for eligibility, 94% applied to extremely 
low, very low, or low-income households. Specifically, 59% targeted households earning up to 
50% AMI, 83% targeted those earning up to 80% AMI, 49% targeted those earning up to 120% 
AMI, and 4% targeted those earning up to 150% AMI.54 Additionally, 16% targeted seniors. 
However, AMI-based calculations do not guarantee that the income limits on new ‘affordable’ 
units, and the associated rent levels, reflect the capacity to pay of a neighborhood’s incumbent 
residents. Therefore, while it is promising that most interventions targeted low, very low, or 
extremely low-income households, more localized approaches are required to ensure that 
incumbent residents can afford new below-market-rate units.55  
 
Mitigating Displacement Pressure in Neighborhoods at Risk of Gentrification 
 
The residential displacement mitigation tools examined in the previous section are critical 
for preserving access to housing for lower-income households in neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification, but they rarely address the broader displacement pressure experienced by residents 
who remain in place. Protecting incumbent small businesses from displacement can preserve a 
                                                 
54Interventions sometimes targeted more than one income level.  
 
55The complexities of such a localized approach were recently exposed by a bill in New York state, which 
would require the allocation of units developed through a tax abatement program to be determined ‘based 
solely on the specific zip code where the project shall be located’ (The New York State Senate, 2017). 
Housing advocates have warned that this approach could see low-income areas hosting developments for 
very low-income households while higher-income areas develop housing for higher income bands, 
resulting in increased economic segregation (Zimmer, 23 February 2017). A similar argument surrounds 
housing preference policies, as discussed in this chapter.  
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neighborhood’s commercial affordability and culture, while job programs for residents of 
affected areas can address the lack of opportunities that accompanies disinvestment.  













Assistance/incentives for landlords to 
provide small businesses with 
affordable/long-term leases 
4% 8% 9% 17% 62% 
Assistance for historically or culturally 
significant local businesses 
8% 21% 4% 21% 47% 
Restrictions on the locations where 
national chain retailers can operate 
4% 2% 4% 21% 70% 
Set-asides of affordable commercial 
space for locally-owned small 
businesses 
0% 13% 9% 19% 58% 
Set-asides of affordable commercial 
space for minority-owned businesses 
0% 4% 8% 17% 71% 
Set-asides of construction or retail for 
residents of the affected neighborhood 
9% 11% 8% 25% 47% 
Source: Survey of City Governments’ Commercial Affordability Policies 
 
Table 5.2 displays responses to the question, ‘How actively does your city use the 
following tools to preserve affordability in neighborhoods that are experiencing revitalization or 
reinvestment?’ Among those that responded, 55% used at least one of the listed tools somewhat 
or very actively.56  The most common tools were financial assistance for historically or culturally 
significant local businesses and set-asides of construction or retail jobs for residents of the 
affected neighborhood, although these were used ‘very actively’ by less than 10% of cities. 
These tools were also the most common ones for which action was proposed, along with setting 
aside commercial space in redevelopment projects for locally- or minority-owned businesses. As 
one respondent noted, ‘[t]here is some attempt to encourage developers to provide less expensive 
                                                 
56The survey also asked about the presence of commercial rent regulation, but none of the cities in the 
study had this tool in place. 
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space as a community benefit…[T]here is a concerted effort right now to find or include 
performance/creative space because the organizations are losing space due to redevelopment and 
cannot afford to stay in the areas they are located’ (Survey Respondent 33, 2016).  
Respondents often indicated that the tools examined in this section were used as 
opportunities arose. For example, one respondent stated that set-asides for local businesses were 
‘considered on a case-by-case basis during the RFP process for land disposition project[s]’ 
(Survey Respondent 49, 2016). Other respondents explained that city-wide programs that 
assisted small businesses or required local hiring could be used to address indirect displacement 
in areas experiencing redevelopment or reinvestment. For example, one described how ‘the city's 
small business lending pool…provides gap financing and other loan programs to support small 
business development, and can be used to support local business with strong ties to the history 
and community’ (Survey Respondent 30, 2016).  
 
Addressing Residential Affordability and Displacement Mitigation City-wide  
 
Prevalence of Policy Tools  
 
The previous two sections examined the prevalence of policy tools that specifically 
mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Here, I examine tools that 
address residential affordability and displacement more broadly (with or without provisions that 
target neighborhoods at risk of gentrification). Although these interventions do not necessarily 
address the specific circumstances of appreciating neighborhoods, they can ease the overall 
shortage of low-cost units and establish long-term affordability in areas that may later gentrify. 
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 Each city had at least one policy tool adopted to address city-wide affordability, ranging 
from one to 18 (of a possible 21 tools).57 Half of cities had seven or fewer approaches. The most 
common tools involved public funding for repairs to rental or ownership units, preserving 
subsidized or regulated housing, converting distressed housing to affordable units, and funding 
general programs for affordable housing development (Table 5.3). Among approaches that were 
proposed, the most common were short-term rental regulations, land banks, decommodified 
housing, and rent-restricting unsubsidized units. The least prevalent approaches all involved 
regulations that may be impeded by state limits: anti-speculation taxes, vacancy controls, and 
rent regulation.58  
Table 5.3 also examines the prevalence of different types of action. Investing public 
resources to create or preserve affordable housing – which were the least commonly-used actions 
to directly mitigate displacement in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification – were the most 
common ones taken to preserve affordability more generally. This supports the argument that 
investing in affordable units is less feasible in areas where land values have already risen. There 
was only minor variation across the other categories of action. 
 
 
                                                 
57 This section examines two additional policy tools, vacancy controls and anti-speculation taxes, which 
were not included in the section on mitigating gentrification-induced displacement because they address 
broader aspects of the housing market.  
 








Table 5.3. City-Level Policy Tools to Address Residential Affordability and Displacement 
Generally (With or Without Provisions Targeting Neighborhoods at Risk of Gentrifying) 
   
Type of 
action  
Policy tool Respondent cities 
that have adopted 
this tool 
Regulating market activity 
 Short-term rent regulation 33% 
 Condo conversion regulation 22% 
 No net loss policies 18% 
 Rent regulation 8% 
 Vacancy controls 3% 
 Anti-speculation tax 0% 
 At least one tool  49% 
Strengthening tenants’ rights 
 Legal aid for tenants 34% 
 Right of first refusal when rental units are sold, converted or 
rehabilitated 
30% 
 Just cause eviction and anti-harassment ordinances 13% 
 At least one tool 49% 
Zoning for affordable housing development 
 Voluntary inclusionary zoning 52% 
 Mandatory inclusionary zoning 27% 
 At least one tool 54% 
Using public resources to extend affordability of low-cost land/housing 
 Homeowner/renter repair programs 95% 
 Preservation of subsidized or regulated housing 78% 
 Conversion of market-rate units to affordable housing 47% 
 Support for non-speculative/decommodified housing 16% 
 Property tax relief for homeowners 20% 
 At least one tool 99% 
Using public resources to create new affordable units 
 Other funding/incentives for affordable housing 99% 
 Conversion of financially or physically distressed units to 
affordable housing 
66% 
 Affordable housing development on public land 57% 
 At least one tool 99% 
Dedicating revenue streams for affordable housing 
 Housing trust fund 47% 
 Reinvesting increased property tax revenue in affordable 
housing 
23% 
 At least one tool 54% 
Source: Survey of city governments’ residential affordability policies and coding of housing plans, 
policy documents, and program descriptions.  
 
Sample is respondents with at least one tool to address residential affordability.  
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Prevalence of Displacement Mitigation Policy Tools and Types of Action by City Context 
 
Local policy action to address the interests of disadvantaged households is more likely, 
and more extensive, in cities with certain economic, political, and demographic conditions. Some 
types of redistributive housing action are also more feasible in specific contexts. This section 
describes the prevalence of policy tools and types of action to mitigate residential displacement 
in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification according to variations in three conditions that studies 
have shown to be particularly important for redistributive housing action: problem severity/need, 
fiscal and economic strength, and the level of community advocacy.  
 
Variation in Number of Policy Tools by City Conditions 
 
I first examined the differences in problem severity/need among cities that had no policy 
tools in place to mitigate displacement and those that had at least one. In these categories, an 
average of 37% and 39% of census tracts gentrified between 2000 and 2010, respectively, which 
suggests that the extent of gentrification is not driving the differences in policy approach 
between them. On the other hand, among cities that had at least one policy tool in place to 
mitigate displacement, those with the highest third of gentrified tracts had the most tools 
adopted, followed by those in the middle third and those in the lowest third (Figure 5.1). 
Cities with stronger fiscal and economic conditions also had more policy tools adopted to 
mitigate residential displacement, on average. Governments with at least one displacement 
mitigation tool had a mean per capita general revenue of $2,515, compared to $1,651 in cities 
without any tools. Those in the lowest third of general revenue had the fewest policy tools on 
average, followed by those in the middle third and those in the top third. Similar differences 
emerged across median home value. Cities with policy tools to mitigate displacement had a mean 
137 
 
value of $232,811 compared to $168,066 in cities without such tools, and the average number of 
tools adopted was highest in cities with the top third of median home values.   
Cities with tools to mitigate gentrification-induced displacement were also more likely to 
report very active pressure to address affordability and displacement (41%) than those without 
(11%). Among cities with at least one tool in place, those facing very active pressure had more 
adopted, on average, than those with somewhat active pressure and those where pressure was not 




Variation in Type of Action by City Conditions 
 
Cities with different underlying conditions also varied in the type of action they took to 
mitigate displacement. As expected, cities with median housing values in the top third were more 
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Figure 5.1. Mean Number of Tools to Mitigate Displacement in Neighborhoods at 
Risk of Gentrification by City Conditions
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middle (56%) and lowest (29%) third. Market regulation was also more common in cities with 
higher median housing values: 83% of those in the top third on this indicator had at least one tool 
that regulated market activity, compared to 40% in the middle and 33% in the lowest third. This 
is not simply a reflection of the need for these policies in expensive markets, as there was much 
less variation in the use of zoning and market regulation across cities with different levels of 
gentrification. Rather, it indicates that economic strength provides the leverage to use these tools. 
This is supported by the finding that housing trust funds, which often harness strong market 
conditions, were in place in 75% of cities with the top third of median housing values compared 
to 54% of those in the middle third and 43% of those in the bottom third. Also consistent with 
the dynamics discussed earlier in this chapter, action to create new affordable units in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrification was most common in cities with the lowest third of 
property values.  
Turning to fiscal strength, the investment of resources to extend affordability or create 
affordable units in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification was more common in cities with 
revenue in the top third than those in the middle and lowest third. The dedication of a revenue 
stream for affordable housing also varied by resources, with 75% of those in the top third of per 
capita revenue taking this action, compared to 71% in the middle and 27% in the lowest. Specific 
tools that require investments of resources also varied according to fiscal strength. For example, 
cities in the top third on this indicator were nearly twice as likely to fund legal aid for tenants as 
those in the middle and lowest third. 
Cities with very active pressure from residents and/or community groups were 
considerably more likely to act across all categories than those with somewhat active pressure or 
inactive pressure. For example, 75% of cities facing very active community pressure had a 
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dedicated revenue stream for affordable housing, compared to 68% of those with somewhat 
active and 33% of those with inactive pressure. Similarly, 54% of those with very active pressure 
used public resources to extend the affordability of low-cost land and housing in gentrifying 
areas, compared to 37% of those with somewhat active and 19% of those with inactive pressure. 
As above, the relationship between displacement mitigation action and the level of need 
was less straightforward than expected. Although the types of action that cities undertook varied 
by gentrification level, the gaps were often lower than those for other city conditions. For 
example, whereas the gap in the use of market regulation between cities with the highest and 
lowest housing values was 50%, the difference between cities with the highest and lowest 
gentrification levels was just 17%. Similarly, the gap in the use of public resources to extend 
affordability of low-cost land and housing in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification was 35% 
when looking at cities with very active compared to inactive community pressure, but 16% 
between cities with the highest and lowest levels gentrification levels. Two categories that 
showed relatively large gaps by level of gentrification were the protection of tenants’ rights and 
the use of dedicated revenue for affordable housing, which were both considerably more 
common in high-gentrification cities than medium- and low-gentrification cities.   
 
A Closer Look at Tools to Mitigate Displacement  
 
This study’s collection of policy data revealed a wealth of programmatic variation across 
cities, which is obscured by aggregate numbers. This section therefore examines in greater depth 
three tools that address different forms of displacement: inclusionary zoning, short-term rental 
regulation, and neighborhood preference policies. Inclusionary zoning, which primarily 
addresses exclusionary displacement, is one of the most prevalent tools that cities have adopted 
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to preserve affordability in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Short-term rental regulation, 
which has the potential to address multiple dimensions of displacement, was the most common 
tool that was being proposed at the time of the study. The survey did not ask about preference 
policies, but open-ended responses, the review of policy documents, and interviews highlighted 
this as an important tool that cities possess to address direct displacement from gentrifying 
neighborhoods. The information in this section is drawn primarily from government documents, 
media articles, the policy literature, and advocacy reports. Where supplementary interviews 




 Inclusionary zoning is an attractive tool for city governments because it harnesses 
developers’ desire to invest in certain neighborhoods, does not require an outlay of city funds, 
and supports mixed-income development goals. However, there are trade-offs involved in using 
a market-based tool to address displacement and in deciding the scale at which the benefits of 
market appreciation should be redistributed. These tensions are evident in four aspects of 
program design: the types of incentives offered, the duration of affordability restrictions, the 
level of affordability required, and the location of new units.  
In the current context of fiscal constraint, inclusionary zoning is a critical tool for city 
governments to address socioeconomic equity and diversity amid reinvestment. To redistribute 
the benefits of market-rate construction, cities typically provide developers with incentives or 
zoning concessions in exchange for the inclusion of affordable units in new projects. In some of 
the programs captured in this study, city subsidies or tax exemptions were offered as incentives. 
However, the vast majority (86%) of programs offered density, height, or floor area ratio 
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bonuses, or other zoning actions that are particularly valuable in neighborhoods where demand is 
increasing (such as changes from non-residential to residential uses). Some of these programs 
responded to market appreciation and some attempted to anticipate it, but all relied on increased 
demand to function. In Portland, for example, dramatic rent increases prompted the creation of 
an inclusionary housing program that aims to ‘capture value of the current high demand real 
estate environment to produce much needed housing…to maintain income diversity in 
neighborhoods across Portland and promote economic inclusion as our city changes’ (Portland 
Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, 2016, p. 3). In other contexts, stimulating market-rate and 
affordable supply are two prongs of the same approach to addressing affordability and 
displacement. For example, New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) program 
attaches affordability requirements proactively to ‘land use actions [that] promote new housing 
development,’ to ensure that the increased construction that is expected to ensue targets a range 
of income levels (New York City Department of City Planning & New York City Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development, 2015, p. 76). Seattle’s program similarly ‘enact[s] 
affordable housing requirements and increase[es] development capacity at the same time’ by 
encouraging the creation of below-market and market-rate housing (City of Seattle, 2017b, p. 1). 
Thus while inclusionary zoning’s reliance on harnessing demand to address displacement is a 
strength, because it reduces the need for public subsidy, it also presupposes a potentially 
destabilizing shift in neighborhood demographic and economic character through an increase in 
market-rate investment and construction (Interview 6, 2017; Stabrowski, 2015; Stein, 2017).  
 Inclusionary zoning programs primarily address exclusionary displacement in 
appreciating neighborhoods by adding to the stock of below-market-rate housing. The duration 
of affordability restrictions on new units affects these programs’ ability to achieve this goal in 
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the long term. Among the interventions captured in the dataset, requirements varied from five 
years to permanent affordability, with 30 years the most common term. Very few had provisions 
for longer-term or permanent affordability. Among the exceptions, New York City’s voluntary 
and mandatory programs required units to remain permanently affordable (New York City 
Department of City Planning, 2017), while units created through Portland’s inclusionary housing 
program and ownership units created through Austin’s Downtown Density Bonus must remain 
affordable for 99 years (City of Austin code chapter 25.2.586: Downtown density bonus 
program, 2017; City of Portland city code 30.01.120 Inclusionary housing, 2017). Some 
programs with shorter initial terms have built-in renewal options. In Boston, the initial 
inclusionary term is 30 years, ‘with a right to renew for 20 years’ (Boston Planning & 
Development Agency, 2015). 
Both voluntary and mandatory programs typically offer developers an array of options for 
meeting their affordability obligations. These options reflect the trade-offs that cities face 
between 1) building a smaller number of units for the lowest-income households versus more 
units for households at higher income limits, and 2) constructing affordable units on-site in 
appreciating neighborhoods versus assisting more, or poorer, households in other parts of the 
city. Reflecting the first tension, most programs require a lower percentage of affordable units to 
be built if these target poorer households. For example, Chula Vista’s voluntary program grants a 
density/FAR bonus in exchange for the construction of at least 10% affordable units for low-
income households, at least 5% for very low-income households, the construction of senior 
housing, or at least 10% shared equity units made available for sale to moderate-income 
households (City of Chula Vista code chapter 19.90: Affordable housing incentives, 2017). 
Portland’s program, which has both mandatory and voluntary aspects, requires 20% of units to 
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be provided at 80% AMI or 10% to be provided at 60% AMI (if construction occurs on-site) 
(Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, 2016).  
There are also trade-offs in deciding where units should be located. Encouraging on-site 
provision is critical to maintain diversity in areas where costs are increasing. Certain programs 
prioritize this goal by requiring all inclusionary units to be built on-site. Most give developers the 
option to build off-site or pay a fee in lieu of construction, but incentivize on-site provision by 
requiring fewer affordable units and/or allowing a higher income band to be targeted. In the 
above-mentioned case of Portland, off-site requirements rise to 20% of units at 60% AMI or 10% 
of units at 30% AMI (Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, 2016). Under San 
Francisco’s recently-strengthened rules, developers of qualifying small rental projects must 
provide 12% of units on-site at 55% of AMI, or contribute the equivalent of 20% of units off-site 
or through a fee (San Francisco Planning Department, 2017). Additional restrictions are often 
attached to off-site provision. For example, Chicago’s inclusionary zoning ordinance requires 
off-site units to be situated ‘in a higher income area’ no more than two miles from the original 
development (City of Chicago, 2015).  
 The combined result of these programmatic options is that below-market-rate units built 
on-site in appreciating neighborhoods through inclusionary zoning are likely to target relatively 
high income bands or comprise a low percentage of new units, which reduces their effectiveness 
in combating displacement. Because program requirements must be financially viable if 
developers are to construct housing, creating more units that reach lower levels of affordability 
on-site either requires an infusion of public funds, which are scarce, or drawing cross-subsidies 
from more (or more expensive) market-rate units, which can accelerate socioeconomic change 
(Interview 6; Sarmiento & Sims, 2015; Stein, 2017). Meanwhile, off-site construction can serve 
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more and/or lower-income households, and the flexible revenue raised by inclusionary fees can 
provide a dedicated source of funding for diverse affordable housing efforts, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter. In light of cities’ broad challenges with housing instability and the scarcity of 
intergovernmental funding, the possibilities of off-site and inclusionary fee options cannot be 
easily dismissed, but must be weighed against the potential loss of diversity in appreciating 
areas.  
 
Short-term Rental Regulations 
 
 While inclusionary zoning seeks to leverage the market, short-term rental regulations 
primarily attempt to rein it in. Short-term rentals can trigger displacement pressure through 
changes to neighborhood character, as well as economic and exclusionary displacement when 
landlords charge nightly rates that long-term residents or potential in-movers cannot match on a 
monthly basis. Many cities have begun to subject short-term rentals to the regulations governing 
hotels, including by requiring licenses and insurance, code compliance, and occupancy taxes. 
Others have gone further to address the effects of the industry on neighborhoods and housing 
markets.  
When designing policies to regulate the impact of short-term rentals, officials must 
balance the interests of property owners and tenants who wish to earn income by renting to 
tourists; neighbors who find the influx of non-residents disruptive; lower-income households 
who can be negatively affected if the short-term use of units reduces the availability of long-term 
rentals; and the city as a whole, which benefits from tourist revenue. Some of these interests also 
overlap among groups. For example, low-income households may wish to earn income from 
renting out their unit on the short-term market but may also be negatively impacted by rent 
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increases. Similarly, homeowners may simultaneously wish to rent out their units and to 
minimize the neighborhood-level externalities of an influx of tourists. Short-term rental policies 
therefore raise important questions about who decides the character of a neighborhood, what 
mixture of uses and occupants is acceptable, and how to reconcile the revenue-generating 
benefits of tourists on a household- and city-wide scale with the costs that their presence imposes 
on those already disadvantaged in the housing market. 
Cities have taken several approaches to balancing these concerns. Some prioritize the 
preservation of neighborhood character by banning short-term rentals in residential areas or 
requiring a conditional use permit for such activity. For example in Henderson (Nevada), short-
term vacation rentals are only permitted in Tourist Commercial zoned districts for between seven 
and 30 days with a conditional use permit (City of Henderson development code Chapter 19.5: 
Use regulations, 2017). The City of Irvine has recently given warnings to dozens of residents for 
violating the city’s zoning code, which prohibits rentals for less than 30 days outside of hotel/ 
motel zoned districts (Leung, 2016; Zoning ordinance of the city of Irvine, California section 3-
3-1: Land use matrix, 2017).59   
Other cities aim to strike a balance between revenue-generating opportunities, housing 
availability, and neighborhood character, by permitting home-sharing only in a primary 
residence and/or limiting the number of days per year during which hosts can rent to short-term 
guests. Madison permits short-term rentals only in registered primary residences, so that 
‘homeowners or renters can earn some extra money renting out space in the dwelling they 
occupy, but…neighbors retain the right to control the type of neighborhood they are living in’ 
                                                 
59A few respondents reported that similar zoning rules governing short-term occupancy (typically written 
before the rise of home-sharing) were not being actively enforced while city officials examined the best 
approach to regulating the new issues posed by this industry.    
146 
 
(City of Madison, 2017; Madison zoning code section 28.151: Tourist rooming house, 2013). 
Proposed regulations in Seattle that target ‘commercial operators who…rent multiple properties 
year-round’ would allow rental of a primary residence and one additional property for fewer than 
30 days at a time (Seattle City Council, 2017). Los Angeles’ proposed ordinance would limit 
short-term rentals to a primary residence that may be offered for 180 days per year (Los Angeles 
City Council, 2016). These policies restrict the number of days per year that a unit can be offered 
on a short-term basis to disincentivize the removal of units from the long-term market. However, 
it may be more lucrative for owners to charge nightly rates for a select number of days per year 
than monthly rates for the full year. For example, one analysis found that given current rates for 
short- and long-term rentals in Los Angeles, it would be more profitable on average for a 
landlord to rent out a unit for 83 days as a short-term rental than for a year to a monthly tenant 
(Inside Airbnb, 2016). Similar concerns have been raised about New Orleans’ 90-day limit; the 
short-term market may still be more profitable than leasing to long-term tenants, since investors 
can ‘rent their units most weekends of the year’ (Feldman, 2017). Due to this relative 
profitability of short-term rentals, enforcing provisions that limit the number and types of units 
that hosts can rent out (particularly those that ban the rental of non-primary residences) are 
critical to prevent units from being taken off the long-term rental market.  
 While the measures listed above aim to restrict the number of units rented out city-wide, 
several cities have attempted to limit the neighborhood-level impacts of short-term rentals by 
capping the number of units that can receive permits in specific areas. Austin allows the short-
term rental of both owner-occupied and non-owner-occupied units, but limits non-owner-
occupied rentals to 3% of a census tract’s units in single-family districts, prohibits two such 
rentals to operate within 1000 feet of each other in these areas, and limits short-term rentals in 
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multifamily residential zones to 3% of a building’s units (City of Austin, 2016). The Metro 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County (2017) similarly limits permits for non-owner-
occupied rentals of single- and two-family homes to 3% of the units in a census tract, and 
requires proof that applicants have informed adjacent owners of the intent to lease a unit on a 
short-term basis. In Grand Rapids, where short-term rentals are limited to one room and units 
must be owner-occupied, only 200 licenses are available city-wide at a given time (City of Grand 
Rapids, n.d.; City of Grand Rapids code of ordinances  Sec. 116.7.646. - Issuance of license & 
Sec. 116.7.648. - Grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of a home occupation license, 
2014).  In a different approach that prioritizes residents’ right to determine how their 
neighborhood is used, Kansas City (Missouri)’s proposed rules would require those who wish to 
rent out non-primary residences to obtain the permission of 75% of neighboring property owners 
(Kansas City City Planning & Development, 2017).60    
 Cities are also attempting to address the impact of home-sharing on equity in the housing 
market by using occupancy taxes from short-term rentals to fund affordable housing. Like 
inclusionary zoning, this approach aims to translate the popularity of short-term rentals into the 
resources to address its consequences for vulnerable residents. For example, in 2016, Chicago 
began imposing a 4% surcharge on home-sharing and vacation rentals to fund housing and 
supportive services for homeless residents (City of Chicago, 2016). Seattle’s City Council also 
recently passed an ordinance that will impose a tax of $14 per night on each short-term rental 
unit (and $8 a night on each guest room) to ‘support investments in affordable housing and to 
support community-initiated equitable development projects’ (City of Seattle, 2017a). Los 
                                                 
60Those who fail to do so must apply for a special permit. 
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Angeles’ proposed ordinance would channel 90% of the occupancy taxes received from home-
sharing to an Affordable Housing Trust Fund (Los Angeles City Council, 2016).  
Several cities have added new enforcement mechanisms to strengthen their attempts to 
regulate the short-term rental market. In San Francisco, where only registered primary residences 
can legally be rented out for fewer than 30 consecutive days, the Office of Short-Term 
Residential Rental Administration and Enforcement reviews home-sharing platforms to identify 
and investigate non-registered units (City & County of San Francisco, 2017; San Francisco 
administrative code sec. 41A.5: Unlawful conversion; remedies, 2017; San Francisco 
administrative code sec. 41A.7: Office of short-term residential rental administration and 
enforcement, 2015). In 2016, New York City’s Administrative Code was revised to provide for 
local enforcement of a state law that prohibits rentals of fewer than 30 consecutive days in any 
residential building with more than two dwelling units when a permanent resident is not present. 
The Code makes it illegal to advertise short-term rentals in violation of the state law, and 
establishes fines of up to $7500 for violations (New York City administrative code 27-287.1 
Unlawful advertisement for certain occupancies, 2016; The New York State Senate, 2010). In a 
different approach, Seattle’s proposed regulations would require companies like Airbnb to obtain 
a license from the city and provide officials with quarterly data to aid in the law’s enforcement 
(Seattle City Council, 2017).  
 The flurry of city-level regulatory activity to adapt to the emergent reality of home-
sharing has been met with aggressive obstruction by state governments that oppose such action 
(National League of Cities, 2017). As of 2016, Arizona bans municipalities from prohibiting 
short-term vacation rentals ‘based on their classification, use or occupancy’ and channels taxes 
on short-term rental activity to the state (Arizona State Legislature, 2017; National League of 
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Cities, 2017). Similar bills were being considered in 2017 in Florida, Missouri, Texas, and 
Wisconsin (Florida House of Representatives, 2017; Missouri State Legislature, 2017; Texas 
Legislature, 2017; Wisconsin State Legislature, 2015).      
 
Neighborhood Preference for Historically or Imminently Displaced Households 
 
Neighborhood preference policies constitute a third area where cities’ attempts to address 
displacement come up against conflicting priorities and concerns. Preference policies mitigate 
direct displacement by reserving a percentage of new subsidized units in neighborhoods that are 
experiencing reinvestment for individuals residing in, or previously displaced from, the area. 
Although they are one of the most direct tools available to cities to ensure that the benefits of 
neighborhood improvement accrue to residents who experienced the harms of disinvestment, 
preference policies expose the tensions that emerge when neighborhood-level concerns with 
affordability and diversity are pitted against city-wide goals of reducing segregation and 
increasing housing opportunity. This section discusses three cities’ approaches to this issue.  
Portland’s North/Northeast Preference Policy aims to mitigate displacement due to 
current reinvestment efforts and to rectify the past displacement of African American residents 
from the neighborhood as a consequence of the city’s urban renewal and revitalization policies 
(Pope, 2016; Portland Housing Bureau, 2016b, 2016a; Semuels, 2016). To address this history, 
the program gives preference for city-subsidized housing in the neighborhood to ‘[c]urrent and 
former residents of specific areas in N/NE Portland that were subject to high levels of urban 
renewal, and their descendants’ (Portland Housing Bureau, 2017a). Those whose ancestors were 
displaced receive preference even if they do not currently live in the neighborhood, and the 
highest priority is given to households whose family property was seized by the city through 
eminent domain (Portland Housing Bureau, 2015a).  
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The policy is part of a $20 million plan for reinvestment in the North/Northeast 
neighborhood that also includes several measures to prevent the displacement of current 
residents (Portland Housing Bureau, 2016a). The plan was developed with widespread resident 
input and is monitored by a community oversight committee (Portland Housing Bureau, 2015a, 
2016a). Prior to drafting a plan, the Portland Housing Bureau held forums in North/Northeast 
Portland and in another neighborhood ‘where many displaced Portlanders have gone’ (Portland 
Housing Bureau, 2017b). Many residents saw proposed development in the neighborhood as 
another episode in a history of reinvestment displacing the African American community 
(Portland Housing Bureau, 2014). A common theme that emerged was that to address this 
history, ‘[d]isplaced people should get priority for new housing opportunities’ (Portland Housing 
Bureau, 2014). While the policy does not give preference based on race, the disproportionate 
impact of renewal and revitalization programs on African American households is reflected in 
policy outcomes (Portland Housing Bureau, 2016a; Theen, 2015). For example, the vast majority 
of initial applicants for and recipients of assistance identified as African American (African 
American Alliance for Homeownership, Hacienda, Proud Ground, Habitat for Humanity, & 
NAYA Family Center, n.d.; Portland Housing Bureau, 2016a).  
San Francisco’s Certificate of Preference program, which originated in 1967 and was 
revised in 2008, also seeks to redress historic displacement caused by city actions. The program 
gives preference in city-subsidized developments to households and businesses whose property 
was seized during post-war urban renewal – although it does not extend to descendants of the 
displaced, and it does not directly help displaced residents return to their neighborhood of origin 
(City and County of San Francisco, n.d.; Redevelopment Agency of the City and County of San 
Francisco, 2008; San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development, n.d.-
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b). Separately, the city’s 2015 Neighborhood Preference Policy reserves 40% of units in new 
subsidized developments for residents of the Supervisorial District where the project is built and 
those living within a half-mile radius of the development (Badger, 2016; San Francisco Mayor’s 
Office of Housing and Community Development, 2016). Proponents assert that it is a step 
towards addressing the impact of displacement on the city’s African American population, which 
dropped from 14% in 1970 to 6% in 2016 (Dineen, 2016; Gonzales, 2016a). As part of this 
strategy, the city planned to give preference for units in a federally-funded senior housing 
development to residents of the historically African American neighborhood in which it was 
located (City and County of San Francisco Office of the City Attorney, 2016). However, HUD 
blocked the plan on the grounds that it violated the Fair Housing Act by reinforcing residential 
segregation (Badger, 2016; Gonzales, 2016a). The city asked HUD to reconsider, noting that 
‘[t]he Plan takes a tool that communities used in the past to keep protected minorities out and 
flips it on its head, to help residents remain in their neighborhoods instead. San Francisco's Plan 
addresses gentrification forces that were unknown when the Fair Housing Act was passed in 
1968, and is not what Congress intended the Fair Housing Act to address’ (City and County of 
San Francisco Office of the City Attorney, 2016). HUD eventually permitted a revised 
preference that includes residents of rapidly-appreciating neighborhoods throughout the city 
(Gonzales, 2016b; San Francisco Office of the Mayor, 2016). While this reduces the chances that 
residents of the neighborhood immediately surrounding the development will secure housing in 
the new building, it protects equity and diversity on a broader scale, by providing those at risk of 
displacement from multiple gentrifying neighborhoods a greater chance to remain in the city 
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(Gonzales, 2016b; San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development, 
n.d.-a).61 
 New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development gives residents 
preference for 50% of developed or rehabilitated units that are subsidized by the city within their 
Community District (Cestero, 2015; New York City Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development, 2017; New York City Housing Development Corporation & New York City 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2016). The policy originated in the 
1980s, when Ed Koch’s administration granted residents preference for units rehabilitated by the 
city in their neighborhood, in response to community demands that public initiatives to address 
abandonment benefit those who lived through disinvestment (Cestero, 2015; Kusisto, 2015; 
Murphy, 2016a, 2016b). The policy is currently under review by HUD following a lawsuit by 
fair housing advocates. These critics allege that the policy perpetuates residential segregation by 
reducing non-white households’ chances of accessing subsidized developments in majority-white 
Community Districts (Winfield et al. v. City of New York, 2015).62 However, the policy is 
strongly supported by residents and community organizations in low-income neighborhoods. For 
example, among 500 South Bronx residents who responded to a survey about a proposed 
rezoning, 94% felt that at least half of new units should be reserved for neighborhood residents 
(Bronx Coalition for a Community Vision, 2015). Elected officials and city agencies claim that 
the policy is critical for securing community support for new housing and ensuring that new 
                                                 
61For developments that do not receive federal funding, the city’s neighborhood preference policy is still 
in effect (Rivano Barros, 2016; San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development, 
2016). 
 
62The policy that affected the plaintiffs in the case was a New York state initiative rather than the city-
level one discussed in this section. The lawsuit was permitted to go forward on the basis that the city’s 
preference policy could reduce the plaintiffs’ chances to access affordable units in future lotteries 
(Murphy, 2016b).  
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construction does not lead to widespread displacement (Grabar, 2016; Interview 3, 2017; 
Interview 10, 2017; Kusisto, 2015; Lander, 2015; Murphy, 2016a).  
The debates over preference policies thus underscore the tensions between city-wide 
goals and neighborhood-level concerns. Such policies have the potential to reinforce city-level 
patterns of segregation by reducing minority residents’ chances of accessing subsidized housing 
in majority-white areas and encouraging existing residents to remain in majority-minority 
neighborhoods. However, at the neighborhood level, these policies can foster political support 
for affordable housing construction in high-opportunity areas. And in gentrifying neighborhoods 
more specifically, these policies can increase low-income residents’ opportunities to stay put 
when amenities improve, offer previously displaced residents a chance to benefit from 




This chapter provides the first systematic, large-scale comparison of cities’ approaches to 
mitigating displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Most cities did not have a 
strong framework for addressing displacement from these neighborhoods. Although the vast 
majority had at least one residential displacement mitigation tool in place, a quarter had only one 
of the 19 tools examined, and over half had three or fewer. The most commonly-adopted policy 
tools – voluntary inclusionary zoning and housing trust funds – typically rely on strong markets 
to be viable. Conversely, the least common tools to address displacement in gentrifying areas 
included those that require available and affordable properties, which are likely to be in short 
supply in appreciating neighborhoods. These policy tools are more commonly used to address 
overall affordability and are more common in cities where land values are low, which indicates 
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that they are suitable to preserve long-term affordability in areas where costs are not yet 
prohibitive. This chapter also revealed the importance of flexible funding sources, whether local 
or intergovernmental, for addressing rapidly-changing contexts in gentrifying neighborhoods – 
and especially for providing tenant services and creating or extending affordable units. As 
intergovernmental funds dwindle, revenue raised by leveraging local market appreciation and 
demand for development provides a lifeline to city governments’ housing efforts, which further 
deepens their dependence on strong markets to address displacement. 
 The cities in this study were more likely to have interventions to address the loss of low-
cost housing units from appreciating neighborhoods than the direct ability of incumbent 
households to remain in place. While most interventions did target low-income residents, this 
does not guarantee that incumbent households will be able to afford new units given the broad 
calculation of AMI levels. Creating units that are affordable to existing residents of low-income 
neighborhoods often requires deep subsidies that are in limited supply. However, there are 
additional measures that cities can take to address direct displacement that do not rely primarily 
on subsidies. These include strengthening tenants’ rights through just cause eviction and anti-
harassment laws and protecting their long-term ability to remain in their units through rent 
regulation, condo conversion controls, no net loss policies, and short-term rental regulations.  
 Displacement pressure is a broader concept than economic, physical, or exclusionary 
displacement, but it is a pervasive issue for long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods. 
Tools to address this phenomenon through commercial affordability programs and hiring 
incentives/requirements were not used very actively by the majority of respondent cities. The 
most actively-used tools were financial assistance for historically/culturally significant local 
businesses and set-asides of construction or retail jobs generated by redevelopment. However, 
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these tools were used ‘very actively’ by fewer than 10% of cities. Where these tools were used, 
this was often done on a case-by-case basis as opportunities arose, or through modifications of 
city-wide programs. 
 Consistent with the policy action literature, cities’ internal conditions were found to 
affect the number of tools they adopt and the type of action they take to address displacement in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Greater levels of problem severity/need, fiscal/economic 
strength, and community pressure were typically associated with higher numbers of residential 
displacement mitigation tools, although the level of gentrification was not an important indicator 
of whether cities adopted such tools at all. Cities with higher housing values were more likely to 
have tools in the zoning and regulation categories, consistent with the notion that such action 
requires some leverage to limit, require, or incentivize action. Municipalities with higher fiscal 
resources were more likely to undertake displacement mitigation actions that require an 
allocation of funding, including creating/extending affordability in appreciating neighborhoods. 
Finally, all categories of action were more likely where community pressure was very active.  
Efforts to create balanced inclusionary zoning policies, regulate short-term rentals, and 
implement neighborhood preferences demonstrate many of the challenges that cities face as they 
try to ensure that residents of low-income neighborhoods experience the benefits of new 
investment. Inclusionary zoning has emerged as a popular tool precisely because it leverages 
market strength to address the potentially destabilizing costs of investment for lower-income 
households and neighborhoods. However, its success in achieving this goal is influenced by the 
relationship between the quantity of market-rate housing that is produced compared to the 
quantity and depth of affordable units constructed. On-site construction is the most direct means 
of protecting low-income households’ ability to access appreciating areas. However, achieving 
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deep affordability on-site is a challenge in the absence of public subsidies, and efforts to do so 
through cross-subsidies from additional or more expensive market rate units can aggravate 
gentrification pressures. Meanwhile, off-site construction can serve more and/or lower-income 
households, and the flexible revenue raised by inclusionary fees can provide a dedicated source 
of funding for affordable housing efforts - but neither holds any guarantees for residents of the 
neighborhood where market-rate construction is occurring.  
Regulating the short-term rental industry is equally complicated, as it requires balancing 
the interests of multiple groups of residents and property owners. Cities are trying to reconcile 
the associated tensions in different ways, whether by prioritizing the preservation of 
neighborhood character, by striking a compromise among individuals’ right to generate revenue, 
neighbors’ right to control their living environment, and lower-income households’ access to 
housing, or by redistributing the revenue from short-term rental activity to address the industry’s 
negative impact on housing equity. However, in many cities, state-level legislative action 
threatens to hamper local control over the short-term rental industry.  
While short-term rental regulations try to tackle a new reality, neighborhood-based 
preferences can address past injustices. The most direct attempt to do this exists in Portland, 
where those displaced from North/Northeast Portland by urban renewal (and their descendants) 
receive preference for city-subsidized units in that neighborhood. Portland’s policy represents an 
effort to address the disproportionate and historic impact of gentrification on communities of 
color. San Francisco’s attempts to mitigate that impact through neighborhood preference in a 
federally-funded project clashed with federal Fair Housing goals and resulted in the modification 
of the policy to include multiple neighborhoods with a high risk of displacement. New York 
City’s preference policy has ignited a similar debate over its potential segregating effects. The 
157 
 
legal challenges in New York and San Francisco exposed the ways in which a policy’s impact on 
equity and diversity can differ depending on the context in which it is employed and the scale 
that is being considered.  
 This chapter showed that, particularly in contexts where enabling conditions are 
favorable, city governments have the will to introduce tools to prevent the displacement of 
lower-income households from appreciating neighborhoods. The following chapter examines the 
role of local conditions more rigorously through a series of multivariate analyses. Many of the 
themes examined in this chapter are also elaborated on in Chapter 7, which draws on semi-
structured interviews with city officials and community organizations to investigate cities’ 
displacement mitigation planning in more depth. 
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Chapter 6: The Conditions Associated with Cities’ Displacement Mitigation Approaches 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, consistent with the expectations from the 
redistributive policy action literature, cities with higher levels of gentrification, community 
pressure, and fiscal and economic strength had more policy tools adopted to mitigate 
displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification – although cities with and without 
such interventions had similar levels of gentrification. This chapter examines these relationships 
more systematically through a series of multivariate regressions that analyze how a city’s 
conditions are related to three measures of their commitment to mitigating displacement: the 
number of displacement mitigation policy tools they have in place, their likelihood of addressing 
direct displacement, and the type of action they take to mitigate displacement. For each model in 
turn, I address the hypotheses being tested, the variable operationalizations, the main results, and 
findings from alternate specifications. I conclude the chapter by summarizing the findings within 
the context of the redistributive policy action literature, before examining these relationships in 
more depth in Chapter 7 and outlining their implications in this dissertation’s conclusion. 
 
Analysis 1: City Conditions and Displacement Mitigation Policy Counts  
 
Hypotheses and Analytic Approach 
 
The first model analyzed the relationship between cities’ conditions and the intensity of 
their approaches to mitigating residential displacement in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. 
The dependent variable counts the number of policy tools that have been adopted in each city. 
Building on the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and the findings in Chapter 5, I hypothesized 
that cities with higher levels of need/problem severity, fiscal and economic strength, and pro-
affordable housing interest group pressure would have significantly higher displacement 
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mitigation policy tool counts.63 Table 6.1 details how these variables were operationalized. To 
address positive skewness, I expressed median housing value, per capita general revenue, and 
population as their natural logarithms. Adopted policy counts were moderately correlated with 
the levels of community pressure (rs=0.46, p<0.01) and gentrification (rs =0.33, p<0.01), and 




Table 6.2 presents the results of a Poisson regression64 that examined the relationship 
between city conditions and the number of policy tools adopted (Model 1.1). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 
show predicted policy counts for different values of the variables that were significantly 
associated with this outcome.   
                                                 
63In a preliminary version of the models presented in this chapter, I tested interaction terms between the 
level of gentrification and community pressure, median housing values, and per capita general revenue, to 
assess whether these variables had a different relationship to displacement mitigation policy tool counts 
across levels of gentrification. However, the interaction terms were not significant and were omitted from 
the final models. 
 
64Tests of over-dispersion were run for all count models in this chapter. As no evidence of over-dispersion 





Table 6.1. Model 1 Dependent and Independent Variables 
  
 







Count of policy tools adopted to 
mitigate displacement in 
neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification 




Count of policy tools implemented to 
mitigate displacement in 
neighborhoods at risk of 
gentrification 
3.19 3.07 0 - 15 
Main Independent Variables 




Percentage of tracts that gentrified 
2000-10 
39% 14% Positive 




Rating of community pressure to address displacement Positive 
Not at all or not actively = 0 27 35% 
Somewhat actively = 1 21 27% 
Very actively = 2 29 38% 






Median housing value  $226,136 $144,736 Positive 










Percentage of residents who identify 
as African American 
21% 15% Positive 




Average of respondents’ rating of 
how actively private real estate 
industry groups provide input on 
housing/ redevelopment plans 




State’s regulatory and financial 
support for affordable housing (1 
point each for allowing rent control 
and inclusionary zoning, and 1 point 
for each capital/ production program) 
4.88 3.21 Positive 
 Frequency Percentage  
Progressive 
policy history 
Living wage ordinance by 2006      Positive 
Yes 17 22% 
No 60 78% 
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Contrary to the problem severity thesis, cities with a higher percentage of gentrified tracts 
did not have significantly higher displacement mitigation policy tool counts. The results did 
support the hypothesis that pro-affordable housing interest group pressure increases the number 
of policy tools adopted, although only the highest level of pressure was significantly associated 
with this outcome. Specifically, in cities with very active community pressure, policy counts 
were 51% higher, on average, than in cities with inactive pressure (p<0.1). This translated to a 
predicted count of 2.67 policy tools for cities with inactive pressure and 4.03 for cities with very 
active pressure, holding all other variables constant, with a significant difference between the 
two (1.36, p<0.05) (Figure 6.1).65  
The results also supported the hypothesis regarding economic strength. Cities with higher 
median housing values had significantly more tools adopted, on average (p<0.05); for example, a 
25% increase in a city’s median housing value increased the expected policy tool count by 11% 
(Figure 6.2).66 When looking at standardized coefficients for variables significantly associated 
with the outcome, the median housing value also had the largest effect. As predicted by the 
locational demand thesis, cities with larger populations also had significantly higher policy 
counts on average (p<0.01). Although these two measures of cities’ bargaining position were 
positively associated with the strength of policy frameworks, the level of fiscal health (per capita 
general revenue) did not emerge as significantly related to this outcome. 
                                                 
65Predicted counts and probabilities in this chapter are the average predicted values when all observations 
in the dataset are treated as having the characteristic of the category (or the value in the case of 
continuous variables) for which the margin is calculated. In this example, 2.67 is the average predicted 
policy count if all observations are treated as having ‘inactive’ pressure and 4.03 is the average predicted 
policy count if all observations are treated as having ‘very active’ pressure, holding all other variables 
constant.  
 
66Logged independent variable coefficients were converted to percentage changes in values of the 




Table 6.2. Poisson Regression of Displacement Mitigation Policy Counts67 
 
 Adopted Implemented 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 
Percentage of eligible tracts that gentrified, 2000-2010 1.37 1.09 
 (0.65) (0.53) 
Somewhat active community pressurea 1.38 1.40 
 (0.30) (0.32) 
Very active community pressurea 1.51* 1.42 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
Log of median housing value 1.60** 1.62** 
 (0.33) (0.34) 
Log of per capita general revenue 0.86 0.84 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Log of population 1.24*** 1.25*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Percentage African American 1.00 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
New political culture score 1.27*** 1.28** 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Level of real estate input 0.93 0.90 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
State support for affordable housing 1.04* 1.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Living wage ordinance adopted by 2006b 1.37* 1.60*** 
 (0.22) (0.27) 
Constant 2.11*** 1.80*** 
 (0.34) (0.32) 
Observations 77 77 
Wald chi2 (11) 200.4 198.9 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.32 
Coefficients are incident rate ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Continuous variables are centered at their means.   
aReference group is cities with inactive pressure. 
bReference group is cities that did not have a living wage ordinance in 2006. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
67For each model in this chapter, I tested for multicollinearity, goodness-of-fit, specification errors, 
distribution of residuals, outliers, non-linearity, and influential observations. No serious issues were 










Several other aspects of cities’ political and policy environments were also significantly 
associated with the expected policy count. A one-point increase in the index of new political 


































































































































Figure 6.2. Predicted Policy Tool Count by Median 
Home Valuee
aDifference between ‘very active’ and ‘not active’ is significant (p<0.05) 
bDifference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.01) 
cDifference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is significant (p<0.1) 
dDifference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.1) 




translated to a predicted count of 2.86 at the 25th percentile of scores compared to 3.74 at the 75th 
percentile for the sample (Figure 6.1). A one-point increase on the scale of state support for 
affordable housing (equivalent to the state allowing one additional regulatory program or having 
one additional housing capital/production program) was associated with a significant but modest 
(5%) increase in expected policy count (p<0.1). Moving from the minimum state support score 
of 1 to the maximum score of 10 increased the predicted policy count by nearly 1.5 units (Figure 
6.1). Finally, cities that had adopted a living wage ordinance by 2006 had a predicted policy 
count that was 1.18 points higher, on average, than those that did not, with a significant 




 Analyzing Implemented Policy Tools 
 
 Model 1.1 included all policy tools that cities had adopted at the time of the study, 
regardless of their implementation status. In Model 1.2, the analysis was replicated for the subset 
of tools that were implemented, to determine whether different conditions affect the existence of 
a policy on paper compared to its application on the ground (Table 6.2).  
As in Model 1.1, there was no evidence that elevated need was associated with 
significantly higher counts of policy tools. Furthermore, neither somewhat active nor very active 
community pressure was significantly associated with this outcome. The results for log of 
median housing value, log of population, new political culture scores, and state support for 
affordable housing remained significant and substantively similar to Model 1.1. The presence of 
a living wage ordinance in 2006 was associated with a 60% increase in average count for 
implemented policy tools (p<0.01), compared to 37% for adopted tools (p<0.1).  
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Alternative Measures of Need  
 
 Although the results in Chapter 4 indicated that several city governments were tracking 
neighborhood-level gentrification pressures, it is possible that cities’ policy efforts are more 
responsive to overall shifts in the housing market than to tract-level changes. I therefore re-
estimated the regressions of adopted and implemented policy counts using the percent change in 
median home value at the city level between 2000 and 2010 as an alternate measure of need. In 
addition, it is possible that a high-need context, rather than incremental changes in the percentage 
of gentrified tracts, motivates policy responsiveness. To test this hypothesis, I re-ran the 
regressions with a binary measure of need that categorized cities as experiencing ‘high 
gentrification’ if more than 50% of eligible census tracts gentrified between 2000 and 2010 
(equivalent to the 75th percentile of cities).   
The change in median housing value was moderately correlated with the total number of 
policy tools adopted (rs=0.42, p<0.01) and implemented (rs=0.43, p<0.01) to mitigate 
displacement. Gentrification status was weakly correlated with adopted (rs=0.29, p<0.05) and 
implemented (rs=0.26, p<0.05) policy counts. In multivariate analyses, however, neither of these 
variables was significantly associated with the number of policy tools adopted or implemented 










Table 6.3. Poisson Regression of Displacement Mitigation Policy Counts (Alternate Measures of Need) 
 
 Adopted Implemented Adopted Implemented 
 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 Model 1.6 
Change in median house value 2000-2010 1.07 1.06   
 (0.33) (0.29)   
High gentrificationa    1.03 0.96 
   (0.13) (0.12) 
Somewhat active community pressureb 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.40 
 (0.30) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) 
Very active community pressureb 1.53** 1.42 1.52** 1.43 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Log of median housing value 1.55** 1.60** 1.58** 1.61** 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.32) (0.33) 
Log of per capita general revenue 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.84 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Log of population 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.26*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Percentage African American 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
New political culture score 1.28*** 1.28** 1.27*** 1.29** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
Level of real estate input 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.91 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
State support for affordable housing 1.05* 1.05* 1.05* 1.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Living wage ordinance adopted by 2006c 1.35* 1.59*** 1.36* 1.59*** 
 (0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) 
Constant 2.11*** 1.80*** 2.09*** 1.82*** 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.35) (0.33) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 
Wald chi2 (11) 200.1 198.2 203.4 214.9 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Coefficients are Incident Rate Ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
aReference group is cities where less than 50% of eligible tracts gentrified between 2000 and 2010. 
bReference group is cities with inactive pressure. 
cReference group is cities that did not have a living wage ordinance in 2006. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Analysis 2: City Conditions and Policy Tools that Address Direct Displacement  
 
Hypotheses and Analytic Approach 
 
In Model 2, I estimated a logistic regression that examined the relationship between city 
conditions and the probability of having adopted at least one intervention that addressed direct 
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displacement in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification.68 This model tested similar hypotheses to 
Model 1. The level of need for direct displacement mitigation was expected to be significantly 
and positively related to the probability of having adopted at least one applicable policy tool. 
Cities with greater fiscal and economic resources and higher levels of community pressure were 
also expected to have a stronger likelihood of addressing direct displacement.  
Some variables were operationalized differently in Model 2 than in Model 1 (Table 6.4). 
First, instead of measuring need using an indicator of the extent of gentrification, this model used 
the level of median rent. This was done because many of the tools that cities use to address direct 
displacement – including rent regulation, condo conversion rules, legal aid for tenants, and right 
of first refusal policies – typically apply city-wide and not exclusively in neighborhoods that are 
experiencing reinvestment or redevelopment. Moreover, they are often used to address 
displacement that arises from issues other than gentrification (such as general housing instability 
due to low levels of affordability).  
Secondly, cross-tabulations of the three-level community pressure variable with the 
dependent variable used in this analysis revealed a low number of observations in some cells. 
Consequently, the measure of community pressure to address displacement is treated as 
dichotomous in this model, with cities receiving a score of 0 if they characterized community 
pressure as not present or not active, and 1 if they identified somewhat or very active pressure. 
Thirdly, the binary variable measuring the presence of a living wage ordinance in 2006 was 
omitted from this model due to very low observations in some cells when cross-tabulated with 
the dependent variable. 
  
                                                 
68Because there were few differences between the models of policy adoption and implementation in 
Analysis 1, the rest of the models in this chapter did not examine implemented policy tools separately. 
168 
 
Table 6.4. Model 2 Dependent and Independent Variables 
  
Concept Variable Frequency Percentage 
Dependent Variable 
Probability of 
having a policy 
tool that mitigates 
direct displacement   
Binary variable equal to 1 if city 
had an intervention that addressed 
economic or physical displacement 
and 0 if the city did not.    
Yes = 51 
 
No = 26  
Yes = 66% 
 
No = 34% 
Main Independent Variables 






Median monthly gross rent  $976 $225 Positive 
Fiscal and 
economic strength 
Median housing value  $226,136 $144,736 Positive 
Per capita property tax revenue $534 $517 Positive 




Survey respondents’ rating of 
community pressure to address 
gentrification (Not at all or not 
actively = 0, Somewhat actively or 
very actively = 1)  
0 = 27 
 
1 = 50 
0 = 35% 
 
1 = 65% 
Positive 
Control Variables 
  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
 
Locational demand Population 623,043 1,062,575 Positive 
Public support for 
redistributive 
housing policies 
Percentage of residents who 
identify as African American 
21% 15% Positive 
Index of new political culture  0.04 0.93 Positive 
Interest groups 
(pro-development) 
Average of respondents’ rating of 
how actively private real estate 
industry groups provide input on 
housing/redevelopment plans 
1.86 0.72 Negative 
Intergovernmental 
support 
State’s regulatory and financial 
support for affordable housing (1 
point each for allowing rent control 
and inclusionary zoning, and 1 
point for each capital/production 
program) 
4.88 3.21 Positive 
 
Finally, this model includes two measures of economic and fiscal capacity: the log of 
median housing value (as above) and the log of per capita property tax revenue. The latter was 
included instead of per capita general revenue because of the specific relationship between direct 
displacement mitigation and property value increases. I hypothesized that cities with lower 
property tax receipts would be more concerned with promoting gentrification and income-mixing 
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than with measures that directly favor stability among incumbent residents (and dampen property 
value increases) in low-income areas. The presence of a direct displacement policy was weakly 
correlated with median gross rent (rs=0.24, p<0.05), and moderately correlated with community 
pressure (rs=0.40, p<0.01), median housing value (rs=0.31, p<0.01), and per capita property tax 




Table 6.5 displays the results of a logistic regression that examined the probability of 
having a direct displacement policy tool. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show predicted probabilities for 
selected variables that were significantly associated with this outcome. Contrary to the first 
hypothesis, but consistent with the findings from Model 1, cities with higher median gross rents 
were not significantly more likely to address direct displacement. The binary measure of 
community pressure and the log of median home value were also not significantly associated 
with this outcome.  
Housing market strength did emerge as a significant factor by another measure, however. 
A 25% increase in a city’s per capita property tax revenue was associated with odds that were 
32% higher of having a direct displacement policy tool (p<0.1).69 Locational demand also 
emerged as a significant variable, with a 25% increase in population associated with a 21% 
increase in the odds of adopting a policy tool to address direct displacement. As in Model 1, 
features of the political and policy environment were also significantly related to cities’ 
likelihood of having a policy tool to address direct displacement. A one-unit increase in the new 
political culture index was associated with a 135% increase in the odds of this outcome (p<0.1), 
                                                 
69The coefficients on logged independent variables were interpreted as odds ratios on the untransformed variable.  
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while one additional point on the measure of state support for affordable housing was associated 
with a 39% increase in the odds (p<0.01). When examining standardized coefficients for 
statistically significant variables, the state support variable emerged as having the strongest 
effect on this outcome. Contrary to the expected direction of this relationship, each additional 
percentage point of residents that identified as African American was associated with a small 
(5%) decrease in the odds of having a direct displacement mitigation policy (p<0.1).   
 
Table 6.5. Logistic Regression of the Probability of Having a Direct Displacement Mitigation Tool 
 
 Model 2 
Median gross rent 1.00 
 (0.003) 
Somewhat or very active community pressurea 2.43 
 (1.75) 
Log of median housing value 0.84 
 (1.19) 
Log of per capita property tax revenue 3.50* 
 (2.25) 
Log of population 2.38* 
 (1.23) 
Percentage African American 0.95* 
 (0.03) 
New political culture score 2.35* 
 (1.16) 
State support for affordable housing 1.39*** 
 (0.17) 





Wald chi2 (9) 22.73 
Prob > chi2 0.007 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 
 Coefficients are odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Continuous variables are centered at their means. 
aReference group is cities with inactive pressure. 













Analysis 3: City Conditions and the Types of Action Taken to Mitigate Displacement 
 
Hypotheses and Analytic Approach 
 
In the final models, I analyzed the conditions associated with the adoption of policy tools 





















Property tax revenue per capita
Figure 6.3. Predicted Probability of Having a Direct 






































































































Figure 6.4. Predicted Probability of Having a Direct Displacement 
Mitigation Policy Tool by Policy Environment
aAverage difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.05) 
b
Average difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.1) 
cAverage difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.01) 







neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. I hypothesized that cities with higher levels of 
gentrification and community pressure would have higher levels of both types of action. As in 
Model 1, I used the percentage of tracts that gentrified as the main measure of need and 
operationalized community pressure using the three-category variable.  
Certain other variables were expected to be significant in explaining different types of 
action. Cities with higher median housing values were hypothesized to have higher counts of 
regulation/zoning tools, because developers’ desire to build in appreciating areas is likely to 
make incentives more valuable and requirements more feasible. Since regulation and zoning 
interventions are particularly vulnerable to state regulatory limits, the state context was also 
hypothesized to be positively and significantly associated with this outcome (in this model, the 
state support variable only included the measures of state regulatory context). Regulation/zoning 
counts were moderately correlated with the level of gentrification (rs=0.31, p<0.01), the level of 
community pressure (rs=0.33, p<0.01), and state regulatory support (rs=0.41, p<0.01), and 
strongly correlated with median housing value (rs=0.63, p<0.01). 
 
Table 6.6. Model 3 Dependent and Independent Variables 
  
 




Count of policy 
tools in regulation/ 
zoning category 
The number of policy tools a 
city has adopted in the 
‘regulation/zoning’ category    
1.68 2.00 0 - 8 
Count of policy 
tools in funding/ 
resources category 
 The number of policy tools a 
city has adopted in the 
‘funding/resources’ category    








Main Independent Variables 
Problem severity/ 
need 
Percentage of tracts that 
gentrified 2000-2010 
39% 14% Positive 




Rating of community pressure to address displacement  Positive 
Not at all or not actively=0 27 35% 
Somewhat actively=1 21 27% 
Very actively=2 29 38% 





Median housing value  $ 226,136 $ 144,736 Positive 




Population 623,043 1,062,575 Positive 
Public support for 
redistributive 
housing policies 
Percentage of residents who 
identify as African American 
21% 15% Positive 
New political culture score  0.04 0.93 Positive 
Interest groups 
(pro-development) 
Average of respondents’ 
rating of how actively private 
real estate industry groups 
provide input on 
housing/redevelopment plans  









support (1 point each for 
allowing rent control and 
inclusionary zoning; 1 point 
for each capital/production 
program) 
4.88 3.21 Positive 
 State’s regulatory support (1 
point each for allowing rent 
control and inclusionary 
zoning) 
1.09 0.75 Positive 
Policy 
environment 
Regulation/zoning tool count 1.68 2.00 Positive 
Funding/resources tool count 1.91 1.95 Positive 
 Frequency Percentage  
Tool adopted to build 
affordable housing on public 
land in neighborhoods at risk 
of gentrification 
Yes = 4 
 
No = 73 
Yes = 5% 
 
No = 95% 
Positive 
                                                 
70 This outcome was expected to be negatively associated with active input from the private real estate industry 
because these actors are likely to oppose regulations that reduce the profitability of private developments. 
 
71 In light of the public-private nature of affordable housing development in the U.S., it was expected that developers 
would actively advocate for additional programs that fund their production of affordable housing. 
174 
 
When analyzing funding/resources action, cities that had higher per capita general 
revenue and higher levels of overall state support were hypothesized to have more policy tools 
adopted, given the importance of supportive fiscal environments and intergovernmental 
programs for interventions that require investment. Cities’ funding/resource policy counts were 
weakly correlated with the level of gentrification (rs=0.25, p<0.05) and state support (rs=0.24, 
p<0.05), and moderately correlated with per capita general revenue (rs=0.32, p<0.01) and the 
level of community pressure (rs=0.48, p<0.01). 
Finally, the policy tool count in each category was included as an independent variable in 
the model for which it was not a dependent variable, to assess whether the number of 
displacement mitigation tools in one category was associated with the number adopted in 
another. These variables acted as a more direct proxy for a supportive policy environment in 




 Model 3.1 examined the conditions associated with the number of regulation/zoning 
policy tools adopted to mitigate displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification (Table 
6.7). The level of need was not significantly associated with this outcome. In addition, the level 
of community pressure did not emerge as a significant factor. As hypothesized, cities with higher 
housing values adopted more tools, on average, than their counterparts with lower property 
values (p<0.01). A 25% increase in median value was associated with a 21% increase in 
expected policy count. When examining standardized coefficients, median housing value also 
had the largest effect on this outcome. Cities that scored one point higher on the state support 
index had counts that were 44% higher, on average (p<0.05). This translated to a predicted count 
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of 2.11 in cities within states that allowed rent control and mandatory inclusionary zoning, 
compared to 1.01 in cities that did not allow either tool (Figure 6.5). 
 
Table 6.7. Poisson Regression of Different Types of Policy Action to Mitigate Displacement 
 
 Regulation/Zoning Funding/Resources 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Percentage of eligible tracts that gentrified, 2000-2010 1.93 0.73 
 (1.16) (0.50) 
Somewhat active community pressurea 1.02 1.63 
 (0.25) (0.49) 
Very active community pressurea 0.95 1.82* 
 (0.28) (0.59) 
Log of median housing value 2.37*** 0.75 
 (0.58) (0.20) 
Log of per capita general revenue 0.81 0.85 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
Log of population 1.12 1.35*** 
 (0.11) (0.14) 
Percentage African American 1.00 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
New political culture score 1.01 1.58*** 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Level of real estate input 1.21 0.82 
 (0.15) (0.12) 
State regulatory support for affordable housing 1.44**  
 (0.25)  
State regulatory and financial support for affordable housing  1.01 
  (0.03) 
Number of funding/resources policy tools 1.14***  
 (0.06)  
Number of regulation/zoning policy tools  1.15*** 
  (0.06) 
Policy adopted to build affordable housing on public land in 
neighborhoods at risk of gentrificationb  
0.18* 1.47 
 (0.16) (0.56) 
Constant 1.25 1.01 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
Observations 77 77 
Wald chi2 (12) 211.5 135.1 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.24 
Coefficients are incident rate ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Continuous variables are centered at their means. 
aReference group is cities with inactive pressure. 
bReference group is cities that do not have such a policy 
















































Policy to build affordable
housing on public land
Regulatory/zoning programs permitted by state
Figure 6.5. Predicted Adopted Policy Tool Count 



























Figure 6.6. Predicted Adopted Policy Tool Count 

























Number of funding/resources policy tools
Figure 6.7. Predicted Adopted Policy Tool Count 
(Regulation/Zoning) by Number of Funding/Resources Policy 
Toolsd
a
The difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is significant (p<0.01) 
b
Average difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.05) 
cAverage difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.01) 








































































Level of community pressure New political culture score
Figure 6.8. Predicted Adopted Policy Tool Count 






















































Number of regulation/zoning policy tools
Figure 6.10. Predicted Adopted Policy Tool Count 
(Funding/Resources) by Number of Regulation/Zoning Policy 
Toolse
a
Difference between ‘somewhat active’ and ‘inactive’ is significant (p<0.1) 
b
Difference between ‘very active’ and ‘inactive’ is significant (p<0.05) 
c
Average difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.01) 
dAverage difference associated with a one-unit change in the variable is significant (p<0.01) 







The city’s internal policy environment also emerged as significantly related to its policy 
counts in the regulation/zoning category. An additional funding/resources tool was associated 
with a regulation/zoning policy count that was 14% higher (p<0.05), on average. Conversely, 
cities that had a tool to build affordable housing on public land in gentrifying neighborhoods had 
counts that were 82% lower than those without such a tool (p<0.1).  
A different set of variables was associated with the number of funding/resources tools 
adopted. Two hypotheses were not supported: neither per capita general revenue72 nor state 
support for affordable housing73 were significantly associated with this outcome. Cities with very 
active community pressure had counts that were 82% higher, on average, than their counterparts 
with inactive pressure (p<0.1). Cities with very active pressure had a predicted count of 2.2 
funding/resources tools, compared to 1.2 where pressure was inactive, with a significant 
difference between the two (p<0.05) (Figure 6.8). Model 3.2 also supported the locational 
demand, political preferences, and progressive policy environment theses, as the log of 
population, new political culture scores, and count of regulation/zoning policy tools were 
significantly and positively associated with the count of funding/resources tools (p<0.01). 





 This chapter’s findings add a new dimension to the literature on the conditions associated 
with redistributive policy action at the city level, which had yet to analyze displacement 
                                                 
72An alternate model that measured fiscal strength using property tax per capita produced the same results.  
 




mitigation policy tools comprehensively. Across diverse specifications, problem severity/need 
(proxied by two measures of the extent of gentrification, as well as median gross rent and change 
in median home value) failed to emerge as a significant predictor of action to mitigate 
displacement from neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Although this finding is contrary to 
the expectations that emerged from previous studies of redistributive housing policy action, the 
analyses in previous empirical chapters offer two plausible explanations. First, higher levels of 
gentrification are often the result of deliberate city action to encourage an influx of highly 
educated professional and creative workers – and as noted in Chapter 4, displacement mitigation 
is not typically considered as a concurrent concern when such action is taken. Second, Chapter 5 
noted that contexts that are experiencing the high demand and land prices associated with 
gentrification are the most difficult in which to invest in place-based affordability. This paradox 
is examined in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
 Two analyses in this chapter concur with evidence from previous studies that community 
advocacy is associated with higher levels of redistributive government action at the local level. 
In models examining the number of policy tools adopted overall and in the funding/resources 
category, cities with very active community pressure had significantly higher counts compared to 
those with inactive pressure. There was no significant difference between cities with ‘somewhat 
active’ and ‘inactive’ pressure in these models, nor was there a significant difference between 
cities with no/not active pressure and those with somewhat/very active pressure when this 
variable was treated as dichotomous in Model 2. This suggests a threshold of community 
pressure above which action is taken. The findings also indicated that community pressure was 
not a significant factor in the organizationally diffuse work of implementation and the more 
politically and legally complex work of regulatory/zoning action to mitigate displacement.  
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As hypothesized, cities’ economic strength was also related to their capacity to address 
displacement. Median housing value was significantly associated with the count of adopted and 
implemented policy tools and with regulation/zoning action. Moreover, when examining 
standardized coefficients, this variable had the largest effect on the adopted policy tool count 
overall and in the regulation/zoning category. This supports the contention that strong housing 
markets provide leverage to impose developer requirements and incentives. Considering the 
cross-sectional nature of this research, the opposite relationship is also plausible: for example, 
cities that introduce more regulations and tools to mitigate displacement may, in turn, have 
higher housing prices. Because it was not possible to acquire the date of introduction of each 
intervention in the dataset, this argument cannot be ruled out. However, previous research 
supports the interpretation that higher property values provide the fiscal and economic capacity 
to adopt redistributive policies (Basolo, 1999; Craw, 2008), as do the findings in Chapter 7.74 
The significant relationship between population and displacement mitigation policy counts 
overall and in the funding/resources category similarly highlights the policy possibilities that 
come with heightened demand for residence in a city.  
In contrast, the relationship between cities’ fiscal resources and their level of 
displacement mitigation policy action was mixed. Per capita property tax revenue was 
significantly and positively related to the likelihood of having a direct displacement policy tool, 
which suggests that cities with lower property tax receipts are more concerned with raising 
property values than introducing displacement mitigation interventions that could deter 
investment. Conversely, the level of per capita general revenue was not significantly related to 
                                                 
74For example, Basolo (1999) found that median housing values in 1990 were significantly associated 
with the probability of local expenditure on housing five years later, and Craw (2008) similarly found that 




displacement mitigation action in any of the models that included it. Thus, the evidence indicates 
that cities’ confidence in the housing market, rather than their broader resources, affect 
displacement mitigation activity. Additional explanations for the counterintuitive findings 
regarding fiscal strength are examined in Chapter 7. 
The analyses in this chapter confirmed the importance of state support for local 
displacement mitigation action. The index of combined state regulatory and financial support 
was significantly and positively associated with the count of adopted and implemented policy 
tools and the probability of having a direct displacement mitigation tool, while the index of state 
regulatory support was significantly associated with the count of regulation/zoning policy tools. 
Although the effect was modest in some models, it was not trivial: moving from the minimum to 
the maximum score on the overall state support scale was associated with a 1.4-point increase in 
the predicted count of adopted policy tools and a 40% increase in the predicted probability of 
having a direct displacement mitigation policy tool. Moreover, this variable had the largest effect 
on the probability of adopting a direct displacement policy tool when examining standardized 
coefficients. This is consistent with the results reported in Chapter 4, wherein city governments’ 
survey responses and housing plans emphasized the obstacles to displacement mitigation and 
affordable housing planning posed by inadequate state funding and restrictive legislation. The 
lack of a significant relationship between state support and the number of policy tools adopted in 
the funding/resources category is consistent with a possible substitutive effect of some state 
capital programs, which can preclude the need for cities to adopt similar funding mechanisms. 
Each model tested two measures of public support for redistributive housing policies, but 
only the index of new political culture scores had a consistently significant relationship with 
action in this area (although it was not significantly related to regulatory/zoning action). These 
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results give credence to the emerging literature on progressive city sub-cultures, which posits 
that populations with high levels of education, knowledge-based occupations, female 
participation in the labor force, and non-traditional living arrangements favor redistributive 
policies. This is a particularly important finding in the context of tools that mitigate the negative 
impact of gentrification. This phenomenon is often associated with influxes of the same residents 
whose presence gives cities higher progressive subculture scores, and the findings indicate that 
these residents’ broader concerns with housing justice may supersede their individual economic 
and cultural interests in gentrifying neighborhoods (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Rosdil, 2013). The 
lack of a significant relationship between political culture and regulatory/zoning action mirrors 
the findings for community pressure above. For this legally and politically charged category of 
action, neither background support for progressive policies nor active pressure to mitigate 
displacement were related to the level of action taken.  
Contrary to previous studies of redistributive local policymaking, the percentage of the 
population identifying as African American was not significantly related to most of the outcomes 
examined and was negatively related to the probability of having a direct displacement policy. 
These counterintuitive results are consistent with qualitative work that describes the often 
ambivalent perceptions that African American residents of gentrifying neighborhoods have 
towards this process (e.g. Freeman, 2006; Schlichtman et al., 2017). From the city government 
perspective, the findings are also consistent with the neighborhood-based priorities identified in 
Chapter 4, which showed that a similar percentage of survey respondents listed racial segregation 
and discrimination as a challenge compared to those identifying displacement as a concern, and a 
much larger percentage was concerned with addressing concentrated poverty (which 
disproportionately affects African American households (Kneebone & Holmes, 2016; U.S. 
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Department of Health and Human Services, 2014)). Cities that have large and segregated 
minority populations may be more interested in fostering mobility than encouraging residents to 
remain in place (Herrine, Yager, & Mian, 2016). Chapter 7 discusses additional possible 
explanations for the counterintuitive relationships observed for this variable. 
 Consistent with past studies, the relationship between the level of real estate input on 
affordable housing and redevelopment plans and the level of displacement mitigation action was 
also counterintuitive. This variable was not significantly related to overall adopted or 
implemented policy counts, the likelihood of having a direct displacement mitigation policy, or 
either category of action. Possible explanations for these findings are examined in Chapter 7. 
Finally, a progressive local policymaking environment was also associated with stronger 
action to mitigate displacement. The adoption of a living wage ordinance by 2006 was 
significantly associated with the count of adopted and implemented policy tools overall, while 
cities with more funding/resources policy tools had significantly higher policy counts in the 
regulation/zoning category, and vice versa. This provides encouraging evidence that progressive 
legislative and policy gains can provide a supportive foundation for future action, even across 
types of action and policy areas. On the other hand, a city’s adoption of a tool to build affordable 
housing on public land was negatively associated with the count of regulatory/zoning policy 
tools, which is consistent with the idea examined in Chapter 5 that different contextual 
conditions facilitate the use of these policy tools.   
  Although the analyses in this chapter provided information on average trends across 77 
study cities using methods that allowed for comparability with the existing literature, these 
findings are limited by the simplification and approximation inherent in regression analysis. To 
contextualize the observed relationships, examine the channels through which they operate, and 
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understand qualitative differences among the roles of different city conditions, Chapter 7 
discusses the results of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with city officials and 
community advocates.  
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Chapter 7: A Closer Look at the Contextual Determinants of Cities’ Displacement 
Mitigation Approaches 
 
This chapter draws on interviews with city officials and housing advocates to elucidate 
and contextualize the trends identified in previous chapters. I first describe respondents’ views of 
and approaches to the challenge of improving residential quality in low-income neighborhoods 
without displacing incumbent residents. I then analyze in greater detail the associations that were 
quantified in the regression models, by investigating the ways in which the relationships between 
city conditions and action to address affordability and displacement operate. Examining each 
policy action thesis in turn, I show that many background local conditions were described by 
interviewees primarily as supportive factors that are catalyzed by activating moments (a crisis 
level of need or threshold of market demand) or activating factors (community organizing or 
policy entrepreneurs). For-profit group input was described as more of a shaping force that 
primarily influences the form and content of the resulting action. I also shed light on the 
unexpected regression findings from the previous chapter by describing how certain conditions 
can simultaneously support and hinder action, how responses to displacement are affected by 
other policy priorities, and how aggregate measures obscure the neighborhood-level dynamics 
that influence such action. I conclude with suggestions for improving operationalization of these 
relationships in future studies.  
 
An ‘Elegant Alchemy’: Striking the Balance between Reinvestment and Affordability  
 
 Interviewees from the public and community sectors across city contexts described the 
challenge of mitigating displacement when investments occur in low-income neighborhoods as 
requiring ‘carefully calibrated’ action (Interview 3, 2017). A community development director 
from a Southern city explained, 
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it’s an interesting paradox actually, because what we’re trying to do…is to move markets 
and to increase property values and to bring investment into neighborhoods, and it’s just 
– there’s an elegant alchemy required to ensure that you don’t displace folks in that 
effort…[Y]ou don’t want gentrification. You just want to make sure that all boats 
rise…and that suggests the real challenge of the work that we do is to figure out how to 
mitigate those unintended consequences and provide some insularity for folks (Interview 
2, 2017).  
 
Several interviewees emphasized that mitigating these consequences requires careful attention to 
programmatic details. As noted by a respondent from a community development organization in 
New York, in the context of the city’s decision to rezone several neighborhoods with high 
proportions of low-income residents of color for greater density,  
building market-rate housing is not a neutral act. If you are in a neighborhood that is 
experiencing displacement pressures, you bring in a critical mass of…people with more 
social and economic and political capital…that creates these secondary displacement 
pressures that sort of ripple throughout the neighborhood…[T]he mayor’s plan is in many 
ways…predicated on tax abatements…and then zoning increases to incentivize the 
private market to build, but…how much market-rate housing you incentivize, compared 
to how much affordability and how deep that affordability is…is the difference between 
whether the mayor’s plan is ultimately destabilizing to a particular neighborhood or 
whether [it] is ultimately good for that neighborhood and good for the city (Interview 6, 
2017). 
 
This balancing act is complicated by the uneven progression of gentrification, which can unfold 
over decades or occur rapidly. Respondents often spoke of gentrification as a process that 
happened gradually or was years away from being a problem. For example, an interviewee from 
a local affordable housing advocacy organization in Columbus and Franklin County described a 
neighborhood that had been gentrifying ‘for many years, probably twenty years’ (Interview 13, 
2017). A Southern city respondent commented that ‘neighborhoods that have lower and 
moderate-income folks in general that have some revitalization efforts targeted towards them, I 
think in those neighborhoods that gentrification could potentially come, but I think it’s down the 
road, I think it’s in five or ten years’ (Interview 2, 2017). In contexts where reinvestment is more 
advanced, respondents described the potential for gentrification to move rapidly and emphasized 
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the importance of advanced planning by city agencies to forestall its negative consequences 
(Interview 3, 2017; Interview 10, 2017). Proactive planning is especially important given the 
months and years it can take to establish regulatory frameworks and work out affordable housing 
deals (Interview 3, 2017; Interview 10, 2017; Interview 11, 2017).   
 The concept that balancing reinvestment with residents’ right to remain requires 
advanced intervention emerged in numerous interviews and has motivated some cities to 
integrate these concerns into their long-term planning frameworks. A senior housing official in 
Minneapolis explained that the city is weaving into its comprehensive plan ‘the issue of making 
sure that as we grow, we prevent displacement from occurring…[I]t’s a new lens that we’ll be 
applying to everything. So as we’re investing in development, as we’re investing in…any kind of 
redevelopment, we’re going to be looking at…what are the likely impacts or potential impacts on 
displacement and how can we mitigate that’ (Interview 7, 2017). As a Southern city works to 
deconcentrate poverty, it is coupling redevelopment with the preservation of affordability for 
existing and future residents in affected neighborhoods:  
[I]n every new development, we are looking for mixed-income housing that would begin 
to help us with the goal of deconcentrating poverty but would also…preserve…[the 
majority] of the housing as affordable units… [including] workforce housing…[and] 
subsidized units for extremely low-income folks…[It] would be written into the 
development agreements that those units would be affordable into perpetuity…[W]e want 
to employ a build early approach, where we are…pulling developers around the table to 
say, we need more affordable housing…and that this…has to be part of this 
redevelopment (Interview 14, 2017). 
 
A respondent from a local affordable housing advocacy organization in Columbus and Franklin 
County noted that a similar ‘intent around revitalization to make sure that there is housing that 
remains affordable to the lowest-income households’ is mitigating the impacts of gentrification 
in central city neighborhoods (Interview 13, 2017).  
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 Respondents emphasized that effective displacement mitigation planning must be multi-
dimensional as well as proactive. In New York, for example, interviewees described a multi-
pronged approach that includes numerous tenant protection and anti-harassment programs, 
investment in housing preservation and production, efforts to prevent property speculation, and 
requirements that developers build affordable housing in rezoned neighborhoods (Interview 3, 
2017; Interview 6, 2017; Interview 10, 2017). One of these respondents explained that the goal 
of preventing displacement guides all the work done by the city’s housing agency, including 
quotidian tasks like code enforcement that are often overlooked as displacement mitigation 
strategies but are crucial for addressing harassment and ‘ensuring that people have that choice to 
stay’ (Interview 10, 2017). A tenant advocate from the Twin Cities similarly noted that tenant 
protections are an indispensable component of any broader effort to preserve affordability 
(Interview 12, 2017). Speaking of the city’s strategy to address its affordability crisis, a 
respondent from a Western city described a suite of programs that tackle different dimensions of 
the problem, including housing production, preservation, and enforcement of affordability terms; 
investments in housing and community development in low-income neighborhoods; and 
protections of tenants’ rights (Interview 11, 2017). 
 For city officials and community advocates, the work of preserving affordability and 
mitigating displacement in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification thus necessitates careful, 
advanced, and comprehensive planning. Although the need for such action is more apparent in 
some cities than others, interviewees across all city clusters identified gentrification as a concern 
– albeit to varying degrees. As indicated in previous chapters and detailed in the following 
section, however, the relationship between concern with gentrification and action to mitigate its 
costs operates in unexpected ways. 
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 Contrary to the expectations from the literature on redistributive local policy action, the 
regression analyses in the previous chapters did not identify a statistically significant relationship 
between various measures of problem severity/need and cities’ displacement mitigation efforts. 
Although interviewees did identify need as a factor behind policy action to address affordability 
and displacement, they described this relationship operating in complex ways that were not fully 
captured in this study’s hypothesis.  
 Firstly, affordable housing-related problems were typically described as driving policy 
action once a crisis existed. For example, a respondent from a Western city commented that ‘the 
housing crisis has been a problem for a while, so politically, there’s lots of energy there to do 
something’ (Interview 11, 2017). A tenant advocate from the Twin Cities described a scenario 
where political will was lacking until need escalated drastically: ‘[In Minneapolis] I think that 
there…has not been the political will to make some really significant investments and changes in 
policy that would better protect tenants in the tenant-landlord relationship. There have been some 
small patches that have come over the last couple years when this gentrification and 
displacement trend has increased dramatically’ (Interview 12, 2017). Describing the paradoxical 
effect of delaying action until a crisis is evident, a respondent from a national non-profit housing 
organization noted that ‘[t]he only time generally we see…political will coming together to 
invest in affordability is when…the challenge is already extreme. Right, when housing costs are 
really high and rents are rising, and homeownership feels out of reach, then it’s like, we have to 
put some resources in. And it’s never enough, and…that’s exactly when it’s super expensive for 
government to invest in housing’ (Interview 8, 2017). While the previous chapter’s analyses did 
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test a threshold effect of problem severity through a binary variable that distinguished high-
gentrification cities from those experiencing less pressure (and did not find a significant 
relationship with policy action), the model could not separately account for the stymieing effect 
that heightened gentrification has on cities’ ability to mitigate displacement, and therefore could 
not isolate the effect of heightened need on policy action.   
 A second dimension of housing need that emerged in interviews concerned competing 
priorities that draw city attention and resources away from displacement mitigation. Consistent 
with the survey findings reported in Chapter 4, several respondents mentioned broader housing 
instability, and specifically its manifestation in homelessness, as a pervasive issue that demanded 
priority action. When asked about the challenges that cities face in their efforts to address 
affordability and displacement, an interviewee from a national non-profit housing organization 
responded that among other factors, 
several [high-cost cities]…really have states of emergency around homelessness that 
loom large, both practically and politically…[where] you have tent cities, you have 
people on the street, it’s highly visible, it is an extreme example of human misery, and 
it’s also something that in a practical sense we know how to solve. We have proven 
models for ending homelessness and it requires investment. So it’s really…politically top 
of mind, and just right in the face of housing officials, and it’s like, you have to deal with 
this. We understand there’s long-term planning, that you need the twenty-year 
thing…but, homelessness now, tent city now (Interview 8, 2017).  
 
This was echoed by a respondent from a Western city, who noted that the ‘housing crisis really 
does reach very high up into the income distribution here, it’s not just very very low-income 
people. Middle-income people too are also feeling the pinch. But…the most critical issue is 
people who are literally living on the street…That’s the most critical issue that we’re focusing on 
at this time’ (Interview 11, 2017). In such contexts, interventions to address the more visible and 
prevalent aspects of housing instability on a city-wide level can take priority over addressing 
gentrification-induced displacement (Interview 1, 2017). 
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 A third insight from interviews was that city governments are often motivated to address 
displacement not by housing need narrowly defined, but by broader, interrelated issues. A 
community development professional in Columbus described how a high-priority public health 
issue drove the city administration’s focus on balancing affordability with reinvestment:  
[W]hen the mayor was on city council, he really took up the mantle of battling our infant 
mortality rate…And in the discussions around that…there is a lot of talk about the fact 
that infant mortality is…one symbol of how well a community is functioning, and that so 
many of the factors are not directly health factors, but are environmental factors – 
poverty, stress on the mother, all of these things really speak to how well a community is 
thriving. And so for the mayor it is a passion around bringing down the infant mortality 
rate but understanding that that can only be done by…improving the quality of life for all 
of our residents (Interview 4, 2017). 
 
A Southern city’s above-mentioned push to integrate place-based affordability into its 
redevelopment plans initially emerged from a policy concern with poverty reduction (Interview 
14, 2017). Another respondent echoed the idea that displacement mitigation action can be 
motivated by need in areas outside of housing (narrowly defined), noting that ‘there [are] 
practical motivations for preventing displacement and making housing more affordable in terms 
of retaining workforce [and] in terms of reducing traffic congestion - because the best way to 
make the roads easier is to have people…able live near to where they work, and go to school, 
and build their lives’ (Interview 8, 2017). A respondent from New York spoke in similar terms 
about mitigating displacement as part of a strategy to promote inclusive access to the 
opportunities to prosper that exist within the city (Interview 3, 2017).   
 Just as cities may invest in displacement mitigation to address non-housing problems, 
action to address displacement does not happen exclusively through housing policy. Interviewees 
mentioned investments in transportation and income equality as non-housing interventions that 
could help mitigate displacement. According to a respondent from Columbus, ‘transportation 
is…the largest displacement factor at the moment, it’s what’s driving the revitalization of the 
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center city, is that people are coming back in order to be closer because it is so difficult to drive 
in and out of the city’ (Interview 4, 2017). A Midwestern city respondent commented that ‘there 
continues to be too many people paying too high a percentage of their income for housing…and 
that’s a struggle I think we’ll continue to face as long as…trends continue around growing 
income inequality’ (Interview 1, 2017). Another respondent similarly noted that ‘it’s not just the 
cost factor, it’s also an income inequality issue’ (Interview 7, 2017). Thus, assessing the 
relationship between displacement and policy action requires a broadening of the assessment of 




 Pro-Affordable Housing Organizing 
 
 Although the expected relationship between housing need and policy action did not 
emerge in the previous chapter, the hypothesis that increased pro-affordable housing community 
pressure is associated with more intense policy action was supported by the regression results. 
Interviewees consistently emphasized the importance of organized pressure for activating the 
establishment of affordability and displacement mitigation interventions. According to a senior 
planning official in New York City, ‘the reason that we have the programs we have and one of 
the…most robust affordable housing programs in the country is that we have an active advocacy 
community’ (Interview 3, 2017). A respondent from a community development organization in 
the same city directly attributed the mayor’s increased anti-displacement efforts to ‘organizing’ 
(Interview 6, 2017). The absence of organizing can delay action to mitigate displacement in 
specific neighborhoods, even in cities where relevant programs exist (Interview 9, 2017). 
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 Respondents described several channels through which housing advocacy groups 
influence the agenda, including by informing city officials about community needs, advising 
them about policy options, and calling them out publicly. A community development official in 
Providence, Rhode Island described such groups as ‘very helpful in…informing policy [and] 
maintaining an active line of communication… [Neighborhood groups] are really effective at 
keeping the city informed, particularly when it comes to…neighborhood-specific needs’ 
(Interview 5, 2017). A planning manager in a Midwestern city credited persistent community 
pressure with influencing city action to keep low-income individuals in their homes:  
[I]n the last few years we’ve expanded…the amount of resources that has been devoted to 
existing owner-occupied repair programs…And that came out of direct advocacy in a lot 
of ways, where residents or community-based organizations continued to say in every 
venue where we were meeting with them on housing and planning issues that [this was] 
one of the biggest needs out there…So we…created new programming to [address] that 
(Interview 1, 2017). 
 
A respondent from a Western city emphasized the critical roles played both by community 
groups that put pressure on elected officials, and advocates who provide policymakers with in-
depth analyses of potential action (Interview 11, 2017). A respondent from a community 
development organization in New York summed up the factors behind successful organizing as 
being right and being scary…[Y]ou have to be effective in what you’re doing, and…be 
clearly identifying the problem. You also have to identify…what the clear policy 
solutions are. And then you also have to…hold decision-makers accountable…[and] 
point out where…this is not just you know, something good that they should do, but 
something that they are responsible to do. And that’s about organizing, that’s about 
neighborhoods being well-informed and…able to rigorously engage with…decision-
makers (Interview 6, 2017).  
 
The respondent added that advocates’ success in organizing for mandatory inclusionary zoning 
in New York benefitted from the fact that this strategy ‘intersect[ed] very well with the way the 
mayor thought about the core logic of his housing plan…because it both relies on…energizing 
the private market to build market-rate housing and extracting some of that value for affordable 
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housing’ (Interview 6, 2017). Thus ‘being right’ involves proposing solutions that are politically 
timely as well as economically feasible. This point was echoed by a senior planning official in 
New York, who noted that the city is ‘often pushed to create a program that just doesn’t work’ 
(Interview 3, 2017), and by a respondent from a local affordable housing advocacy organization 
in Columbus and Franklin County, who described the importance of ‘focusing on…what can we 
do that somebody can say ‘yes’ to’ (Interview 13, 2017). 
 The concept of ‘being scary’, or publicly holding city governments to account for their 
responsibilities, is another important tactic. For example, when asked about the factors that had 
influenced a successful campaign around a Section 8 anti-discrimination ordinance in 
Minneapolis, a tenant advocate partially credited ‘a number of really high-profile rental housing 
related…news stories and organizing campaigns’ (Interview 12, 2017), or what the literature 
refers to as ‘focusing events’ (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 72). The respondent went on to describe that 
after a large apartment building in a suburb south of Minneapolis was sold, ‘upscaled,’ and most 
of the tenants displaced, there was ‘a lot of organizing around that, and then there was a federal 
fair housing class action lawsuit that was filed, and there’s been a documentary that was 
produced…[about] that whole issue and the broader community consequences…So I think that 
raised it, and elevated housing as an issue metro-wide’ (Interview 12, 2017). At the same time, 
the respondent cautioned that public pressure tactics carry risks of retaliation for community 
groups who rely on public funding, and for tenants themselves.  
 In addition to their roles as organizers and advocates, community-based organizations are 
key partners in implementing affordability and displacement mitigation strategies. Respondents 
repeatedly described these groups’ importance in providing services to tenants, developing and 
managing housing, informing the city of buildings and tenants that are at risk, and providing 
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feedback on program effectiveness. Two programs in New York exemplify the forms that this 
teamwork can take. The Partners in Preservation program leverages community groups’ ‘front 
line’ knowledge of neighborhood conditions by having them identify at-risk buildings that the 
city can then attempt to preserve (Interview 10, 2017). The Predatory Equity Bill, which would 
enable the creation of a ‘speculation watchlist’ of properties that sell for ‘a far higher threshold 
than one would think based on the rent roll,’ takes the opposite approach. The city would notify 
communities about buildings that are likely to experience harassment by owners attempting to 
‘flip…rent-stabilized property into market-rate housing’ so that advocacy groups can target their 
efforts to inform and protect the buildings’ tenants (Interview 10, 2017).  
 For-Profit Real Estate Groups 
 
 Respondents also elaborated on the roles of for-profit real estate actors in influencing 
affordability and displacement mitigation policies, and their responses provided possible insights 
into why the regression analyses in this and previous studies have not found the expected 
relationships. These groups were more often described as shaping the content of affordable 
housing and displacement mitigation action, rather than influencing whether relevant policy tools 
were adopted. Furthermore, interviewees described diverse relationships with for-profit actors, 
wherein active input from the latter into housing planning could present either a challenge or a 
boost depending on the policy area in question. 
 For-profit real estate actors are an inescapable part of the policy context in today’s 
market-led development environment. Consistent with the results in Chapter 4, city officials 
emphasized that they had no choice but to work with for-profit developers if they wished to see 
housing built in their jurisdictions, and that these actors therefore had a seat at the table in 
negotiations around policy and program details. As a respondent from a Southern city put it, 
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‘they are the market, they’re the practitioners. So if they’re not going to use it [a policy tool]…if 
it doesn’t make sense for them, then it’s not going to work’ (Interview 2, 2017). According to a 
senior planning official in New York, ‘they’re developers, they want to make money…but they 
were surprisingly forthcoming about…what makes a project work and how much can you set 
aside to really do this [inclusionary zoning]. Ultimately the city – we have to work with these 
developers…so we do need to have something that works’ (Interview 3, 2017). According to 
another city official from New York, the role of city agencies in this process is to act as ‘a 
negotiator between the private market and the community groups that are on the ground calling 
for these [displacement mitigation] policies’ (Interview 10, 2017). Another respondent from a 
Southern city similarly described city council’s role in ‘pushing back on the developers’ on 
affordable housing issues (Interview 14, 2017). For-profit developers have a more cohesive voice 
in these negotiations in some cities than others. A respondent from Columbus described a real 
estate industry that worked with officials on program design, but that was not yet a united force 
on affordable housing policy:  
I think that there is a rising interest. I don’t know that they have quite fleshed out how 
their role would work. I think there is still this tension between generating revenue in a 
project and the ability to understand that usually long-term affordability is at some cost to 
the owner. So I think there’s an interest in hearing what’s out there but I don’t know that 
they clearly have put a stake in the ground of what their place is (Interview 4, 2017).  
 
In other contexts, the for-profit real estate industry is a more coordinated force for cities to 
contend with when developing affordable housing and displacement mitigation policies 
(Interview 6, 2017; Interview 9, 2017).  
Interviews also revealed that the substance of for-profit actors’ input varied depending on 
whether development, funding, or regulation was in question. For example, a respondent from 
the Twin Cities cited the power of a landlord trade organization at the local and state level as 
posing a challenge in advocates’ negotiations with policymakers regarding tenant protections 
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(Interview 12, 2017), and a respondent from a Western city noted similar landlord opposition to 
regulations that benefit tenants (Interview 11, 2017). On the other hand, several respondents 
described a coordinated private real estate industry as a key partner in promoting affordable 
housing construction. According to a respondent from Providence, the city tries ‘to make sure 
that they have a seat at the table, and certainly they’ve been very supportive on affordable 
housing, especially in a community like Providence where the majority of the city is low-income. 
I think there’s a recognition from the industry that…that’s really their client base, so we need to 
be creating products that work for clients with a slightly lower income’ (Interview 5, 2017). For-
profit developers can also be helpful allies when cities are advocating for funding at higher levels 
of government. A respondent from a Midwestern city noted the city’s partnership with the 
development community in pursuing Low Income Housing Tax Credits (Interview 1, 2017), 
while the official from Minneapolis explained that   
we have a lot of…non-profit developers. We also do have a fair amount of for-profit 
developers, and…we’ve had a lot of success, I think, in speaking for example at our state 
legislature with a unified voice of…asking for more funding for affordable housing, and 
we’ve been successful in the last…several years in getting bonding money for affordable 
housing, so I think that that’s been really positive…I think the for-profit side…can be 
more successful sometimes in…rallying some of the other aspects of the for-profit 
industry that is created around affordable housing (Interview 7, 2017).  
 
When the interests of private sector actors and housing advocacy groups align, they can also 
combine to pressure city governments to address affordability and displacement. One respondent 
described how this occurred in Miami:  
[T]he Chamber of Commerce was working closely with, and helping to present work 
from, [a non-profit affordable housing/homelessness advocacy group] because the 
Chamber of Commerce really cared about retaining workers. Miami was losing folks. 
Property costs were going up really fast, driven in part by…international investment in 
Miami real estate… and it was making it hard to retain workers, and that affects business 




Similarly, a respondent from Columbus and Franklin County described their group’s 
collaboration with the private real estate sector as helping to advance their advocacy goals 




 The importance of resources for addressing affordability and displacement was 
mentioned consistently across interviews. A Western city respondent summarized the common 
sentiment when they said, ‘it takes investment to keep people, and it’s really hard to come up 
with the financial resources to do that’ (Interview 9, 2017). However, interviews revealed that 
the relationship between cities’ general fiscal resources and displacement mitigation action, 
which was not found to be statistically significant in the previous chapter, is complicated by 
competing budgetary demands, uncertainty about funding levels, efforts to depend less on 
subsidies, and trade-offs between investing in appreciating areas or neighborhoods where land is 
cheaper. As one respondent noted, ‘if all we look at is where government money flows, we won’t 
understand or affect the bulk of affordable housing in the country’ (Interview 8, 2017).  
 Increased fiscal resources may not translate into more intense action to mitigate 
displacement because city budgets face competing demands. This conflict is compounded by the 
large allocations of funding that are required to address affordability issues, which can reduce 
political will to invest in this area, as well as the paralysis that can set in when officials are faced 
with finite resources and myriad needs. When describing the delicate balance of New York’s 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) program, a respondent pointed out that providing ‘more 
affordable housing and deeper affordability’ requires increased subsidy from the city, and 
‘someone has to pay for that. That comes from someone’s taxes, that defers funding that would 
199 
 
go to other things like the capital budget’ (Interview 3, 2017). The vast resources necessary to 
address affordability issues, competing budgetary pressures, and uncertainty around resource 
availability were all described as stymieing local action in a response by an interviewee from a 
local affordable housing advocacy organization in Columbus and Franklin County:  
[P]eople are getting stuck on the numbers [the cost of addressing affordable housing 
challenges], so we’re really having some pushback that the numbers are so 
big…[E]lected officials…talk about competing demands on local dollars and so…the 
barriers [to addressing housing affordability] are ultimately someone has to put money on 
the table…[and] we’re just in this very uncertain environment with regard to [federal] 
government funding (Interview 13, 2017).  
 
Because of the constraints and competing demands on city budgets, interviewees emphasized 
that city governments are turning to non-subsidy types of action to reduce their reliance on 
funding to address affordability and displacement. A respondent from Columbus described this 
as ‘the challenge of – you can’t subsidize your way out of it, so how do we figure something out 
that isn’t just us taking the entire city budget for that?’ (Interview 4, 2017). According to a 
respondent from a national non-profit housing organization, the hunt for alternative action is a 
common one in high-cost cities across the country, because 
pretty much every jurisdiction [has] recognized hey, if we can put local money into 
subsidizing housing, that can create affordability for a particular building or for a 
particular neighborhood, right. You can do that. But they also [have] pretty generally 
recognized that if all we do is chase rising housing costs with generally flat or shrinking 
subsidy, we lose the race. And, so it needs to also be thinking about changing the cost 
structure, changing where there really are development opportunities (Interview 8, 2017).  
  
 
Cities across contexts were therefore turning to more sustainable forms of financing than direct 
subsidy, such as revolving loans; finding new development opportunities through zoning 
revisions that enable tools like Accessory Dwelling Units and inclusionary housing; investing in 
early acquisition to decrease the cost of preservation; and strengthening existing regulations to 
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effectively address a worsening housing crisis (Interview 2, 2017; Interview 4, 2017; Interview 
7, 2017; Interview 8, 2017; Interview 9, 2017; Interview 11, 2017).   
 Finally, the relationship between fiscal resources and the strength of cities’ displacement 
mitigation efforts is complicated by the trade-off between spending large sums of money to 
address displacement in rapidly-appreciating areas and investing the same sum to create or 
preserve more units of affordable housing in cheaper areas. A respondent from a Western city 
said of a program that preserves the long-term affordability of housing units, ‘I think [for] our 
constituents, who are…trying to stabilize their communities… they’d be willing to spend 
anything to preserve people’s housing. And we have to take the bigger picture, sort of 
opportunity cost of our funds being spread out over a broader section [of the city]’ (Interview 9, 
2017). A respondent from New York described a similar trade-off in relation to a program to 
preserve rent-limited units in rapidly-appreciating areas: ‘[T]he appreciation of real estate in 
some of those areas is so much higher than the city as a whole that…the agency, in order to 
compete with the private market just has to pay more…[I]t’s very important…that we preserve 
as much privately-owned rent-stabilized housing as possible today’ (Interview 10, 2017). 
Ultimately, then, it is not just the level of resources at cities’ disposal, but also the budgetary 
pressures and uncertainties they face, the other types of action they have recourse to, and the 
calculations they make about investing in appreciating areas or less costly neighborhoods that 
affect the role of fiscal resources in displacement mitigation efforts. 
 
Housing Market Confidence and Locational Demand 
 
 Confidence in the housing market and locational demand emerged in this study as 
significant indicators of the type and intensity of displacement mitigation action that cities take. 
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The idea that growth and investment are preconditions for city wellbeing and facilitate 
redistributive capacity was repeated across interview contexts. A Southern city community 
development director noted that ‘there’s a balance there that you have to find because at the end 
of the day you still need investment and you still need to do development. You just want it done 
in a way that reflects the values that you have as a city, which, in our city, is…to create housing 
opportunities of choice for everyone’ (Interview 2, 2017). A respondent from New York 
remarked that ‘we are sort of the victims of our own success…But we want to be a prosperous 
city, so we have to…create the housing to keep the virtuous cycle going…[W]e want people to 
be able to stay here and all New Yorkers to benefit from the prosperity’ (Interview 3, 2017). In 
Columbus, a respondent described the challenge of ‘how we continue to bring momentum to the 
city while not displacing a large amount of folks and creating a vacuum…So really trying to 
figure out how we can be strategic with the investment that we’re seeing is kind of a critical 
question’ (Interview 4, 2017). 
Consistent with the results in Chapter 6, interviewees also confirmed that robust demand 
increases regulatory and zoning policy options. For example, strong markets were described as 
enabling the establishment of inclusionary zoning programs, while officials in cities with less 
robust leverage were wary of disincentivizing investment by placing onerous requirements on 
developers. A Southern city community development director explained this tension:  
If you just say that people have to do it [build affordable housing], from a competitive 
perspective, if there are other markets that they can do business in, that do have some 
tools or do have some mechanisms that can help them do that, then you’re at a 
competitive disadvantage. And I think…that’s where the markets are across this country 
is figuring out what that tipping point is. You have to gauge the health and robustness of 
your market against your competitors or your peer cities, frankly, because these folks 




In another Southern city, uneven market growth was seen as inhibiting the possibility of creating 
a city-wide inclusionary zoning policy (Interview 14, 2017). These pressures produce a timing 
paradox when it comes to capitalizing on market momentum. On one hand, the political will to 
intervene to address displacement is typically lacking before the market reaches the ‘tipping 
point’ referred to by the Southern city community development director above (Interview 2, 
2017). As a community development professional in Columbus commented when asked about 
the interventions they would introduce if they could go back ten or twenty years, 
the advocate in me would like to say that we would be faster at implementing regulatory 
changes versus incentive changes…[W]e have gotten, for our city, pretty far down the 
road in building up our downtown, and the fact that there were not regulations in place to 
make sure that there was affordability there is kind of a sore spot for me, as an advocate. 
However… [others] would also argue that we are at the very best point in the clock, and 
just at the beginning of those ten years where there’s been enough development and 
enough movement forward that people see the benefit to investing in the city, that we can 
start a conversation on regulatory changes without freezing out the market. So I think, I 
think we’re at the perfect point right now, all things considered (Interview 4, 2017). 
 
A respondent from a Western city similarly noted that ‘twenty years ago there wasn’t the 
political will to do what we’re doing today. And if there was, we would’ve done it… [T]he land 
has pressure on it to develop, and what’s an issue now wasn’t an issue back then. Housing was 
much cheaper twenty years ago. And then it wasn’t’ (Interview 11, 2017). Before this turning 
point of market strength is reached, the focus is therefore often on encouraging market-rate 
development rather than imposing regulations or investing in affordable housing preservation. 
An interviewee from a national non-profit organization detailed this dilemma:  
What we really should be doing is, as government, as a society, investing in housing in 
the long term when it’s cheap…[I]n places that have land banks, and land trusts designed 
to…husband real estate during a downturn, their natural inclination, and there’s a lot of 
political pressure in this direction, is to, well let’s move this land, let’s get it out, let’s sell 
it cheap…and that means government has no control over it later…It would be much 
better to do things like long-term ground leases, or put restrictions on the use, or turn it 
over to mission entities who would maintain it as affordable housing over the long term, 
assuming there [were] resources to help them do it…So if I had to think about advice for 
places that haven’t yet turned, it’s recognize that at some point you will. At some point 
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markets will get hot…[and] if we don’t invest in them in the downturn, they’re going to 
be really expensive during the upturn (Interview 8, 2017). 
 
Several interviewees confirmed that delaying intervention until markets are strong shrinks the 
opportunities for preservation. Among them, a senior housing official in Minneapolis noted that 
amid heightened demand and increased costs, ‘the market is working against us’ and commented 
that, ‘I think if we could turn the clock back even ten years…I would’ve recommended that, 
knowing what I know now, that the city be a lot more…involved in either acquiring or 
facilitating the acquisition of property at the time when…we could have acquired it at a much 
lower cost, for long-term preservation of affordability’ (Interview 7, 2017). Thus policymakers 
face the paradox of needing to act before they perceive that the necessary market momentum 
exists – and facing fewer opportunities for preservation, and a greater reliance on tools that 




 Progressive City Values and their Champions 
 
 Interviewees frequently referred to the city government’s internal values as an important 
factor in their efforts to address affordability and displacement, which confirms this study’s 
quantitative findings. The notion that ‘[y]ou just want to make sure that all boats rise’ (Interview 
2, 2017) was commonly cited as a driving force. As an official from Minneapolis put it,  
I think the motivation [to address affordability and displacement] is one based on 
values…[L]ike many other urban areas in the country, the city of Minneapolis is growing 
at a faster rate than we have since…pre-1950, and that growth and development is 
putting…a lot of pressure on things like affordability, cost, and so the value there is to 
make sure that…existing residents, and in particular existing low-income residents, 
benefit from this growth and development. And so instead of being forced out, 
that…they’re able to realize some of the benefits of that. And that we maintain a city 




Other interviewees also spoke of increasing equity and intervening on behalf of disadvantaged 
residents to address unjust power relations. When describing the proposed establishment of an 
anti-speculation watchlist, a respondent from New York explained that the city ‘want[s] to bring 
more information to tenants, whether it be that their building sold, or whether it be the value of 
their lease…whatever can be more helpful upfront as opposed to later so that they have a leg up 
in the negotiations that they’re facing with their landlord’ (Interview 10, 2017). A Western city 
respondent spoke about tenant protections in similar terms: ‘[T]here’s definitely both sides to the 
decision [between landlords and tenants], but I think the city…felt that there needed to be some 
balance there in that tenants are very vulnerable, low-income tenants especially’ (Interview 11, 
2017). 
 Respondents consistently mentioned the critical activating role of particular individuals in 
city government (sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Kalafatis & 
Lemos, 2017; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Norman, 2009)) who champion these values and 
sustain their cities’ affordability and displacement efforts. When asked about the challenges to 
action in this policy area, a respondent from a national non-profit housing organization 
mentioned among other factors, 
sustaining political will on it. It’s hard. Affordable housing is an issue that is complex 
enough to seem arcane. It is often one that gets counterintuitive in terms of the right 
solutions at the right times, it’s one where people like to have quick answers and often 
the answer isn’t quick, so it’s hard to really sustain political interest in it, and the places 
that were doing best were ones where you had a mayor or a city council member or two, 
or folks who had a deep understanding and a sustained commitment to it and who could 
empower staff to spend a lot of time and resources and focus on it over a period of time 
(Interview 8, 2017). 
 
In New York, the mayor’s shift in thinking about displacement mitigation was credited with 
resulting in a set of programs, including strong tenant protections, that benefitted residents of 
appreciating neighborhoods (Interview 6, 2017). On the other hand, a respondent from a local 
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affordable housing advocacy organization in Columbus and Franklin County described a 
perception among communities that on affordable housing issues, ‘we don’t necessarily have 
people who, in a leadership position who are willing to champion this….[and are] willing to step 
up and say “yes…the city should do this and I’m going to spearhead the city putting resources in 
or the county putting resources in”’ (Interview 13, 2017).  
 Policy History  
 
 Progressive city values and policy entrepreneurs were mentioned more frequently than 
internal policy history as factors behind the adoption of displacement mitigation policies. 
However, existing policies were described as particularly helpful when it came to the work of 
regulating, implementing, and improving newer interventions. For example, New York’s 
voluntary inclusionary housing program was considered a useful basis for the mandatory one that 
followed because the city had the necessary regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in place 
(Interview 3, 2017). The voluntary program also helped subsequent efforts in terms of lessons 
learned: ‘[T]he voluntary inclusionary housing program has actually been tremendously effective 
at producing affordable housing but that is mostly…in the places where it was well-aligned with 
the tax policy…And I think that was a lesson that the city learned and fixed…through the 
changes that were ultimately made to the 421-A program75…to make it consistent with MIH 
(Interview 3, 2017). A respondent from a Western city described a similar process of learning 
from and building on earlier programs in the context of a ‘version two’ initiative to address 
displacement (Interview 9, 2017).  
 Another way in which previous policies broke ground for future initiatives was in terms 
of advocacy. Again concerning New York’s inclusionary programs, a respondent noted that  
                                                 
75A state tax exemption for housing development. 
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when voluntary inclusionary housing was sort of first coming up as something to fight 
around, the majority of…the affordable housing activists in the city sort of said…What is 
that? Why do we care about this? You know, so there was already a kind of comfort level 
with the issue [when MIH was being discussed], and some experience with what did and 
didn’t work, right. So people knew what they hadn’t won under Bloomberg and thought 
they could set about and win it under De Blasio (Interview 6, 2017).  
 
A respondent from a local affordable housing advocacy organization in Columbus and Franklin 
County spoke in similar terms about the value of incremental policy wins in driving subsequent 
action: ‘[Y]ou have to keep your eye on the ball in terms of your big goal, but realize at what 
point you have to take small wins and build on those, and I think that’s what we’re focusing on 
right now, is…what can we do that somebody can say ‘yes’ to so that we can get started and 
continue to push for a more systemic solution’ (Interview 13, 2017). 
 Cities’ negative policy histories also play a role in driving present action. Respondents 
mentioned their governments’ past experiences with gentrification as motivation for current 
efforts to create more equitable reinvestment and redevelopment plans. A respondent from a 
Southern city mentioned that, after a previous public housing redevelopment project resulted in 
the displacement of the incumbent community, in its current planning for public housing 
redevelopment, the city was working with existing residents to make sure that the project 
‘preserves long-term affordability in what is built back, for current residents in the future’ 
(Interview 14, 2017). A respondent from a Western city noted a similar concern with making 
sure that the city’s current investments in low-income neighborhoods were more equitable than 
past initiatives (Interview 9, 2017). 
State Regulatory and Financial Support 
 
 Consistent with the findings in Chapter 6, interviewees repeatedly described state 
orientations as enabling or obstructing their efforts to address affordability and displacement. A 
Midwestern city respondent noted the hindering effects of a ‘state government [that] has enacted 
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a number of pieces of legislation that limit [the city’s] ability to…enact some of the tools you 
might use [to address housing affordability]’ (Interview 1, 2017). Others noted that state 
regulations pre-emptively took options such as mandatory inclusionary zoning or certain tax 
programs off the table (Interview 4, 2017; Interview 7, 2017). This pressure is also felt by 
advocacy groups. According to a respondent from the Twin Cities, ‘[w]e almost would rather not 
bring up tenant-landlord issues [in Minneapolis] on a state level because it’s more likely we’ll be 
playing defense, and some of the existing state law that protects tenants…would be pulled back’ 
(Interview 12, 2017). Even where favorable state regulatory contexts exist on paper, state 
authority over local programs can impede cities’ displacement mitigation efforts. This is the case 
in New York, as described by a respondent from a community development organization: ‘[T]he 
most important anti-displacement housing affordability policy that we have is…rent-
stabilization, which…since the 1996 reforms of the law, ha[s] been leaking like a sieve. And 
unfortunately…the mayor is constrained from virtually any authority over that, because Albany 
has taken unto themselves the power over rent regulation’ (Interview 6, 2017).  
 In some cases, states were described as having disabling regulatory but supportive 
financing environments. A planning manager from a Midwestern city mentioned the state’s 
‘great work with the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program’ (Interview 1, 2017) and a 
respondent from Minneapolis stated that ‘[w]e have a very strong…state housing finance agency 
that has been very responsive to…the greatest needs that Minnesota residents have in affordable 
housing’ (Interview 7, 2017). Another respondent summed up the importance of 
intergovernmental support by stating that ‘[our city] has been the most productive when we have 
had the benefit of leveraging our own resources with the state and federal government…and we 
need more from both of those entities. We are already…doing all the things that we can do 
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locally to raise money’ (Interview 9, 2017). The sentiment that cities’ housing crises could not be 




 Political Support for Redistributive Housing Policies  
 
 In addition to city governments’ internal values and policy history, Chapter 6 found that 
cities with more progressive political cultures among residents had stronger displacement 
mitigation frameworks. Interviews confirmed that resident support is important to these efforts, 
although as noted above, they also emphasized the critical role of having this support activated 
through organized pressure or elected leaders who are willing to champion these values. An 
interviewee from Providence described residents’ views as an enabling factor: ‘[W]e don’t run 
into much opposition when it comes to affordable housing…[I]t’s not as heavy of a lift here, you 
know the general public is well aware that we need affordable housing, and that it’s becoming a 
crisis in the Northeast and certainly the public seems to be very supportive of those efforts’ 
(Interview 5, 2017). Resident support was sometimes framed explicitly in terms of an emerging 
progressive political culture. A Western city respondent referred to the trend described in earlier 
chapters, whereby members of the demographics that are implicated in gentrification can have 
progressive views of housing development (Interview 9, 2017).  
 Interview data also indicated that resident preferences affect city efforts in more localized 
ways, especially where opposition exists to hosting the supply of housing that city officials 
consider necessary to address an affordability crisis. Residents may oppose affordable housing 
construction in their neighborhood because of a perceived adverse effect on property values or a 
desire to keep lower-income or minority households out (Interview 8, 2017; Interview 11, 2017; 
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Interview 14, 2017). Opposition to market-rate construction, particularly in lower-income 
neighborhoods, is often based on a fear of increased housing costs and/or a shift in neighborhood 
culture (Interview 3, 2017; Interview 6, 2017). As a respondent from New York stated, ‘nobody 
really wants it [increased supply] in their neighborhood. I think everybody understands 
conceptually that the city needs to increase its supply, but when it’s in your neighborhood…you 
bear the burdens of that growth’ (Interview 3, 2017).76 The respondent went on to comment that 
localized opposition to increased supply has ‘made it very very hard to actually address the… 
root of the problem, which is that we don’t have enough housing’ (Interview 3, 2017).  A 
respondent from a community development organization detailed how this tension is perceived at 
the community level:  
[F]or the most part…neighborhoods that have been concerned about rezonings [and] have 
struggled around this issue of displacement aren’t NIMBY, and aren’t afraid of density, 
they’re concerned about displacement…[F]inding the right balance of how much market-
rate you’re incentivizing with your levers, and how much affordability you’re 
requiring…part of that answer is you have to incentivize less market-rate 
housing…[T]hat is a hard realization for the mayor and one that he’s not yet come to 
(Interview 6, 2017).  
 
In other contexts, localized concerns can manifest in a desire for new construction to take the 
form of market-rate rather than affordable housing. As one respondent noted, ‘we get a lot of 
pushback on NIMBYism…[people saying] my [neighborhood] is already…shouldering its share 
of…low-income folks and you know, we need more market-rate, we need to move the market, 
and in order to do that we need to have more than just…affordable housing’ (Interview 14, 
2017). Constituents’ preference for the form of housing investment also complicates 
policymaking. For example, a Western city respondent described residents’ support for new 
                                                 
76This finding is consistent with a recent study by Hankinson (2017, p. 14), which showed that in 
expensive cities, renters opposed an increase in market-rate housing in their neighborhoods but not on a 
city-wide level, and that this was linked to ‘anxiety about rising housing prices’.  
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construction over preservation as a serious impediment to mitigating displacement (Interview 9, 
2017). Thus city officials have to contend not just with the broader public sentiment around 
affordable housing, but also with residents’ more localized perceptions of the tenure and form of 
housing that is desirable for the future of their neighborhoods. 
 Racial Composition of the Population  
 
 Despite findings in previous studies that cities with higher percentages of the population 
identifying as African American had stronger support for affordable housing interventions, the 
racial composition of the population did not emerge frequently during interviews as a factor 
directly related to support for displacement mitigation interventions. This is consistent with the 
findings in Chapter 6, which did not find the expected relationships between racial demographics 
and policy action.  
 When interviewees did discuss this topic, they described the relationship between 
race/ethnicity and action to address affordability and displacement as more complex and 
localized than this study hypothesized. Firstly, even in cities where constituencies align around 
ethnic or racial identities, these constituencies’ concerns are typically diverse and can vary by 
location. A respondent from a national non-profit housing organization explained, 
[y]ou can…get coalitions driven by things mostly not housing…[A] lot of the politics [in 
Miami] is just really factional identity politics, right, you have an African American 
community, you have a Cuban expat community, you have some other mostly ethnically 
divided communities that sometimes vote as a block, and housing can be one issue on the 
list among many, or not, but it comes up around for instance big-scale redevelopment 
projects…[T]he motives really vary, and they’re highly localized (Interview 8, 2017).  
 
Another respondent noted that different groups also have varying capacities to influence local 
politics (Interview 9, 2017).  
 Another complicating localized dynamic comes up when interventions that city officials 
view as anti-displacement tools are perceived as causing displacement in neighborhoods with 
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high proportions of residents of color. As a respondent from a community development 
organization in New York explained,  
much of [the mayor’s] affordable housing plan…is based on rezoning a large swath of the 
city. And that sort of creates a lot of displacement-related issues because the specific 
neighborhoods that the mayor has chosen to rezone for a bunch of reasons are…relatively 
“underzoned” neighborhoods, that happen to be low-income neighborhoods of color that 
are within…close commuting distance with the business centers and are ones that are 
either currently in the throes of sort of increasing displacement pressure or are likely to 
be the next neighborhoods where displacement pressure is arising (Interview 6, 2017).  
 
Another respondent also noted the intersections between displacement and racial segregation. 
The interviewee described how in appreciating areas, ‘you have the risks of displacement, you 
have risks of people being priced out, you have the challenges of reinforcing rather than 
challenging patterns of segregation that have been around for a long time’ (Interview 8, 2017).  
 Race was also mentioned by interviewees in the related context of local disparities, 
because communities of color are disproportionately affected by housing, economic, and public 
health issues. For example in Minneapolis, ‘people of color are more likely to be cost-burdened, 
more likely to live in over-crowded conditions, more likely to face homelessness, more likely to 
be evicted’ (Interview 7, 2017). Some interviewees alluded to these disparities as driving cities to 
foster more inclusive growth through affordability and displacement mitigation policies. This 
was the case in Columbus, where a substantially higher infant mortality rate among the African 
American population was one motivating factor in the city’s above-mentioned efforts to improve 
the living environments of all residents, including through affordable housing initiatives 
(Interview 4, 2017). Thus interviews indicated that it is not the percentage of the population 
identifying as African American in and of itself that affects policy decisions, but the overlap 







Displacement mitigation planning is a complex balancing act. It is influenced by 
enabling, activating, and shaping features of the local context that often manifest in localized and 
contradictory ways. Consistent with the literature, interviews confirmed that organized 
community pressure is critical for the introduction of affordability/displacement mitigation 
policies; that confidence in market demand opens new policy opportunities; that progressive city 
orientations and local political cultures are positively associated with policy action; and that state 
regulatory and financial support influences cities’ displacement mitigation and affordability 
efforts. Interviews also provided insight into unexpected regression findings, explicated the 
channels through which these relationships operate, and indicated where the variable 
operationalization in this study could be improved.  
Interview responses indicated that the association initially hypothesized between need and 
displacement mitigation action only captured a sliver of this relationship. Cities are typically 
spurred to action when a housing crisis already exists, but at that point, action is correspondingly 
more difficult. This can adversely affect the number of policy tools adopted even if political will 
is elevated. Secondly, where housing need is high, more visible and quantifiable manifestations 
of the problem, such as homelessness, may take policy priority over gentrification-induced 
displacement. Thirdly, city action to address affordability and displacement may be motivated by 
problems other than housing scarcity, such as public health or environmental issues. And finally, 
cities may use investments in other policy areas, such as transportation or wages, to address 
displacement problems. These findings indicate that operationalizing need and policy response in 
the context of displacement mitigation could benefit from additional survey data. Having 
respondents rate the difficulty of addressing displacement from appreciating neighborhoods in 
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their city could yield a variable that isolates the difficulty of acting from the level of need. 
Asking them to rank their housing priorities (rather than list them non-hierarchically) could 
reveal where homelessness takes precedence over displacement. And asking whether initiatives 
in other policy areas are being used to address displacement could add non-housing dimensions 
to the policy index. The concept of non-housing needs that motivate displacement mitigation, on 
the other hand, is best examined outside the confines of a quantitative survey.  
 This chapter confirmed that organized advocacy is critical for activating affordable 
housing and displacement mitigation action through persistent pressure, policy critique, and 
public accountability tactics. City agencies’ diverse relationships with for-profit real estate 
actors, and the latter group’s role in negotiating the shape that policies take, were also fleshed out 
by interview data. In different contexts and on different issues, active input from these actors can 
support or hinder efforts to address affordability and displacement. A more comprehensive 
survey measure of this relationship would therefore assess not only the intensity of these groups’ 
input but also its content, by asking respondents to rate for-profit actors’ level of input on, and 
support for, affordable housing development, regulations, and tenant protections. 
Interviews also revealed the complex relationship between fiscal resources and action to 
address affordability and displacement. Respondents indicated that the fiscal capacity to address 
these issues in appreciating areas is affected not just by resource availability, but also by 
uncertainty around funding streams, competing budgetary pressures, the overwhelming cost of 
addressing affordability issues, and the availability of other (non-subsidy) policy options. 
Moreover, cities face trade-offs between investing resources in cost-increasing areas and using 
those resources to preserve or produce more units in cheaper neighborhoods. Although 
interviews offer the best method to examine these issues, asking survey respondents to rate how 
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large a barrier fiscal resources present for addressing displacement, or to rank the barriers to such 
action, could provide a more nuanced quantitative measure of the fiscal capacity-policy action 
relationship.   
Market confidence, as measured by housing wealth and locational demand, can be a 
paradoxical and complex lever for cities to pull. The ability to capitalize on demand can often 
only be realized once a threshold of market strength activates sufficient political will to introduce 
new regulations and requirements, but this simultaneously increases the costs of preservation. 
Because market confidence is subjective and influenced by uneven economic geographies within 
cities, asking survey respondents to rate the strength of their market could provide useful 
information for measuring this relationship, which is often proxied simply by median housing 
values. 
Progressive city government values on displacement mitigation and affordable housing 
facilitate policy action in this area. These values are typically championed by a policy 
entrepreneur, and future surveys should therefore ask about the presence of such an individual in 
city government. Interviews also showed that existing policies provide a foundation for 
policymakers and advocates to build on– and that past histories of injustice can also motivate a 
more progressive present. Regarding the broader political environment, interviews demonstrated 
that measures of formal state regulations miss the nuanced ways in which state authority over 
local programs prevents cities from fully utilizing the displacement mitigation tools at their 
disposal. Having survey respondents rate the level of state regulatory and financial support for 




 Interviews identified local political culture, and chiefly residents’ views on affordable 
housing, as enabling policy action in this area (particularly when activated by community 
organizing or policy entrepreneurs). However, broad support for affordable or market-rate 
housing development does not translate neatly into support for construction in one’s 
neighborhood. Whether driven by an aversion to density, fear of displacement, or desire to 
exclude ‘others’, localized opposition to housing development complicates displacement 
mitigation efforts in ways that cannot be directly captured in quantitative surveys. Nonetheless, 
asking respondents to rate residents’ support for hosting new market-rate or affordable housing 
in their neighborhoods could provide a proxy for this relationship.   
 Finally, interview data indicated that the relationship between racial demographics and 
displacement mitigation action is different than this study hypothesized. A more precise indicator 
of this relationship would capture not just the percentage of residents that identify as African 
American, but also those of other racial and ethnic identities. An additional consideration would 
be to measure the percentage of residents from these groups that have incomes below the poverty 
line, given the role of disparities in driving city action. If possible, accounting for issues that 
might influence racial and ethnic groups’ attitudes towards displacement mitigation policies, 
such as the share living in gentrifying neighborhoods, would also be useful. 
Although this section has offered several suggestions for improving survey and regression 
model operationalizations of the relationships between local conditions and displacement 
mitigation/affordable housing action, these suggestions must be weighed against the need for 
parsimony in survey and regression design. Quantitative survey responses and regression models 
are by necessity simplifications and approximations of the relationships in question, and the 
added complexity revealed by interviews is an argument for using multiple methods in policy 
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action studies as well as refining the tools and concepts used within each of those methods. 
These methodological implications of this study, along with those for theory, policy 




Conclusion: Mitigating Displacement in the Just City 
 
 The work of mitigating displacement in today’s market-driven and fiscally constrained 
urban environment is fraught with challenges, but many city governments are taking action to 
protect lower-income households’ ability to access and remain in neighborhoods that experience 
reinvestment. This dissertation has examined the contexts in which this action takes place, the 
tools cities are using, and the conditions that motivate and facilitate intervention. The 
investigation was organized around four questions: 1) what are the political, economic, and 
knowledge environments within which displacement mitigation planning occurs in large U.S. 
cities? 2) how are these cities addressing direct and indirect displacement in neighborhoods that 
are at risk of gentrifying? 3) which conditions are associated with the strength of cities’ 
approaches to mitigating displacement and the type of action they take to address this challenge? 
4) how do local policy and planning actors explain the ways in which these conditions motivate, 
facilitate, and shape city governments’ policy approaches?  
 The empirical chapters addressed these questions in turn. Chapter 4 showed that city 
governments are operating in an environment of widespread housing instability and are more 
likely to be concerned with reinvesting in areas of concentrated poverty, promoting mixed-
income development, and attracting knowledge-based firms than addressing displacement. Their 
efforts to plan for place-based affordability are hampered by legal obstruction, fiscal constraint, 
and unpredictable levels of funding from higher levels of government. Politically, they 
experience robust community pressure to address displacement as well as active input from 
private real estate industry groups on redevelopment and housing plans. However, cities are 
missing important opportunities to integrate residents’ local knowledge and other cities’ policy 
experiences into their displacement mitigation planning processes.  
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 Chapter 5 examined the policy tools that cities have adopted to address displacement in 
and beyond neighborhoods at risk of gentrifying. The majority of cities did not have a strong 
framework in place to mitigate gentrification-induced residential displacement. The tools that 
they used most commonly to address this issue leveraged strong markets to incentivize the 
construction of affordable housing or to fund dedicated revenue sources. In contrast, action to 
address affordability on a broader spatial scale more commonly relied on investments in the 
establishment or extension of affordability, which is more feasible in neighborhoods where land 
values are low. While interventions to mitigate displacement in areas at risk of gentrifying 
typically targeted low-income households, cities were more likely to address the exclusionary 
displacement of future residents than the economic and physical displacement that incumbent 
residents can experience. Moreover, action to address displacement pressure was uncommon. 
This chapter also used the examples of inclusionary zoning, short-term rental regulations, and 
community preference policies to illustrate the tensions around the form and scale of 
displacement mitigation interventions - particularly the paradox of using a market-based tool to 
address displacement and the difficulties of balancing neighborhood-level displacement 
mitigation aims with individual and city-wide interests. 
 In Chapter 6, a series of multivariate regression models tested the hypotheses that cities’ 
displacement mitigation frameworks were significantly and positively associated with local 
levels of problem severity/need, community pressure, and fiscal and economic strength. While 
very active community pressure, median home value, and per capita property tax revenue did 
have the expected relationships in different model specifications, the levels of need and general 
fiscal resources were not significantly related to any measures of displacement mitigation action. 
The regression models supported several additional redistributive policy action theses and 
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yielded counterintuitive results for others. State support for affordable housing policy, a 
progressive political culture, and a history of progressive policy action were significantly and 
positively associated with various measures of displacement mitigation action. However, the 
level of input from the private real estate industry did not emerge as a significant variable, and 
the percentage of residents identifying as African American was only significantly – and, 
contrary to expectations, negatively -  associated with one outcome. 
 Chapter 7 examined these relationships in more depth through semi-structured interviews 
with city officials and community advocates in a representative subset of study cities. The data 
showed that enabling background conditions are catalyzed by activating forces (organized 
community pressure and policy entrepreneurs) and activating moments (a threshold of market 
confidence and crisis levels of need), while for-profit real estate interest groups’ input was 
typically identified as a factor that ‘shaped’ the content of interventions. The chapter also shed 
light on counterintuitive regression findings, including by showing that high levels of need can 
simultaneously motivate and obstruct policy action, that competing policy priorities and spatial 
goals can stymie investment in displacement mitigation, and that aggregate measures of concepts 
like racial demographics obscure the neighborhood-level dynamics of gentrification-induced 
displacement.  
In this chapter, I summarize the implications of these findings for theories of equitable 
and Just City planning and redistributive policy action, for empirical studies of policy tools, and 
for those involved in developing, implementing, and advocating for displacement mitigation 







Equity and Just City Planning 
 
The Just City and equity planning traditions advocate the redistribution of resources and 
opportunities to improve the material outcomes, rights, and political power of disadvantaged 
residents, in pursuit of gradual systemic change (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Kraushaar, 1988; 
Krumholz, 1982, 1999). This principle underpinned many of the interventions discussed in this 
dissertation. These were typically designed to redistribute the costs and benefits of economic 
growth, to reduce power imbalances between low-income households and the for-profit real 
estate industry, and more generally to protect those already disadvantaged in the housing market. 
Cities expressed a commitment to these principles in their broad statements about, and visions 
for, displacement mitigation planning, and their strategies often included the specific policy 
guidelines that Fainstein (2010) proposed for furthering equity in the realm of redevelopment.  
Also in line with Just City theory, city officials felt constrained to achieve their 
displacement mitigation goals primarily through market mechanisms. This was evident in the 
types of tools that cities most commonly used to address displacement, which rely on strong 
markets to be viable; in the pervasiveness of input from private real estate industry actors on 
redevelopment and affordable housing plans; in cities’ dependence on for-profit developers to 
achieve their housing goals; and in their broader perception that economic growth and 
investment provide the preconditions for local wellbeing. Attaching policy solutions to a mode of 
development that produces inherently inequitable outcomes decreases the potential for radical, 
systemic change, and often results in internal policy contradictions (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; 
Kraushaar, 1988), as in the case of inclusionary zoning policies that rely on incentivizing market-
rate development in low-income neighborhoods to secure long-term affordable housing for low-
221 
 
income residents. Nonetheless, market forces do not simply impose their will on city 
governments, many of which are taking on an expanded regulatory role in housing and claiming 
victories against an unfettered market wherever they can. While this often means that 
displacement mitigation is addressed through a patchwork of interventions that are borne of 
‘identifying opportunities as they arise’ (S. S. Fainstein, 2010, p. 176), important precedents are 
set by each effort to regulate markets, place requirements on developers, and strengthen tenants’ 
bargaining position.  
As Just City and equity planning advocates propose, each small victory can contribute to 
building a planning context that is fundamentally more just than what came before, by gradually 
normalizing concerns with, and interventions towards, equity as starting points for discussions of 
how the city develops (S. S. Fainstein, 2010; Krumholz, 1982). Both the quantitative and 
qualitative results of this study indicated that pro-equity orientations and interventions provide a 
foundation for strengthening cities’ responses to displacement. Several of the initiatives that 
were discussed in surveys and interviews were expansions or bolstered versions of previous 
programs or revised uses of existing initiatives, as in the case of city-wide commercial 
affordability and inclusive development interventions that were modified to target neighborhoods 
at risk of gentrification. In regression analyses, the presence of a living wage ordinance in 2006 
was significantly associated with the number of displacement mitigation policy tools adopted and 
implemented, while cities with more policy tools in the funding/resources category had 
significantly higher policy counts in the regulation/zoning category, and vice versa. Interviews 
showed that existing programs can establish necessary regulatory frameworks and provide 
important lessons for increasing the effectiveness of initiatives that follow. Incremental gains 
also matter for advocacy. Interviews revealed that even when organizing produces a weaker 
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version of a program than originally envisioned, the initial victory lays critical groundwork for 
future battles and broadens the sense of what is possible. As cities that have long been complicit 
in promoting gentrification through urban renewal and revitalization increasingly take a 
proactive stance against displacement, integrate mitigation principles into their comprehensive 
plans, and spend scarce city resources to keep vulnerable residents in their homes, there is 
evidence that a gradual shift towards a more just urban redevelopment climate is occurring.    
At the same time, displacement mitigation planning is a prime example of how the Just 
City principles of equity, diversity, and democracy operate in tension and can motivate different 
policy options depending on the spatial scale at which justice is being considered. This 
manifested itself in several ways: the legal challenges brought against community preference 
policies by fair housing advocates; the implications of investing finite resources in gentrifying 
neighborhoods instead of in cheaper areas; the tensions between individual, neighborhood, and 
city-wide interests associated with short-term rental activity; and the localized challenges to 
aspects of cities’ displacement mitigation plans that residents see as threatening to their 
neighborhoods. City officials are highly aware of these tensions and make difficult choices about 
them every day. The challenge for Just City theory is to explicate the consequences of those 
choices for the types of cities that we live and plan in – and vice versa. The trade-offs among 
these principles are policy outcomes in themselves, and certain local conditions may be more 
conducive to prioritizing equity, or democracy, or diversity. This points to space for productive 
overlap between Just City theory and theories of redistributive policy action, which are rarely 
explicitly integrated into the same studies. Although the policy action theories reviewed for this 
study focused on interventions that further equity through redistribution, this could be broadened 
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to examine the conditions associated with policies and processes that promote diversity and 
democracy, as evaluated by Just City guidelines.  
 
Redistributive Policy Action 
  
 This dissertation drew on theories of redistributive policy action as they have been 
applied to various policy realms, including affordable housing. Based on this literature, I 
hypothesized that the levels of problem severity/need, community advocacy, and fiscal and 
economic strength would be significantly and positively associated with cities’ displacement 
mitigation efforts. While this study’s quantitative findings confirmed that very active community 
pressure and strong housing demand are conditions underpinning such action, the levels of need 
and general fiscal resources did not emerge as significant factors. Other conditions that the 
literature identifies as associated with affordable housing interventions, including the percentage 
of the population identifying as African American and the level of private real estate industry 
input on affordable housing and redevelopment planning, did not have the expected relationships 
to displacement mitigation efforts. The qualitative investigation shed further light on the 
expected and unexpected relationships that emerged in the regression analyses and their 
implications for the field of redistributive policy action. 
The interview data showed that certain conditions play a more activating role than others 
in the displacement mitigation policy process. A crisis level of need, a threshold of market 
confidence, active community organizing, and the sustained will of a policy entrepreneur were 
identified as critical forces that pushed a city towards action, compared to conditions that played 
a more ‘enabling’ or ‘shaping’ role. This helped to account for the counterintuitive findings 
regarding real estate industry input and problem severity/need, shed light on the paradox of 
market strength, and revealed how broader values become the basis for interventions. First, 
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respondents described private real estate industry actors as more active in negotiating the details 
of policies and programs than dictating whether interventions were adopted. Second, the 
tendency described in interviews for cities to respond to an advanced crisis means that they are 
spurred to action at a time when it is more costly to intervene, which complicates the relationship 
between need and response levels. Third, cities delay action not just because crises accelerate 
political will, but also because, until they are confident in market strength, officials tend to 
prioritize stimulating markets over imposing regulations or preserving long-term affordability. 
This, in turn, increases the cost of investing in preservation and deepens their reliance on market-
based tools to address displacement. Finally, while interviews confirmed the quantitative 
evidence that progressive city and resident values enable displacement mitigation action, they 
also highlighted the critical role of organized community pressure and policy entrepreneurs in 
channeling those values into policy action through sustained pressure and political will.  
The value of policy entrepreneurs and community organizing, the motivating nature of a 
crisis, and the leverage attached to market strength are already well-recognized in the literature 
on redistributive policy action, as discussed in Chapter 2. Further investigating how these 
‘tipping’ conditions interrelate, how they vary in different policy realms, and how they affect the 
form and timing of intervention will yield a more complete theorization of cities’ motivation and 
capacity for redistributive policy action. 
This study also demonstrated that the conditions associated with cities’ interventions to 
address the neighborhood-level process of gentrification-induced displacement differ in 
important ways from those associated with action to address housing affordability city-wide. The 
two policy areas overlap, but they are also pitted against each other, and this tension helps to 
explain other unexpected regression findings. For example, while increased fiscal capacity can 
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be expected to increase spending on affordable housing (broadly conceived), this relationship is 
less straightforward when it comes to levels of displacement mitigation policy action, as cities 
must decide whether to invest resources in appreciating areas or use that money to assist more 
and/or lower-income households in cheaper neighborhoods. This tension also emerges when 
cities are dealing with broad crises of housing instability or homelessness that eclipse, and draw 
political and material resources away from, more localized displacement mitigation problems.  
Displacement mitigation can also clash with other neighborhood-based priorities. For 
example, if cities are concerned with addressing racial segregation or concentrated poverty, they 
may prioritize measures that encourage in-movers of diverse races and incomes to affected areas 
over tools that protect the residential stability of incumbent residents. Redistributive policy 
action theses’ treatment of certain conditions on a city-wide basis, such as public support for 
affordable housing or the percentage of residents who identify as African American, also ignores 
the ways in which residents of differently-impacted neighborhoods may vary in their support for, 
and ability to influence, displacement mitigation measures. Displacement mitigation thus 
competes for political and fiscal attention both with officials’ city-wide priorities and residents’ 
conflicting localized interests. Theories that have been developed to explain action on city-wide 
redistribution must therefore be modified to account for these spatial dynamics when they are 
applied to phenomena that unfold at the neighborhood scale.  
The application of the concept of new political culture to the context of displacement 
mitigation is illustrative of this issue. The literature posits that cities with higher percentages of 
highly-educated, younger, knowledge-based, and creative workers with non-traditional lifestyles 
are more likely to undertake redistributive policy action. This study recognized from the outset 
that an influx of such populations can also precipitate gentrification, and that these newcomers 
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may therefore be ambivalent towards interventions that support incumbent low-income 
households in the up-and-coming neighborhoods attractive to young professionals. Nevertheless, 
I expected that cities with higher percentages of such residents would have more advanced 
displacement mitigation frameworks, on the basis that an overall vision of what constitutes a just 
or equitable city may prevail over, or at least be conceived separately from, these residents’ more 
immediate economic and cultural interests (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Rosdil, 2013). This 
expectation was borne out by the study findings. Considering the potentially localized nature of 
attitudes towards displacement mitigation thus enabled me to cast my findings in terms of the 
broad emerging literature on the role of progressive local cultures in redistributive action as well 
as the specific theory that overarching concepts of city-wide justice can supersede individuals’ 
neighborhood-based interests. 
Finally, this study examined whether different conditions are associated with policy 
adoption and implementation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on redistributive policy 
action typically proposes similar hypotheses to explain both the adoption and implementation of 
the interventions of interest. This study confirmed that nearly identical conditions were 
associated with these processes, but it identified two variables that differed in their relationships 
with adopted and implemented policy tool counts. First, the level of community pressure to 
address affordability in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification was significantly associated with 
the number of adopted, but not implemented, displacement mitigation policy tools. This suggests 
a waning of activism once an intervention has been adopted and the more organizationally 
diffuse work of implementation begins. Although interviews indicated that community-based 
organizations are integral to the implementation of displacement mitigation interventions, 
advocacy itself appears to play less of a role at this stage of policymaking. Secondly, a 
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progressive policy history had a greater impact on the implemented policy tool count than the 
adopted policy tool count. The modest increase in the effect of this variable on implementation 
may reflect the added benefit of a progressive policy infrastructure for surmounting the 
challenges of organizational capacity necessary to implement policy tools once they have been 
adopted. As suggested in interviews, this infrastructure can be particularly valuable in the realm 
of housing, where it can take years to establish regulatory frameworks and agreements. Although 
the idea that the processes of policy adoption and implementation differ is not new, these 
findings suggest that it should be more frequently integrated into large-scale comparative 
research on redistributive policy action, which typically does not examine differences between 




This study also has several methodological implications for empirical research on 
redistributive policy action. Chapter 7 showed that many of the relationships that such studies 
typically proxy through census data could be operationalized in more nuanced ways through 
survey questions. This highlights the utility of surveys for studies of policy action: the 
information collected can be tailored to the study’s hypotheses and the spatial scale at which the 
policy area of interest unfolds. It also suggests that conducting some exploratory interviews prior 
to survey development could improve variable measurement and thereby increase the accuracy 
of results. Obtaining answers to questions that seek a high level of nuance or breadth of 
information may require splitting the survey into multiple parts that are sent to different 
individuals with the specialized knowledge to complete them, as was done for this study. The 
value of this additional data must be weighed against the time each survey component adds to the 
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piloting, pre-testing, and formal surveying stages, the importance of survey parsimony for 
increasing response rates, and the trade-offs between the nuanced data that surveys provide and 
the more standardized measurements associated with census data.  
Although survey questions can provide more thoughtful measurements of the concepts 
under investigation, even the most targeted survey indicators and regression variables cannot 
capture the complexity of the relationships between city conditions and policy outcomes. Studies 
that combine methods can provide a more comprehensive understanding of these processes. The 
quantitative and qualitative phases of this study worked together to reveal the prevalence of 
displacement mitigation tools, the conditions that enable cities to use them, and the channels 
through which those conditions affect action. While the quantitative phase was essential to 
measure and compare these trends and associations across 80 cities, several key insights about 
how the relationships between context and action operate would not have emerged without the 
qualitative investigation. For the redistributive policy action field, which is crowded with studies 
that rely on regression models to identify the conditions associated with policy outcomes, this 
suggests that critical information about the mechanisms through which the identified 
relationships operate are being missed.  
This study also demonstrated the feasibility of increasing the accuracy, reliability, and 
detail of survey data through triangulation with policy documents. Although a key feature of 
surveys that collect information on policy tools is that they can be verified and supplemented in 
this way, few studies take full advantage of this possibility. If it is prohibitively time-consuming 
to do so for each tool or intervention in a survey dataset, it is at least incumbent upon researchers 
to compare (a percentage of) pre-test observations to documented policy and program 
information to verify the reliability of the collected data prior to the final surveying stage. Where 
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time permits the supplementation of policy tools for all participating government units, a survey 
can be a useful instrument for identifying the existence of policy tools for which further 
information can then be gathered.  
Finally, this study’s participants repeatedly affirmed the usefulness of studies like this 
one that document the tools that cities in different contexts have in place to address common 
policy challenges. Respondents noted that city agencies value the opportunity to learn from other 
cities’ initiatives but rarely have the time to do the comprehensive work involved in creating 
policy inventories.  
 
Implications for Planners and Policymakers 
 
This study compiled an inventory of displacement mitigation tools that entail diverse 
forms of action, address different types of displacement, are suited to distinct local conditions, 
and are used with varying prevalence nationwide. However, introducing these tools was not a 
priority for the majority of cities in the study. Although many participant cities were 
incorporating Just City principles into their approaches to managing neighborhood change, only 
a minority of survey respondents identified mitigating displacement as a current challenge, and 
most did not have robust displacement mitigation frameworks in place.  
This relative complacency around displacement mitigation manifests in a trend of late 
intervention, which has been a recurring theme throughout this study. My research showed that 
city governments tend to focus on promoting reinvestment and socioeconomic mixing without 
approaching displacement mitigation as a concurrent challenge, particularly during the early 
stages of gentrification - which is precisely when intervention to address long-term affordability 
is most cost-effective. They are also more likely to address affordability and displacement when 
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these problems reach crisis levels, at which point it is correspondingly more difficult to 
intervene. Late intervention is also fueled by city officials’ reluctance to introduce regulations 
and requirements before a certain level of market confidence exists, as well as their prioritization 
of market stimulation over affordable housing preservation in neighborhoods where market 
strength is lagging. Delayed intervention shrinks the opportunities for preservation and increases 
cities’ reliance on tools like inclusionary zoning that harness strong markets to create affordable 
units. In light of constrained city budgets and shrinking federal resources, leveraging demand for 
development is likely to continue to be an important way for cities to increase dedicated 
resources and encourage developers to include affordable units in new market-rate 
developments. However, this reliance on robust demand leaves city agencies struggling to catch 
up with the market, particularly given the complicated and lengthy work of establishing new 
programs and working out preservation deals.  
 Proactive planning that addresses reinvestment and long-term affordability concurrently 
is the key to breaking this cycle, as several cities in this study have recognized. Investing in 
affordability before revitalizing neighborhoods experience appreciation, particularly through 
programs like CLTs and land banks that can keep land affordable in perpetuity, can provide 
long-term stability for those who wish to remain in the neighborhood and keep the area 
accessible to future residents. Because it is less expensive to invest in affordability before 
appreciation is advanced, early intervention can reduce cities’ reliance on strong-market tools to 
address displacement and minimize the conflicts that arise between investing in gentrifying and 
non-gentrifying parts of the city. The results in Chapter 5 showed the feasibility of investing in 
the extension and creation of affordability outside of gentrifying neighborhoods. What is needed 
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is to ensure that these investments protect long-term affordability and form an integrated 
component of efforts to improve neighborhood conditions. 
Cities are using several strategies to target neighborhoods that may be vulnerable to 
gentrification, including integrating the principle of displacement mitigation into comprehensive 
planning so that all city development initiatives consider the implications for incumbent 
residents, and creating intentional revitalization plans that embrace affordability for existing 
residents as an early and key component of investment in neighborhoods. Although it did not 
come up in this study, early warning systems that identify neighborhoods that are likely to face 
gentrification and displacement pressures could aid in these efforts (Chapple & Zuk, 2016). 
Creating a stream of flexible resources by dedicating city revenue from taxes, fees, or general 
funds for affordable housing is another proactive measure that cities can take to prepare for the 
eventuality of gentrification. Dedicated funding can be marshalled to finance legal aid for tenants 
who are at heightened risk of eviction and to provide quick access to funding to compete against 
for-profit actors in acquiring low-income housing that is at imminent risk of sale or conversion.  
 Although the case for acting early is sound and multiple tools exist, interviewees 
indicated that political will is lacking in this area. Public pressure for early intervention is weak 
in the face of more urgent and visible problems, and strong economic and fiscal incentives exist 
to prioritize the stimulation of market activity over the preservation of long-term affordability in 
disinvested areas. In a policymaking environment where city officials are activated by crisis-
level conditions, organized pressure, and market confidence, the odds are therefore stacked 
against a broad shift towards early intervention. Part of achieving this change will involve 
recognizing disinvestment and gentrification as two sides of the same crisis that require solutions 
that are linked through the concept of equitable development. 
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 In neighborhoods where housing appreciation is already advanced, officials face equally 
tough choices. Acquiring and rent-limiting unsubsidized housing to prevent direct and 
exclusionary displacement in these areas requires large investments of resources, which could be 
used to build more units of housing in cheaper areas. For cities that value inclusive 
neighborhoods and believe that low-income households should have a choice to stay, investing 
heightened resources in displacement mitigation is increasingly seen as a necessity. Strong 
demand also brings additional policy options, as cities can leverage market actors’ desire to 
invest. However, policy trade-offs exist when using market-based tools to mitigate displacement. 
For example, inclusionary zoning programs’ success in stemming the tide of displacement is 
influenced by the relationship between the overall quantity of market-rate housing that is 
produced relative to the quantity and affordability levels of units constructed on-site. However, 
achieving deep affordability on-site is a challenge in the absence of layered subsidies, and efforts 
to do so through cross-subsidies from additional or more expensive market rate units add to 
gentrification pressures. Tools that harness market conditions should therefore be considered as 
one carefully-designed component of a comprehensive and proactive strategy that includes 
preservation and tenant protection efforts.  
Tenant protections are a critical part of any strategy to increase housing equity for lower-
income households in neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. Tenants’ rights can be 
strengthened through regulatory measures, such as just cause eviction, right of first refusal, or 
anti-harassment ordinances, or through funding for legal assistance when they face harassment or 
eviction. City-wide protections can help with early intervention by establishing a pre-existing 
bulwark against predatory landlord activity. More targeted measures, such as those tackling buy-
outs and providing information about building sales, can address imminent risks where 
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appreciation is advancing rapidly. These tools also offer a clear pathway to addressing this 
study’s finding that cities are more likely to target the stock of low-cost housing in gentrifying 
neighborhoods than incumbent residents’ ability to remain in place. While interventions that 
address exclusionary displacement can reduce the loss of opportunities for disadvantaged 
households to move within, and into, appreciating neighborhoods, they hold few guarantees for 
existing residents unless units are reserved for these populations at appropriate income levels. 
Despite the legal debates surrounding them, neighborhood preference policies can therefore 
provide a direct tool to ensure that existing residents benefit from reinvestment in their 
neighborhoods. 
 Another relatively neglected aspect of displacement mitigation involves addressing 
displacement pressure through measures that support incumbent small businesses and foster 
more inclusive development. These measures were not commonly used in respondent cities, and 
when they were, it was often on a case-by-case basis when opportunities arose during 
redevelopment projects. One avenue forward in this realm involves expanding on these practices 
to create more formalized policy tools. Another would see city-wide initiatives that assist small 
businesses or target local hiring used more frequently to address the specific circumstances and 
challenges of neighborhoods at risk of gentrification.   
 Finally, this study showed that city governments are not maximizing the more localized 
input of neighborhood residents on redevelopment plans nor the learning opportunities offered 
by other cities’ displacement mitigation experiences. Gentrification-induced displacement is a 
neighborhood-based problem, and the local knowledge of the residents most affected by this 
phenomenon is a resource that should be central to the planning and policymaking processes. 
Mitigating displacement is also a problem that often requires rapid solutions, and considering the 
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common challenges that different cities face, there are clear opportunities for policy tools to be 
adapted from one setting to another.  
 
Implications for Advocacy 
 
Both the quantitative and qualitative phases of this dissertation confirmed the importance of 
organized advocacy for activating city efforts to address affordability and displacement. This 
advocacy is not just a significant factor in motivating policy adoption – it is one of the key 
catalysts for action. Respondents unequivocally credited organized community pressure for the 
introduction and strengthening of several of the programs discussed in this study. They also 
offered insights into the ways in which advocacy influences policy adoption. Interviewees noted 
that successful anti-displacement and affordable housing advocacy relies on persistent pressure, 
nuanced policy analysis, and holding governments publicly accountable for furthering 
communities’ demands. Different groups may fulfill each of these roles, but they all contribute to 
putting (and keeping) the issue on the political agenda and providing policymakers with the tools 
to address it. Respondents also indicated that demands for pragmatic solutions that are in keeping 
with politicians’ views of what is feasible and desirable have a greater chance of success than 
those that ask more than elected officials feel they can deliver.  
The findings also suggest some possible entryways into putting displacement mitigation 
on the policy agenda. One strategy involves framing displacement as an issue that affects 
wellbeing beyond the realm of housing by tying it to broader issues like public health and 
economic inequality. This is likely to be a particularly useful approach if a policy entrepreneur in 
local government is pushing for action on one of those issues. Alternatively, attention to non-
housing policies that might relieve displacement pressures could provide another channel 
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through which to impact this issue where the political will or resources to address it through 
housing investment are not forthcoming. 
 Interviewees indicated that political will is lacking to intervene early to address long-term 
affordability in low-income neighborhoods, and that cities often put off the preservation of 
affordable housing until the problem is advanced. This is not news to advocacy groups who have 
been working for decades to establish CLTs and other tools to stabilize neighborhoods in the 
face of both disinvestment and reinvestment. However, given the acknowledged role that 
advocacy plays in influencing the political agenda, it suggests that more organized pressure, 
information campaigns, and studies of feasible policy options directed at shifting the political 
calculus on when to intervene to address displacement could lead to more proactive equitable 
development strategies. Emphasizing the economic logic of this course of action, and its 
implications for general housing and neighborhood stability, could aid this effort. 
 Finally, another possible channel for advocacy that emerged from this study involves 
potential commonalities or partnerships with the for-profit private sector. While for-profit 
interest groups are more often on the side of decreasing regulations and requirements, their 
openness to negotiation and their willingness to advance the anti-displacement cause when it is 
in their business interest can provide opportunities to leverage their considerable power at the 
city and state levels to advance equitable development goals. 
 
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 There are several ways in which future work could improve and build on this study. First, 
expanding the sample to include more and smaller cities would allow an exploration of how the 
studied dynamics manifest in localities with a greater diversity of population profiles. It would 
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also increase the power of the regression models and allow the addition of some of the potential 
variables identified in Chapter 7. Second, this study was unable to account for the different 
scopes of cities’ interventions. For example, a city that provided a small amount of funding to a 
legal aid organization to represent tenants at risk of eviction received the same credit for having 
this policy tool as a city that guaranteed representation to all low-income tenants in housing 
court. A fuller comparison of the strength of cities’ displacement mitigation efforts would 
account for the differences between these and other programs. A third limitation is that the 
enforcement of these interventions was beyond the scope of this study.  
Fourthly, I was unable to account for all the programmatic details that influence a 
displacement mitigation intervention’s impact– including whether the income and rent levels of 
new subsidized units reflect the socioeconomic profile of the neighborhood. Fifth, the database 
could not capture the date of introduction of every documented intervention, and it was therefore 
not possible to measure independent variables at a time before any interventions were 
introduced. As a result, the study captures the conditions associated with the tools that were in 
place at the time of the study rather than the more temporally proximate conditions associated 
with the probability of first adoption. Future studies that focus on individual policy tools and 
capture their dates of introduction will be able to shed more light on the latter relationships and 
how they differ across types of intervention. 
 A final limitation of this study, and one that future research should urgently address, 
concerns impact. While this dissertation began with a review of the empirical research on the 
ways in which public interventions can protect low-income households from displacement when 
neighborhoods appreciate, the empirical study did not attempt to evaluate the outcomes 
associated with these tools. More research is needed to assess how well the interventions that 
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cities are using to mitigate displacement achieve their goals. One of the major challenges of 
conducting such research, particularly across many governmental units, is the difficulty of 
measuring displacement. However, it is crucial that such research takes center stage in the field 
of gentrification and displacement, both through in-depth case studies and quantitative work that 
makes use of the increasingly refined proxies for displacement that have been developed over the 
past several decades of gentrification research. The housing plans, surveys, and interviews that I 
analyzed in this study made it clear that city officials in many different contexts are convinced 
that displacement from gentrifying areas is a problem. What they indicated is that they need 
more information on how best to navigate the dilemmas inherent in efforts to develop 
neighborhoods in a more equitable manner. In light of both the increasingly evident costs of 
displacement for lower-income households and city officials’ will to use a variety of policy tools 
to address them, it is time for researchers to shift their attention towards helping to identify the 
policy tools that effectively mitigate this outcome.  
 
Planning for Equitable Neighborhood Change 
 
 Despite the contradictions and challenges involved in displacement mitigation planning, 
cities across the country are taking action to prevent the market from riding roughshod over the 
interests of the disadvantaged. This study exists because across a wide range of contexts, cities 
are responding to organized pressure, leveraging market momentum, and building on progressive 
internal values, political cultures, and state orientations to preserve lower-income residents’ 
opportunities to access housing and meet their needs in neighborhoods that are at risk of 
gentrifying. These efforts are incremental and incomplete, but they are becoming an increasingly 
central part of some cities’ overall planning philosophies. Much work remains to be done. In 
many cities, future work has a supportive framework of policy interventions to build on. For 
238 
 
others, the preceding pages are a reminder that such action is feasible, that multiple policy tools 
are available, and that diverse city conditions can be leveraged in different ways to create more 
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1. What are the most critical housing-related issues in your city at the moment? 
2. How would you describe the state of housing affordability in your city?  
3. Are any neighborhoods in your city experiencing gentrification or issues of displacement 
from revitalizing neighborhoods? 
4. How does your city government view and balance the relative importance of promoting 
investment in lower-income neighborhoods and preserving affordability for incumbent 
residents? 
5. What are the main actions your city is taking to address housing affordability 
a. city-wide 
b. in neighborhoods where costs are increasing?  
6. What do you think motivates the city to take action and devote resources in this area? 
7. How do you think the city’s affordability and displacement mitigation efforts have been 
perceived by the public? 
8. Are there any other types of action that the city has considered using to address these 
issues, but that were not deemed feasible (e.g. politically, economically, or legally)?  
9. What are the main barriers to addressing affordability and displacement in your city? 
10. What are the main barriers to implementing the relevant policies? 
11. What role have community organizations and advocacy groups played in your city’s 
decisions about how to address these issues?  
12. What role have for-profit real estate industry groups/private developers played in your 




13. Have other levels of government been supportive of your city’s housing affordability and 
displacement mitigation efforts? 
14. If you could turn the clock back ten or twenty years, with the knowledge you have now, 
are there any policies you would introduce or advocate for to address the city’s current 
housing issues? 
15. Is there anything you’d like to add about your city’s housing affordability efforts or its 
work to balance revitalization with affordability? 
Community Advocates 
 
1. What are the most critical housing-related issues in your city at the moment? 
2. How would you describe the state of housing affordability in your city?  
3. Are any neighborhoods in your city experiencing gentrification or issues of displacement 
from revitalizing neighborhoods? 
4. How would you characterize the city government’s efforts to address affordability 
a. city-wide 
b. in neighborhoods where costs are increasing? 
5. What do you think motivates the city to take action and devote resources in this area? 
6. What role has your organization played in influencing the city’s policies in this area? 
7. What factors have enabled your organization to be successful in its advocacy work?  
8. What are some of the barriers or challenges that your organization has faced in this 
advocacy? 
9. Besides community advocacy, what factors do you think have shaped the city’s current 
approach to addressing affordability and displacement?  
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10. What are the main barriers that the city and groups like your organization face in 
implementing anti-displacement strategies? 
11. What role do you think private, for-profit real estate industry groups and developers have 
played in the city government’s approach to addressing affordability and displacement? 
12. If you could turn the clock back 10 or 20 years, with the knowledge you have now, are 
there any measures you would advocate for to address the city’s current housing issues? 
13. Is there anything else you’d like to add about your city’s or your organization’s housing 
affordability efforts or its work to balance revitalization with affordability? 
 
 
 
